Cooperation, Contest, and Co-optation : Freedom of Expression and Positive Obligations in EU Social Media Content Regulation by Hiltunen, Miikka
Cooperation, Contest, and Co-optation: 
Freedom of Expression and Positive Obligations in EU Social 
Media Content Regulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Miikka Hiltunen 
014456624 
 
Pro gradu -tutkielma 
Helsingin yliopisto 
Oikeustieteellinen tiedekunta  
Valtiosääntöoikeus; OTM-836S 
Ohjaaja: Tuomas Ojanen 
4 elokuuta 2020 
I 
 
Tiedekunta – Fakultet – Faculty 
 Oikeustieteellinen tiedekunta 
Koulutusohjelma – Utbildingsprogram – Degree Programme 
Oikeustieteen maisterin koulutusohjelma 
 
Tekijä – Författare – Author 
 Miikka Hiltunen 
Työn nimi – Arbetets titel – Title 
 Cooperation, Contest, and Co-optation: Freedom of Expression and Positive Obligations in EU Social Media Content Regulation 
Oppiaine/Opintosuunta – Läroämne/Studieinriktning – Subject/Study track 
valtiosääntöoikeus 
Työn laji – Arbetets art – Level 
 Pro gradu -tutkielma 
Aika – Datum – Month and year 
 4.8.2020 
Sivumäärä – Sidoantal – Number of pages 
 82 
Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract 
 
The thesis analyzes how the EU regulates freedom of expression on social media and how the regulation transfers 
power. It interrogates EU’s positive fundamental right obligation to put in place a legislative and administrative 
framework to prevent and redress different online harms. By taking up a critical method that analyzes the 
contradiction between efficiency and democracy, the thesis focuses on the changes that are happening to positive 
obligations as part of the fundamental rights structure. The thesis links the structural changes to the advancement of 
neoliberal governmentality that favors managerial techniques such as cost-benefit analysis and privatization in 
government. 
 
After laying out the foundations, the thesis is divided into two parts. The first part departs from the observation that 
the EU has pressure to shift positive obligations regarding the protection of people’s freedom of expression and 
related rights to social media companies. It develops the general analytical framework of cooperation and contest 
which is informed by power struggles. In cooperation, the interests of the EU and the companies in rights protection 
are considered aligned. In contest, the focus is on situations where the interests diverge and where the EU and the 
companies deploy their respective strategies to assert their power unilaterally. The second part contextualizes the 
framework of cooperation and contest in three case studies. The case studies analyze three different initiatives to 
regulate social media introduced by the EU between 2016 and 2019. The initiatives are EU Code of conduct on hate 
speech, the revised Directive on audiovisual media services, and the Regulation on preventing the dissemination of 
terrorist content online. The case studies locate cooperation and contest in regulation through the analysis of relevant 
policy documents and other preparatory materials of the legislative processes. 
 
The thesis concludes that the emerging regulatory framework for rights protection exhibits hybridity that results from 
the interconnectedness of public and private power. While the framework can provide more effectiveness for the EU 
in protecting rights and public interest on social media, by deploying managerial techniques it also tends to sideline 
the considerations for people’s democratic self-determination, and reinforce the power of the executive and large 
social media companies. It is argued that new ways to enhance the horizontality of rights are needed for people to 
assert their rights against emerging hybrid power. 
 
Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords 
 Freedom of expression, Positive obligations, Neoliberalism, Social media, Platform power 
Ohjaaja tai ohjaajat – Handledare – Supervisor or supervisors 
Tuomas Ojanen 
Säilytyspaikka – Förvaringställe – Where deposited 
 
Helsingin yliopiston kirjasto, Helsingfors universitets bibliotek, Helsinki University Library  
Muita tietoja – Övriga uppgifter – Additional information 
 
 
 
II 
 
 
Contents 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................ IV 
Primary Sources ..................................................................................................................................... IV 
Secondary Sources ................................................................................................................................ XII 
Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................................... XXIV 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Scope of Analysis, Research Questions, and Definitions ..................................................................... 1 
1.1.1 Scope and Research Questions ..................................................................................................... 1 
1.1.2 Definitions .................................................................................................................................. 4 
1.2 Method and Structure ......................................................................................................................... 6 
2. Foundations: Freedom of Expression and Content Moderation .........................................................11 
2.1 Fundamental Right Obligations .........................................................................................................11 
2.2 Hard Content Moderation and e-Commerce Directive........................................................................15 
2.3 Soft Content Moderation: Personalization as Commodified Governance ............................................20 
3. General Framework of Cooperation and Contest ................................................................................26 
3.1 Decentring Positive Obligations ........................................................................................................26 
3.1.1 Challenges for Regulating Social Media .....................................................................................27 
3.1.2 Cooperation and Contest .............................................................................................................29 
3.2 Legislative Framework: Cooperation in Norm-setting ........................................................................30 
3.2.1 Voluntariness Conundrum, Co-regulation, and Multistakeholderism ...........................................32 
3.2.2 Law and the Lack of Normative Refinement ...............................................................................35 
3.3 Administrative Framework: Cooperation in Monitoring and Enforcement .........................................37 
3.3.1 Monitoring Regulatory Chains ....................................................................................................37 
3.3.2 Bargaining Enforcement and Impaired Horizontality ..................................................................40 
3.4 EU Contest: Fiat Interdiction .............................................................................................................43 
3.5 Company Contest: Free Expression Management ..............................................................................45 
3.5.1 Platform Companies as Fundamental Right Subjects ...................................................................45 
3.5.2 Free Expression Protection vs Free Expression Management ......................................................46 
III 
 
4. Case Studies of Cooperation and Contest ............................................................................................51 
4.1 Code of Conduct on Hate Speech ......................................................................................................51 
4.1.1 EU Internet Forum......................................................................................................................52 
4.1.2 Code and Its Monitoring .............................................................................................................54 
4.2 Directive on Audiovisual Media Services ..........................................................................................57 
4.2.1 Violence, Hatred, and Organizational Responsibility ..................................................................58 
4.2.2 (Un)viability of Co-regulation ....................................................................................................59 
4.2.3 Irish Online Safety & Media Regulation Bill...............................................................................62 
4.3 Regulation on Preventing Terrorist Content Online............................................................................65 
4.3.1 EU’s Attempt of Fiat Interdiction ...............................................................................................66 
4.3.2 Removal Orders by Competent Authorities .................................................................................67 
4.3.3 Referrals to Platform Companies ................................................................................................69 
4.3.4 Companies’ Proactive/Specific Measures ....................................................................................72 
5. Conclusion: Between Co-optation and Compromise ...........................................................................75 
5.1 Regulatory Framework and the ECtHR Jurisprudence .......................................................................76 
5.2 Summary and the Threat of Co-optation ............................................................................................79 
5.3 Toward Compromise? – Final Remarks .............................................................................................80 
 
IV 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Primary Sources 
EU legislation 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391 
Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online (2016) <https://bit.ly/3i3Jzzh> accessed 22 May 
2020 
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/47 
Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and 
expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law and national laws transposing it [2008] OJ 
L328/55 
Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects 
of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on 
electronic commerce') [2000] OJ L178/1 
Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 amending 
Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual 
Media Services Directive) in view of changing market realities [2018] OJ L303/69 
EU Code of Practice on Disinformation (2018) <https://bit.ly/33hRTHt> accessed 19 July 2020 
Interinstitutional agreement on better law-making [2003] OJ C321/1 
Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the 
European Commission on Better Law-Making [2016] OJ L123/1 
Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European 
Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 
2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA [2016] OJ L135/53 
 
 
 
V 
 
ECHR 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
Human Rights, as amended) 
 
Case-law 
ECtHR 
Case "relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium" v Belgium 
(Belgian Linguistic case) App nos 1474/62 to 2126/64 (ECtHR, 23 July 1968) 
Handyside v the United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976) 
Airey v Ireland App no 6289/73 (ECtHR, 9 October 1979) 
Marckx v Belgium App no 6833/74 (ECtHR, 13 June 1979)  
Young, James and Webster v The United Kingdom App nos 7601/76 and 7806/77 (ECtHR, 13 August 1981) 
X and Y v the Netherlands App no 8978/80 (ECtHR, 26 March 1985) 
Rees v the United Kingdom App no 9532/81 (ECtHR, 17 October 1986) 
Plattform “Ärtze für das Leben” v Austria App no 10126/82 (ECtHR, 21 June 1988) 
Costello-Roberts v the United Kingdom App no 13134/87 (ECtHR, 25 March 1993) 
Jersild v Denmark App no 15890/89 (ECtHR, 23 September 1994) 
Osman v the United Kingdom ECHR 1998-VIII 101 
Özgür Gündem v Turkey ECHR 2000–III 1 
VgT Verein Gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland ECHR 2001–VI 243 
Appleby and Others v the United Kingdom ECHR 2003–VI 165 
Assanidze v Georgia ECHR 2004–II 221 
Öneryildiz v Turkey ECHR 2004–XII 79 
Sychev v Ukraine App no 4773/02 (ECtHR, 11 October 2005) 
Storck v Germany ECHR 2005–VI 111 
Anheuser-Busch Inc v Portugal ECHR 2007–I 39 
VI 
 
KU v Finland ECHR 2008–V 125 
Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v Sweden ECHR App no 23883/06 (ECtHR, 16 December 2008) 
Times Newspapers Ltd (nos 1 and 2) v the United Kingdom ECHR 2009–I 377 
Uzun v Germany ECHR 2010–VI 1 
Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v Ukraine ECHR 2011–II 393 
Centro Europa 7 Srl and Di Stefano v Italy ECHR 2012–III 339 
Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey ECHR 2012–VI 505 
Animal Defenders International v the United Kingdom 2013–II 203 
Söderman v Sweden ECHR 2013–VI 203 
Hämäläinen v Finland ECHR 2014–IV 369  
Delfi v Estonia ECHR 2015–II 319 
Cengiz and Others v Turkey ECHR 2015–VIII 177 
Roman Zakharov v Russia ECHR 2015–VIII 205 
Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v Hungary App no 22947/13 (ECtHR, 2 February 
2016) 
Egill Einarsson v Iceland App no 24703/15 (ECtHR, 7 November 2017) 
Ivashchenko v Russia App no 61064/10 (ECtHR, 13 February 2018) 
Big Brother Watch and Others v the United Kingdom App nos 58170/13, 62322/14 and 24960/15 (ECtHR, 
13 September 2018) 
Magyar Jeti Zrt v Hungary App no 11257/16 (ECtHR, 4 December 2018) 
 
CJEU 
Case C-9/56 Meroni & Co Industrie Metallurgiche SpA v High Authority of the ECSC [1958] ECR 133 
Case C-10/56 Meroni & Co Industrie Metallurgiche SpA v High Authority of the ECSC [1958] ECR 157 
Joined Cases C-236/08–C-238/08 Google France and Google Inc. v Louis Vuitton Malletier and others 
[2010] ECR I–2417  
Case C-324/09 L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others [2011] ECR I–6011 
VII 
 
Case C‑360/10 Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v Netlog NV, 
EU:C:2012:85 
Case C-286/12 European Commission v Hungary, EU:C:2012:687  
Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105 
Case C-270/12 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council 
of the European Union (ESMA), EU:C:2014:18 
Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and 
Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others, EU:C:2014:238 
Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and 
Mario Costeja González, EU:C:2014:317 
Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, EU:C:2015:650 
Case C-205/15 Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Brașov (DGRFP) v Vasile Toma and 
Biroul Executorului Judecătoresc Horațiu-Vasile Cruduleci, EU:C:2016:499 
Case C-619/18 European Commission v Poland, EU:C:2019:531 
Case C-507/17 Google LLC, successor in law to Google Inc v Commission nationale de l'informatique et des 
libertés (CNIL), EU:C:2019:772 
Case C‑18/18 Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook Ireland Limited, EU:C:2019:821 
Case C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited and Maximillian Schrems, 
EU:C:2020:559 
 
EU policy documents 
European Commission 
Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, ‘Countering illegal hate speech online – EU 
Code of Conduct ensures swift response’ IP/19/805 
Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality and Directorate-General for Justice and 
Consumers, ‘Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech online: Fourth evaluation confirms self-
regulation works’ (Factsheet 4th round) (February 2019) <https://bit.ly/3gmNlTD> accessed 26 July 2020 
VIII 
 
Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality and Directorate-General for Justice and 
Consumers, ‘How the Code of Conduct helped countering illegal hate speech online’ (February 2019) 
<https://bit.ly/33fgsVv> accessed 26 July 2020 
European Commission, ‘Behavioural Study on Advertising and Marketing Practices in Online Social Media’ 
(Final Report, June 2018) 
European Commission, ‘Better Regulation Toolbox: TOOL #18 – The choice of policy instruments’ 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/better-regulation-toolbox-18_en> accessed 18 June 2020 
European Commission, ‘Better Regulation Toolbox, Tool #57: Analytical methods to compare options or 
assess performance’ <https://bit.ly/2XjYVaO> accessed 25 July 2020 
European Commission, ‘Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech online: Questions and answers 
on the fourth evaluation’ MEMO/19/806 
European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Preventing radicalisation to 
terrorism and violent extremism: strengthening the EU's response’ COM (2013) 941 final 
European Commission, ‘Digital Single Market: updated audiovisual rules’ MEMO/18/4093 
European Commission, ‘Follow up to the European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a 
regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content 
online’ SP (2019) 440 
European Commission, ‘Impact assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision 
of audiovisual media services in view of changing market realities’ SWD (2016) 168 final 
European Commission, ‘Impact assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online’ SWD 
(2018) 408 final 
European Commission, ‘Launch of the EU Internet Forum Brussels, 3 December 2015’ (Redacted), Ref 
Ares(2016)1160160 - 07/03/2016 <https://bit.ly/314bsjy> accessed 22 May 2020 
European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services in view of 
changing market realities’ COM (2016) 287 final 
IX 
 
European Commission, ‘Proposal of a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online’ COM (2018) 640 final 
European Commission, ‘Revision of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD)’ (5 December 
2018) <https://bit.ly/3194FoR> accessed 6 June 2020 
European Commission, ‘Shaping the Digital Single Market’ (last update 19 February 2020) 
<https://bit.ly/3gl6mWQ> accessed 2 June 2020. 
European Commission DG Home Affairs, ‘Jour Fixe Meeting: EU Internet Forum’ (Redacted) (10 June 
2015) 3 <https://bit.ly/2Db1zZC> accessed 22 May 2020 
European Commission Directorate-General Migration and Home Affairs, ‘Launch of EU Internet Forum: 
Summary of Meeting’ (Redacted) Ref Ares(2016)1158809 (7 March 2016) <https://bit.ly/3gnrQlU> 
accessed 22 May 2020 
European Commission Press Release, ‘EU Internet Forum: Bringing together governments, Europol and 
technology companies to counter terrorist content and hate speech online’ IP/15/6243. 
European Commission Press Release, ‘EU Internet Forum: A major step forward in curbing terrorist content 
on the internet’ IP/16/4328 
European Commission Press Release, ‘Fighting Terrorism Online: Internet Forum pushes for automatic 
detection of terrorist propaganda’ IP/17/5105 
European Commission Secretary General, Decision of the Secretary General on behalf of the Commission 
pursuant to Article 4 of the implementing rules to Regulation (EC) N° 1049/20011, C (2016) 2065 final 
<https://bit.ly/3fgbJFm> accessed 22 May 2020 
 
Council of the European Union 
Council of the European Union, ‘Assessment of the Code of Conduct on Hate Speech online: State of Play’ 
(27 September 2019) 12522/19 
Council of the European Union, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services in view of 
changing market realities (First reading) – general approach’ (24 May 2017) 9691/17 
Council of the European Union, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online – general approach’ (3 December 2018) 14978/18 
X 
 
EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, ‘EU CTC input for the preparation of the informal meeting of Justice 
and Home Affairs Ministers in Riga on 29 January 2015’ (17 January 2015) DS 1035/15 
 
European Parliament 
European Parliament, ‘Draft Report with recommendations to the Commission on Digital Services Act: 
Improving the functioning of the Single Market’ 2020/2018 (INL) 
European Parliament legislative resolution of 17 April 2019 on the proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online, P8_TA (2019) 
0421 
European Parliament, ‘Report on competition policy – annual report 2019’ P9_TA (2020) 0158 
European Parliamentary Research Service, ‘The Audiovisual Media Services Directive: State of Play’ 
(November 2015) PE 571.329 
European Parliamentary Research Service, ‘Protecting the Rule of Law in the EU: Existing Mechanisms and 
Possible Improvements’ (November 2019) PE 642.280 
 
Other EU documents 
EDiMA, ‘Consultation on Directive 2010/13/EU on audio-visual media services (AVMSD) A media 
framework for the 21st century: Questionnaire’ (July–September 2015) 17 <https://bit.ly/33kKzuK> 
accessed 8 June 2020 
ERGA (European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services), ‘Analysis & Discussion Paper to 
contribute to the consistent implementation of the revised Audiovisual Media Services (AVMS) Directive’ 
(2018) <https://erga-online.eu/?page_id=14> accessed 25 July 2020 
EU Internet Referral Unit, ‘Transparency Report 2018’ (20 December 2019) <https://bit.ly/33i15LS> 
accessed 15 May 2020 
European Ombudsman, Decision in case 292/2016/AMF on the European Commission´s handling of a 
request for access to documents related to the launch of the EU Internet Forum (5 July 2017) 
Fiedler K (EDRi), ‘Complaint about maladministration’ (17 February 2016) <https://bit.ly/2Dohzaq> 
accessed 22 May 2020 
XI 
 
FRA (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights), ‘Proposal for a Regulation on preventing the 
dissemination of terrorist content online and its fundamental rights implications: Opinion of the European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights’ (12 February 2019) FRA Opinion 2/2019 
 
United Nations documents 
‘Letter of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy and the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’ (7 December 2018) OL 
OTH 71/2018 
UNCHR, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression’ (11 May 2016) UN Doc A/HRC/32/38 
UNCHR ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences on 
Online Violence against Women and Girls from a Human Rights Perspective’ (18 June 2018) UN Doc 
A/HRC/38/47 
UNCHR ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression’ (9 October 2019) UN Doc A/74/486 
 
Council of Europe documents 
Council of Europe, ‘Liability and Jurisdictional Issues in Online Defamation Cases’ (September 2019) DGI 
(2019) 04 
Council of Europe (Rapporteur Karen Yeung), ‘Responsibility and AI: A study of the implications of 
advanced digital technologies (including AI systems) for the concept of responsibility within a human rights 
framework’ (September 2019) Study DGI (2019) 05 
 
Ireland policy documents 
Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment, ‘General Scheme of the Online Safety & 
Media Regulation Bill 2019: Amending the Broadcasting Act 2009’ (January 2019) <https://bit.ly/33jN0xq> 
accessed 10 June 2020 
XII 
 
Facebook Ireland Limited, ‘Public Consultation on the Regulation of Harmful Content on Online Platforms 
and the Implementation of the revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive: Submission of Facebook 
Ireland Limited’ (2019) <https://bit.ly/2PirOjb> accessed 10 June 2020 
Google, ‘Public consultation on the regulation of harmful content on online platforms and the 
implementation of the revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive’ (2019) <https://bit.ly/2PirOjb> 
accessed 10 June 2020 
 
Secondary Sources 
Books and articles 
Abbott KW, Levi-faur D and Snidal D, ‘Theorizing Regulatory Intermediaries: The RIT Model’ (2017) 610 
The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 14 
—— and others, ‘Competence versus Control: The Governor’s Dilemma’ (2019) Regulation & Governance 1 
<https://bit.ly/2BUxVat> accessed 20 May 2020 
AccessNow, ‘Two Years Under the EU GDPR: An Implementation Progress Report’ (May 2020) 
<https://bit.ly/33jMCyU> accessed 15 June 2020 
Alexy R, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Julian Rivers tr, OUP 2002) 
Amalfitano C, General principles of EU law and the Protection of Fundamental Rights (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2018) 
Ananny M, ‘Making up Political People: How Social Media Create the Ideals, Definitions, and Probabilities 
of Political Speech’ (2020) 4 Georgetown Law Technology Review 351 
—— and Crawford K, ‘Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of the Transparency Ideal and Its Application 
to Algorithmic Accountability’ (2018) 20 New Media & Society 973 
Andersen J and Søe SO, ‘Communicative Actions We Live by: The Problem with Fact-checking, Tagging or 
Flagging Fake News – The Case of Facebook’ (2020) 35 European Journal of Communication 126 
Ayres I and Braithwaite J, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (OUP 1992) 
Balkin JM, ‘Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory’ (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 743 
—— ‘Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot’ in Mark A Graber, Sanford Levinson and Mark Tushnet 
(eds), Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? (OUP 2018) 
—— 'Free Speech Is a Triangle' (2018) 118 Columbia Law Review 2011 
XIII 
 
Barbour C, 'Between Politics and Law: Hannah Arendt and the Subject of Rights' in Marco Goldoni and 
Christopher McCorkindale (eds), Hannah Arendt and the Law (Hart Publishing 2012) 
Bassini M, ‘Fundamental Rights and Private Enforcement in the Digital Age’ (2019) 25 European Law 
Journal 182 
Beijer M, The Limits of Fundamental Rights Protection by the EU: The Scope for the Development of 
Positive Obligations (Intersentia 2017) 
Benkler Y, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom (Yale 
University Press 2006) 
—— ‘Degrees of Freedom, Dimensions of Power’ (2016) 145 Daedalus 18 
Birch K, Chiappetta M and Artyushina A, ‘The Problem of Innovation in Technoscientific Capitalism: Data 
Rentiership and the Policy Implications of Turning Personal Digital Data into a Private Asset’ (in press, 
2020) Policy Studies <https://bit.ly/3hWpOcP> accessed 23 July 2020 
Birnhack MD and Elkin-Koren N, ‘The Invisible Handshake: The Reemergence of the State in the Digital 
Environment’ (2003) 8 Virginia Journal of Law and Technology 1 
Black J, ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding The Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a 'Post-
regulatory' World’ (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 103 
Boonen C, ‘Limits to the Politics of Subjective Rights: Reading Marx After Lefort’ (2019) 30 Law & 
Critique 179 
Britton-Purdy J and others, ‘Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-
Century Synthesis’ (2020) 129 The Yale Law Journal 1784 
Busch C, ‘Self-regulation and Regulatory Intermediation in the Platform Economy’ in Marta Cantero Gamito 
and Hans-W Micklitz (eds), The Role of the EU in Transnational Legal Ordering: Standards, Contracts and 
Codes (Edward Elgar Publishing 2020) 
Cafaggi F and Pistor K, ‘Regulatory Capabilities: A Normative Framework for Assessing the Distributional 
Effects of Regulation’ (2015) 9 Regulation & Governance 95 
Callamard A, 'The Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors' in Rikke Frank Jørgensen (ed), Human 
Rights in the Age of Platforms (MIT Press 2019) 
Cappello M (ed), Self- and Co-regulation in the New AVMSD (IRIS Special, European Audiovisual 
Observatory 2019) 
Castells M, ‘The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global 
Governance’ (2008) 616 The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 78 
XIV 
 
—— The Rise of the Network Society (2nd edn, Wiley-Blackwell 2010) 
Citron DK, 'Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep' (2018) 93 Notre Dame Law 
Review 1035 
Coche E, ‘Privatised Enforcement and the Right to Freedom of Expression in a World Confronted with 
Terrorism Propaganda Online’ (2018) 7(4) Internet Policy Review 1 
Cohen JE 'Affording Fundamental Rights: A Provocation Inspired by Mireille Hildebrandt' (2017) 4 Critical 
Analysis of Law 78 
—— Between Truth and Power: Legal Constructions of Informational Capitalism (OUP 2019) 
—— ‘Tailoring Election Regulation: The Platform Is the Frame’ (2020) 4 Georgetown Law Technology 
Review 641 
Couldry N and Kallinikos J, 'Ontology' in Jean Burgess, Alice Marwick and Thomas Poell (eds), The SAGE 
Handbook of Social Media (SAGE Publications 2017) 
Dobber T, Fathaigh RÓ and Borgesius FJZ, ‘The Regulation of Online Political Micro-targeting in Europe’ 
(2019) 8(4) Internet Policy Review 1 
Edwards L, '‘With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility?': The Rise of Platform Liability' in Lilian 
Edwards (ed), Law, Policy and the Internet (Hart Publishing 2019) 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Freedom to Conduct a Business: Exploring the 
Dimensions of a Fundamental Right (Publications Office of the European Union 2015) 
Finck M, 'Digital Co-regulation: Designing a Supranational Legal Framework for the Platform Economy' 
(2017) LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 15/2017 <https://bit.ly/3fpMSPk> accessed 23 March 2020 
—— ‘Automated Decision-Making and Administrative Law’ (2019) Max Planck Institute for Innovation & 
Competition Research Paper, No. 19-10 <https://bit.ly/39SVM6P> accessed 20 June 2020 
Fontanelli F, ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union and the Illusion of Balancing in Internet-Related 
Disputes’ in Oreste Pollicino and Graziella Romeo (eds), The Internet and Constitutional Law: The 
Protection of Fundamental Rights and Constitutional Adjudication in Europe (Routledge 2016) 
Frantziou E, The Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights in the European Union: A Constitutional Analysis 
(OUP 2019) 
—— '(Most of) the Charter of Fundamental Rights is Horizontally Applicable' (2019) 15 European 
Constitutional Law Review 306 
XV 
 
Gardbaum S, 'The Structure and Scope of Constitutional Rights' in Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg (eds), 
Comparative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 
Gillespie T, Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, Content Moderation, and the Hidden Decisions That 
Shape Social Media (Yale University Press 2018) 
—— 'Platforms Are Not Intermediaries' (2018) 2 Georgetown Law Technology Review 198 
Gordon C, ‘Governmental Rationality: An Introduction’ in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller 
(eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality: With Two Lectures by and an Interwiev with Michel 
Foucault (University of Chicago Press 1991) 
Gorwa R, 'The Platform Governance Triangle: Conceptualising the Informal Regulation of Online Content' 
(2019) 8(2) Internet Policy Review 1 
—— ‘What Is Platform Governance?’ (2019) 22 Information, Communication & Society 854 
—— Binns R and Katzenbach C, ‘Algorithmic Content Moderation: Technical and Political Challenges in 
the Automation of Platform Governance’ (2020)(Jan–Jun) Big Data & Society 1 
—— and Ash TG, ‘Democratic Transparency in the Platform Society’ in Nate Persily and Josh Tucker (eds), 
Social Media and Democracy: The State of the Field and Prospects for Reform (forthcoming, CUP 2020) 
<https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/ehcy2/> accessed 28 May 2020 
Graber CB, ‘Artificial Intelligence, Affordances and Fundamental Rights’ in Mireille Hildebrandt and 
Kieron O’Hara (eds), Life and the Law in the Era of Data-driven Agency (Edward Elgar Publishing 2020) 
Grewal DS and Purdy J, ‘Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism’ (2014) 77 Law & Contemporary Problems 1 
Grimmelmann J, ‘The Virtues of Moderation’ (2015) 17 Yale Journal of Law & Technology 42 
—— 'The Platform Is the Message' (2018) 2 Georgetown Law Technology Review 217 
Helberger N, ‘The Political Power of Platforms: How Current Attempts to Regulate Misinformation Amplify 
Opinion Power’ (2020) Digital Journalism <https://bit.ly/3hY3akg> accessed 27 July 2020. 
Hildebrandt M, Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 
Hoffmann AL, Proferes N and Zimmer M, ‘“Making the World More Open and Connected”: Mark 
Zuckerberg and the Discursive Construction of Facebook and Its Users’ (2018) 20 New Media & Society 
199 
Hofmann J, Katzenbach C and Gollatz K, ‘Between Coordination and Regulation: Finding the Governance 
in Internet Governance’ (2017) 19 New Media & Society 1406 
XVI 
 
Ingram JD, 'What Is a “Right to Have Rights”? Three Images of the Politics of Human Rights' (2008) 102 
American Political Science Review 401 
Jørgensen RF, 'Framing Human Rights: Exploring Storytelling within Internet Companies' (2018) 21 
Information, Communication & Society 340 
—— ‘Rights Talk: In the Kingdom of Online Giants’ in Rikke Frank Jørgensen (ed), Human Rights in the 
Age of Platforms (MIT Press 2019) 
—— ‘When Private Actors Govern Human Rights’ in Ben Wagner, Mattias C Kettemann and Kilian Vieth, 
Human Rights and Digital Technology (Edward Elgar Publishing 2019) 
—— and Møller Pedersen A, ‘Online Service Providers as Human Rights Arbiters’ in Mariarosaria Taddeo 
and Luciano Floridi (eds), The Responsibilities of Online Service Providers (Springer 2017) 
—— and Zuleta L, 'Private Governance of Freedom of Expression on Social Media Platforms' (2020) 41(1) 
Nordicom 51 
Kapczynski A, ‘The Law of Informational Capitalism’ (Book review) (2020) 129 The Yale Law Journal 
1460 
Kaye D, Speech police: The Global Struggle to Govern the Internet (Columbia Global Reports 2019) 
Keller D, ‘Internet Platforms: Observations on Speech, Danger, and Money’ (2018) Hoover Institution 
Essay, Aegis Series Paper No. 1807 <https://bit.ly/31dLrhM> accessed 20 June 2020 
—— ‘Who Do You Sue?: State and Platform Hybrid Power over Online Speech’ (2019) Hoover Institution 
Essay, Aegis Series Paper No. 1902 <https://hvr.co/39PBzz1> accessed 20 March 2020 
—— and Leerssen P, ‘Facts and Where Find Them: Empirical Research on Internet Platforms and Content 
Moderation’ in Nate Persily and Josh Tucker (eds), Social Media and Democracy: The State of the Field and 
Prospects for Reform (forthcoming, CUP 2020) <https://bit.ly/2EJAOfh> accessed 16 July 2020 
Khoury S and White D, Corporate Human Rights Violations: Global Prospects for Legal Action (Routledge 
2017) 
Klonick K, 'The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech' (2018) 131 
Harvard Law Review 1598 
Korpisaari P, ’Sananvapaus verkossa: yksilöön kohdistuva vihapuhe ja verkkoalustan ylläpitäjän vastuu’ 
(2019) Lakimies 928 
Koulu R, Law, Technology and Dispute Resolution: Privatisation of Coercion (Routledge 2019) 
XVII 
 
Kuczerawy A, Intermediary Liability and Freedom of Expression in the EU: From Concepts to Safeguards 
(Intersentia 2018) 
—— ‘The Proposed Regulation on Preventing the Dissemination of Terrorist Content Online: Safeguards and 
Risks for Freedom of Expression’ Center for Democracy and Technology (5 December 2018) 9 
<https://tinyurl.com/y4mr7wyj> accessed 15 March 2020 
Laidlaw EB, Regulating Speech in Cyberspace: Gatekeepers, Human Rights and Corporate Responsibility 
(CUP 2015) 
Land MK, ‘Regulating Private Harms Online: Content Regulation under Human Rights Law’ in Rikke Frank 
Jørgensen (ed), Human Rights in the Age of Platforms (MIT Press 2019) 
Lavrysen L, Human Rights in a Positive State: Rethinking the Relationship between Positive and Negative 
Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (Intersentia 2016) 
Leerssen P, 'Cut Out by the Middle Man: The Free Speech Implications of Social Network Blocking and 
Banning in the EU' (2015) 6 Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and Electronic 
Commerce Law 99 
—— ‘The Soap Box as a Black Box: Regulating Transparency in Social Media Recommender Systems’ 
(SSRN 2020) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544009> accessed 17 July 2020 
Leino P, ‘Secrecy, Efficiency, Transparency in EU Negotiations: Conflicting Paradigms?’ (2017) 5 Politics 
and Governance 6 
Liscow Z, ‘Is Efficiency Biased?’ (2018) 85 The University of Chicago Law Review 1649 
Lynskey O, ‘Regulating “Platform Power”’ (2017) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 1/2017, 
28 < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2921021> accessed 25 May 2020 
Maréchal N and Roberts Biddle E, ‘It's Not Just the Content, It's the Business Model: Democracy’s Online 
Speech Challenge’ Ranking Digital Rights (17 March 2020) 
—— MacKinnon R and Dheere J, ‘Getting to the Source of Infodemics: It’s the Business Model’ Ranking 
Digital Rights (26 May 2020) 
Marsden CT, Internet Co-regulation: European Law, Regulatory Governance and Legitimacy in Cyberspace 
(CUP 2011) 
—— ’Prosumer Law and Network Platform Regulation: The Long View Towards Creating Offdata’ (2018) 2 
Georgetown Law Technology Review 376 
XVIII 
 
Maroni M, ‘The Liability of Internet Intermediaries and the European Court of Human Rights’ in Tuomas 
Ojanen and Bilyana Petkova (eds), Fundamental Rights Protection Online: The Future Regulation Of 
Intermediaries (forthcoming, Edward Elgar Publishing 2020) 
Mir JB and Bassini M, ‘Freedom of Expression in the Internet: Main Trends of the Case Law of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ in Oreste Pollicino and Graziella Romeo (eds), The Internet and 
Constitutional Law: The Protection of Fundamental Rights and Constitutional Adjudication in Europe 
(Routledge 2016) 
Morgan B and Yeung K, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Materials (CUP 2007) 
Morozov E, To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism (Public Affairs 2013) 
Moyn S, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (Harvard University Press 2018) 
Naarttijärvi M, ‘Legality and Democratic Deliberation in Black Box Policing’ (2019) Technology and 
Regulation 35 
Nieborg DB and Helmond A, ‘The Political Economy of Facebook’s Platformization in the Mobile 
Ecosystem: Facebook Messenger as a Platform Instance’ (2019) 41 Media, Culture & Society 196 
Ohm P, ‘Regulating at Scale’ (2018) 2 Georgetown Law Technology Review 546 
Palmer S, 'Privatization and Human Rights in the United Kingdom' in Tsvi Kahana and Anat Scolnicov 
(eds), Boundaries of State, Boundaries of Rights (CUP 2016) 
Pariser E, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding from You (Penguin 2012) 
Pasquale F, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information (Harvard 
University Press 2015) 
—— ‘The Automated Public Sphere’ in Ann Rudinow Sætnan, Ingrid Schneider and Nicola Green (eds), The 
Politics and Policies of Big Data: Big Data, Big Brother? (Routledge 2018) 
Petre C, Duffy BE and Hund E, ‘“Gaming the System”: Platform Paternalism and the Politics of Algorithmic 
Visibility’ (2019)(October–December) Social Media + Society 1 
Pollicino O, ‘Metaphors and Judicial Frame: Why Legal Imagination (Also) Matters in the Protection of 
Fundamental Rights in the Digital Age’ in Bilyana Petkova and Tuomas Ojanen (eds), Fundamental Rights 
Protection Online (forthcoming, Edward Elgar Publishing 2020) 
Quintel T and Ullrich C, ‘Self-Regulation of Fundamental Rights?: The EU Code of Conduct on Hate 
Speech, Related Initiatives and Beyond’ in Tuomas Ojanen and Bilyana Petkova (eds), Fundamental Rights 
Protection Online: The Future Regulation Of Intermediaries (forthcoming, Edward Elgar Publishing 2020) 
XIX 
 
Raymond M and DeNardis L, 'Multistakeholderism: Anatomy of an Inchoate Global Institution' (2015) 7 
International Theory 572 
Reed C and Murray A, Rethinking the Jurisprudence of Cyberspace (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018) 
Roberts A, ‘Privacy, Data Retention and Domination: Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for 
Communications’ (2015) 78 Modern Law Review 535 
Rubinstein IS, 'The Future of Self-regulation Is Co-regulation' in Evan Selinger, Jules Polonetsky and Omer 
Tene (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Consumer Privacy (Cambridge University Press 2018) 
Sander B, ‘Freedom of Expression in the Age of Online Platforms: The Promise and Pitfalls of a Human 
Rights-Based Approach to Content Moderation’ (2020) 43 Fordham Internal Law Journal 939 
Sarfaty GA, ‘Measuring Corporate Accountability Through Global Indicators’ in Sally Engle Merry, Kevin 
E Davis and Benedict Kingsbury (eds), The Quiet Power of Indicators: Measuring Governance, Corruption, 
and Rule of Law (CUP 2015) 
Savin A, ‘Regulating Internet Platforms in the EU: The Emergence of the ‘Level Playing Field’’ (2018) 34 
Computer Law & Security Review 1215 
Schneider I, ‘Bringing the State Back in: Big Data-based Capitalism, Disruption, and Novel Regulatory 
Approaches in Europe’ in Ann Rudinow Sætnan, Ingrid Schneider and Nicola Green (eds), The Politics and 
Policies of Big Data: Big Data, Big Brother? (Routledge 2018) 
Schwarz O, ‘Facebook Rules: Structures of Governance in Digital Capitalism and the Control of Generalized 
Social Capital’ (2019) 36 Theory, Culture and Society 117 
Schwemer SF, ‘Trusted Notifiers and the Privatization of Online Enforcement’ (2019) 35(6) Computer Law 
& Security Review 1 
Short J, ‘Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform’ (2011) 63 Hastings Law Journal 633 
—— Toffel MW and Hugil AR, ‘Monitoring Global Supply Chains’ (2016) 37 Strategic Management 
Journal 1878 
Sunstein CR and Thaler RH, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and Happiness (Revised 
edn, Penguin 2012) 
Susi M, 'The Internet Balancing Formula' (2019) 25 European Law Journal 198 
Susser D, Roessler B and Nissenbaum H, ‘Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World’ 
(2019) 4(1) Georgetown Law Technology Review 1 
Suzor NP, Lawless: The Secret Rules That Govern Our Digital Lives (CUP 2019) 
XX 
 
—— Seignior B and Singleton J, 'Non-consensual Porn and the Responsibilities of Online Intermediaries' 
(2017) 40 Melbourne University Law Review 1057 
—— and others, 'Human Rights by Design: The Responsibilities of Social Media Platforms to Address 
Gender‐Based Violence Online' (2019) 11(1) Policy & Internet 84 
Taylor E, The Privatization of Human Rights: Illusions of Consent, Automation and Neutrality (Centre for 
International Governance Innovation 2016) 
Urban JM, Karaganis J and Schofield B, ‘Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice’ (Version 2, 2016, 
updated March 2017) UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No 2755628 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755628> accessed 22 June 2020 
van der Sloot B, ‘A New Approach to the Right to Privacy, or How the European Court of Human Rights 
Embraced the Non-domination Principle’ (2018) 34 Computer Law & Security Review 539 
van Dijck J, Poell T and de Waal M, The Platform Society: Public Values in a Connective World (OUP 
2018) 
van Gestel R and van Lochem P, ‘Private Standards as a Replacement for Public Lawmaking?’ in Marta 
Cantero Gamito and Hans-W Micklitz (eds), The Role of the EU in Transnational Legal Ordering: 
Standards, Contracts and Codes (Edward Elgar Publishing 2020) 
Vieth K, ‘Policing ‘Online Radicalization’: The Framing of Europol’s Internet Referral Unit’ in Ben 
Wagner, Matthias C Kettemann and Kilian Vieth (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Digital 
Technology: Global Politics, Law and International Relations (Edward Elgar Publishing 2019) 
Wagner B, Global Free Expression: Governing the Boundaries of Internet Content (Springer 2016) 
—— ‘Liable, but Not in Control? Ensuring Meaningful Human Agency in Automated Decision-Making 
Systems’ (2019) 11 Policy & Internet 104 
Waldman AE, ‘Power, Process, and Automated Decision-making’ (2019) 88 Fordham Law Review 613 
Ward A, 'Remedies under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights' in Sionaidh Douglas-Scott and Nicholas 
Hatzis (eds), Research Handbook on EU Law and Human Rights (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 
Williams A, 'Human Rights in the EU' in Damian Chalmers and Anthony Arnull (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of European Union Law (OUP 2015) 
Woods L, ‘Social Media: It Is Not Just about Article 10’ in David Mangan and Lorna E Gillies (eds), The 
Legal Challenges of Social Media (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 
Xenos D, The Positive Obligations of the State under the European Convention of Human Rights (Routledge 
2012) 
XXI 
 
Yeung K, ‘Better Regulation, Administrative Sanctions and Constitutional Values’ (2013) 33 Legal Studies 
312 
—— ‘‘Hypernudge’: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by Design’ (2017) 20 Information, Communication 
& Society 118 
—— ‘Five Fears about Mass Predictive Personalization in an Age of Surveillance Capitalism’ (2018) 8 
International Data Privacy Law 258 
Zuboff S, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for the Future at the New Frontier of Power 
(Profile Books 2019) 
 
News articles  
‘Plans for ‘first-of-its-kind’ online safety regulator published’ Irish Legal News (10 January 2020) 
<https://bit.ly/3k5A0kY> accessed 10 June 2020 
Ackerman E and others, ‘A letter on justice and open debate’ Harper’s Magazine (7 July 2020) 
<https://harpers.org/a-letter-on-justice-and-open-debate/> accessed 19 July 2020 
Biddle S, Ribeiro PV and Dias T, ‘Invisible Censorship’ The Intercept (16 March 2020) 
<https://tinyurl.com/y4eolz7o> accessed 3 August 2020. 
Chen A, ‘The laborers who keep dick pics and beheadings out of your Facebook feed’ WIRED (23 October 
2014) <www.wired.com/2014/10/content-moderation/> accessed 16 July 2020 
Diresta R, ‘Free speech is not the same as free reach’ WIRED (20 October 2018) 
<www.wired.com/story/free-speech-is-not-the-same-as-free-reach/> accessed 19 July 2020 
Gorey C, ‘Online safety law could block social media sites for non-compliance’ Siliconrepublic (10 Jan 
2020) <www.siliconrepublic.com/companies/online-safety-law-ireland-details> accessed 10 June 2020 
Halliday J, ‘Twitter's Tony Wang: ‘We are the free speech wing of the free speech party’’ The Guardian (22 
March 2012) <https://bit.ly/3gnKf1I> accessed 22 May 2020 
Horwitz J and Seetharaman D, ‘Facebook executives shut down efforts to make the site less divisive’ 
Washington Post (26 May 2020) <https://on.wsj.com/2PdX4js> accessed 23 July 2020 
Lewis H, ‘How capitalism drives cancel culture’ (14 July 2020) <https://bit.ly/39O2Z8h> accessed 19 July 
2020 
Luckerson V, ‘Here’s how Facebook’s news feed actually works’ TIME (9 July 2015) 
<https://time.com/collection-post/3950525/facebook-news-feed-algorithm/> accessed 19 July 2020 
XXII 
 
McCarthy T, ‘Zuckerberg says Facebook won't be 'arbiters of truth' after Trump threat’ The Guardian (28 
May 2020) <https://bit.ly/3gnnTO6> accessed 16 July 2020 
Meyer R, ‘When a snuff film becomes unavoidable’ The Atlantic (26 August 2015) <https://bit.ly/3fm5D6n> 
accessed 6 June 2020 
Murphy, M and others, ‘Tech results: Amazon, Apple and Facebook earn record profits during pandemic’ 
The Telegraph (20 July 2020) <https://bit.ly/2DrFt4Y> accessed 2 August 2020 
Ranking J, ‘EU says China behind 'huge wave' of Covid-19 disinformation’ The Guardian (10 June 2020) 
<https://bit.ly/3hXZbUQ> accessed 2 August 2020 
Solon O, ‘Twitter launches another bid to tackle bots and abuse after years of promises’ The Guardian (1 
March 2018) <https://bit.ly/30jtzCY> accessed 22 May 2020 
Solon O, ‘Facebook ignored racial bias research, employees say’ NBC News (23 July 2020) 
<https://nbcnews.to/3fg9cLm> accessed 29 July 2020.   
Wintour P, ‘Mark Zuckerberg: Facebook must accept some state regulation’ The Guardian (15 February 
2020) <https://bit.ly/33pQ3nI> accessed 14 April 2020 
Wong JC, ‘Twitter to ban all political advertising, raising pressure on Facebook’ The Guardian (20 October 
2019) <https://bit.ly/39Qgnc2> accessed 19 July 2020 
 
Blog posts 
Ananny M, ‘Probably speech, maybe free: toward a probabilistic understanding of online expression and 
platform governance’ Knight First Amendment Institute (21 August 2019) <https://bit.ly/31ckHhW> 
(accessed 19 July 2020) 
Bickert M and Fishman B, ‘Hard Questions: What are we doing to stay ahead of terrorists?’ Facebook 
Newsroom (8 November 2018) <https://bit.ly/3gyq8hm> accessed 17 July 2020 
Butler C, ‘Official EU agencies falsely report more than 550 Archive.org URLs as terrorist content’ Internet 
Archive (10 April 2020) <https://bit.ly/2EFE0Zf> accessed 26 June 2020 
Gleicher N, ‘Removing more coordinated inauthentic behavior from Iran’ Facebook Newsroom (28 May 
2019) <https://about.fb.com/news/2019/05/removing-more-cib-from-iran/> accessed 23 July 2020 
Jeppesen J-H, Nosák D and Esposito P, ‘EU Tech Policy Brief: March 2020 Recap’ Center for Democracy & 
Technology (3 April 2020) <https://bit.ly/3gyq3KA> accessed 4 May 2020 
XXIII 
 
Keller D, ‘Broad Consequences of a Systemic Duty of Care for Platforms’ The Center for Internet and 
Society and Stanford Law School (1 June 2020) <https://stanford.io/2XkFFtG> accessed 29 June 2020 
Romero J, ‘Taking legal action against those who abuse our services’ Facebook Newsroom (18 June 2020) 
<https://about.fb.com/news/2020/06/automation-software-lawsuits/> accessed 19 July 2020. 
 
Websites 
EDiMA Website, <https://edima-eu.org/> accessed 8 June 2020 
EDRi, ‘EU Internet Forum against terrorist content and hate speech online: Document pool’ (10 March 
2016) <https://edri.org/eu-internet-forum-document-pool/> accessed 22 May 2020 
EDRi, ‘EDRi and Access Now withdraw from the EU Commission IT Forum discussions’ (31 May 2016) 
<https://bit.ly/2EJ7N3m> accessed 23 July 2020 
Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment, ‘Minister Bruton Publishes Draft Scheme 
of New Online Safety Law’ (10 January 2019) <https://bit.ly/3hZ7505> accessed 10 June 2020 
Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment, ‘Regulation of Harmful Online Content 
and the Implementation of the revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive’ (April 2019) 
<https://bit.ly/3grnZEk> accessed 10 June 2020 
Europol, ‘EU Internet Referral Unit - EU IRU: Monitoring terrorism online’ (2020) 
<www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/eu-internet-referal-unit-eu-iru> accessed 15 May 2020 
Facebook, ‘Community Standards’ Facebook Inc (2020) <www.facebook.com/communitystandards/> 
(accessed 25 February 2020) 
Facebook, ‘Data Policy’ Facebook Inc (19 April 2018) <www.facebook.com/about/privacy> accessed 24 
February 2020 
Facebook Inc, ‘Facebook Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2019 Results’ (29 January 2020) 
<https://bit.ly/3i5FCdr> accessed 14 April 2020 
Facebook, ‘Product Policy Forum Minutes’ Facebook Inc (15 November 2018) <https://bit.ly/2EFDnPn> 
accessed 22 May 2020 
Facebook Transparency, ‘Content Restrictions Based on Local Law: Jan – Jun 2019’ Facebook Inc 
<https://transparency.facebook.com/content-restrictions> accessed 17 April 2020 
OnlineCensorship.org, ’How to Appeal’ <https://tinyurl.com/y48x9ezr> accessed 22 July 2020 
‘Overview’ Amazon Mechanical Turk Inc <www.mturk.com/> accessed 2 August 2020 
XXIV 
 
PwC Ireland, ‘7 things you need to know about the proposed Online Safety and Media Regulation Bill’ (29 
January 2020) <https://pwc.to/2PeVu0N> accessed 6 June 2020 
Simonovic D and Kaye D, ‘UN experts urge States and companies to address online gender-based abuse but 
warn against censorship’ OHCHR (8 March 2017) <https://bit.ly/39PADuv> accessed 5 March 2020 
Twitter, ‘Defending and respecting the rights of people using our service’ Twitter Inc (2020) 
<https://bit.ly/33j7syH> accessed 17 April 2020 
Twitter, ‘Our Advocacy’ Twitter Inc (2020) <https://tinyurl.com/y256pwwa> accessed 7 March 2020 
Twitter, ‘Safety at Twitter’ Twitter, Inc (2020) <https://about.twitter.com/en_us/safety/safety-partners.html> 
accessed 15 March 2020 
Twitter Transparency Report, ‘Removal Requests – January to June 2019: No Action’ Twitter Inc (2020) 
<https://transparency.twitter.com/en/removal-requests.html> accessed 17 April 2020 
YouTube, ‘About’ YouTube LLC (2020) <www.youtube.com/intl/en-GB/about/> accessed 7 March 2020. 
YouTube, ‘YouTube for the Press’ YouTube LLC <www.youtube.com/about/press/> accessed 14 April 2 
 
Abbreviations 
CJEU    Court of Justice of the European Union 
ECHR    European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR    European Court of Human Rights 
EU IRU   Europol Internet Referral Unit 
FRA    European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
TFEU    Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
When thinking about the subject of this thesis, I started, as I believe one often starts with legal research, from 
a concern over an injustice in society that I had perceived and which for some reason had stuck to my mind. 
There is likely a host of explanations to why one perceives some societal injustices and not others or, why 
some perceived injustices stuck while others are ephemeral. The concern over an injustice stuck to my mind 
departs from the now so often repeated statement that it has probably already flattened to a banality. It is that 
now a handful of multinational corporations intermediate and disintermediate communication among people 
on network settings that have become to be labeled as ‘social media’. These are namely Facebook, YouTube, 
Twitter, and perhaps a couple others. 
I had understood that intermediation and disintermediation by Facebook and others would afford substantial 
influence on communication. Moreover, intermediation and disintermediation are not accidental but 
purposeful. I had also remarked the increasingly vocal concerns over how the intermediation and 
disintermediation by corporations implicate people’s wellbeing and produce myriad other harms that had 
proliferated on these networks, ranging from racial hatred and sexual harassment to election manipulation. 
However, more dauntingly I noticed that many had little understanding of why and how these harms had come 
into being (perhaps because I didn’t understand myself either) or little control to react to them.  
Yet I had taken note of the flurry of relevant initiatives set in motion by the EU. Some initiatives had already 
been implemented. They were imposing regulation – it was something. What I was finding troubling was that 
the regulation introduced for rights protection didn’t seem to interrogate the private power of 
(dis)intermediation, but rather it appeared to facilitate and cement it. The EU seemed to deeply involve the 
corporations in its own regulatory efforts. I started to look for a piece of fundamental rights doctrine that could 
serve as a backdrop against the change I thought I had observed. While there are undoubtedly other viable 
approaches that I could have opted, the ECtHR doctrine on state’s positive obligations resonated particularly 
well for me. Effectively, the positive obligations require a state to put in place an adequate legislative and 
administrative framework to prevent and remedy violations to fundamental rights, whether inflicted by public 
authorities or private actors. The conundrum, however, was that this was exactly what the EU seemed to be 
doing: implementing a regulatory and administrative framework for addressing harms related to these services. 
But was it ‘adequate’? Therefore, I ended up situating my thesis at the intersection of this fundamental rights 
‘regulation mandate’ and the actual regulatory practice incorporating the new trend of private involvement. 
1.1 Scope of Analysis, Research Questions, and Definitions 
1.1.1 Scope and Research Questions 
This thesis explores how the EU protects/implicates freedom of expression and information by regulating the 
user-generated content and adverts on social media, and how this regulation distributes power. One should be 
mindful that freedom of expression is hardly the only fundamental right implicated on social media but instead 
2 
 
a wide array of rights is at stake, ranging from non-discrimination to privacy to rights of the child and so on. 
However, I am approaching the issues on social media from the perspective of freedom of expression. Yet one 
must be wary here. The conventional truisms of freedom of expression and information may promote ideals 
and doomsday visions that might from time to time need rethinking. I am trying to avoid locking into such 
uncontested axioms too strictly. My point of departure for the argumentation in this thesis is that the 
requirements of freedom of expression are contextual and thus often far from self-evident, especially in the 
still relatively unexplored setting of social media. In addition, many issues online lend themselves to be 
assessed through free expression as well as with the lenses of other rights.1 Rights don’t always produce 
contradictory demands but are often concurrent and interdependent.2 Thus, it may at times be appropriate to 
involve other rights too, especially where they seem to connect with freedom of expression. However, data 
extraction on the Internet, for instance, is not central in this thesis. On top of this basis, I am putting forward 
four delineating points that draw the scope of analysis further.  
Firstly, my interest focuses on the degree of involvement of private actors, most prominently the social media 
companies, in the regulation of people’s freedom of expression. To be sure, remarks on ‘private enforcement’3 
and ‘privatization of human rights’4 have become somewhat commonplace in digital rights scholarship. In my 
view, however, those remarks have often produced slightly isolated criticisms without a systematic analysis of 
the broader framework through which the ‘privatization’ is to be actuated. From this it follows that my thesis 
concerns primarily the structure of freedom of expression on social media. The structure of rights is not widely 
held to be an independent sub-field of rights study.5 However, according to Gardbaum: ‘The structure of 
constitutional rights can be usefully distinguished from their substance. (…) [T]he structure is the underlying 
framework – set of concepts, principles, doctrines and institutions – that applies to, organizes and characterizes 
as a whole within that system’.6 The structure of rights as a sub-field of doctrine encompasses questions on the 
limitations of rights, vertical and horizontal effect of rights, and negative and positive rights.7 The specific 
focus in my thesis are positive and negative rights obligations, which are closely related to the themes of 
vertical and horizontal effect.8 While rights scholarship often focuses on interrogating specific laws’ substance, 
I believe my shift of attention to structure allows me zoom out to see the potential changes in the broader 
 
1 Lorna Woods, ‘Social Media: It Is Not Just about Article 10’ in David Mangan and Lorna E Gillies (eds), The Legal 
Challenges of Social Media (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 115–124.  
2 Emily Taylor, The Privatization of Human Rights: Illusions of Consent, Automation and Neutrality (Centre for 
International Governance Innovation 2016) 2. 
3 Marco Bassini, ‘Fundamental Rights and Private Enforcement in the Digital Age’ (2019) 25 European Law Journal 
182; and Eugénie Coche, ‘Privatised Enforcement and the Right to Freedom of Expression in a World Confronted with 
Terrorism Propaganda Online’ (2018) 7(4) Internet Policy Review 1. 
4 Taylor (n 2). 
5 Stephen Gardbaum, 'The Structure and Scope of Constitutional Rights' in Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg (eds), 
Comparative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 387. 
6 ibid.  
7 ibid 388, 391–392, 396–397. 
8 Eleni Frantziou, The Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights in the European Union: A Constitutional Analysis (OUP 
2019) 39–40;  
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picture. Yet focusing on the structure does not mean complete detachment from the substance.9 Addressing 
the structure in complete isolation could be counterproductive as without any outline of the substantive 
implications to freedom of expression, it might be hard to concretize the structure as well. 
Secondly, without prejudice to the notion of acontextual indeterminacy I remarked above, some legal reference 
points are of course necessary. My principal one here is the European Convention on Human Rights10 
(hereafter the ECHR) as ‘the flagship treaty’ for European-wide human rights codification.11 In addition, the 
structural typology of positive and negative fundamental right obligations has also developed in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter the ECtHR) as the authoritative interpreter 
of the ECHR. However, because the aim is to analyze EU regulation, and because the European-level rights 
system has become pluralistic, it is not possible to exclude the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU 
(hereafter the Charter).12 Moreover, it is clear that in general the most relevant articles for freedom of 
expression and information are Article 10 of the ECHR and Article 11 of the Charter.  
Thirdly, as indicated in the title, my primary interest is targeted to the companies that operate a social media 
service. However, I am introducing also a limitation here: I limit my analysis primarily to the largest services, 
i.e. social networking service Facebook (including Instagram as owned by the former), micro-blogging service 
Twitter and video-sharing platform YouTube (as owned by Google/Alphabet).13 The focus on the biggest 
social media services may at first appear rather arbitrary but, in my view, it receives backing from a branch of 
the Internet regulation studies which are concerned on the so-called ‘Internet gatekeepers’.14 Namely, I am 
referencing to an influential study by Emily B Laidlaw, who identifies a wide array of different Internet 
gatekeepers which exercise control over information flows by ‘channeling information through a channel, 
deleting information or shaping information into a particular form’.15 A gatekeeper, ‘as a result of this control 
of the flow of information, facilitate or hinder deliberation and participation in democratic culture’.16 Indeed, 
social media platforms are conveniently placed at the intersection of massive information flows of users’ social 
interaction: information flows through their platforms.17 Laidlaw’s point is that gatekeeping is a relevant use 
of power from the fundamental rights perspective, and while also small Internet businesses and even 
 
9 Gardbaum (n 5) 402. 
10 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended). 
11 Joan Barata Mir and Marco Bassini, ‘Freedom of Expression in the Internet: Main Trends of the Case Law of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ in Oreste Pollicino and Graziella Romeo (eds), The Internet and Constitutional Law: 
The Protection of Fundamental Rights and Constitutional Adjudication in Europe (Routledge 2016) 71. 
12 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391. 
13 In 2016, a study by the Commission identified Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Instagram as the four most popular 
platforms in terms of online traffic in Europe and (worldwide) monthly active users. European Commission, 
‘Behavioural Study on Advertising and Marketing Practices in Online Social Media’ (Final Report, June 2018) 14–16. 
14 Chris Reed and Andrew Murray, Rethinking the Jurisprudence of Cyberspace (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018) 159–
163.  
15 Emily B Laidlaw, Regulating Speech in Cyberspace: Gatekeepers, Human Rights and Corporate Responsibility 
(CUP 2015) 231. 
16 ibid 57. 
17 Julie E Cohen, Between Truth and Power: Legal Constructions of Informational Capitalism (OUP 2019) 219–220. 
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individuals may act as gatekeepers, their control is far more limited compared to those gatekeepers that control 
the vital access points in the whole Internet structure.18 According to Laidlaw, the gatekeepers fundamental 
rights obligations should correspond their gatekeeping power, with the most powerful gatekeepers having the 
most stringent constraining obligations as well.19 I agree with Laidlaw and I believe understanding social media 
service providers as vital Internet gatekeepers justifies my limitation made above.20 
Fourthly, I am pointing out that my thesis does not focus on analyzing the rules of perhaps the most 
fundamental piece of social media content regulation, namely the EU e-Commerce Directive.21 As the 
Directive came into force in 2000, a lot of insightful research has already been made on its role in defining the 
responsibilities of social media companies.22 Instead, this thesis limits it scope to the more recent regulatory 
additions introduced during the last five years of the Juncker Commission, even though the most relevant rules 
of the Directive are briefly revisited throughout. The more recent regulation builds on top of the framework 
laid out by e-Commerce Directive. Based on this outline, I believe I am able to formulate the following research 
questions: Who has the power over people’s freedom of expression on social media, including the power to 
define the meaning of the right itself? Through what regulatory techniques EU social media content regulation 
allocates this power? How the power allocation relates to the dominant fundamental rights doctrine? All three 
questions are intertwined and thus the answers to them should produce a comprehensive understanding on the 
involvement of private actors to fundamental rights protection on social media and its power implications. 
1.1.2 Definitions   
As a start, regarding the term ‘freedom of expression’, I must underline that while using the term, I mean 
freedom of expression and information as it is stated in Article 10 of ECHR and Article 11 of the Charter. For 
the sake of brevity and ease of language, I also use term ‘free expression’ throughout the thesis. Next, my 
definition for the somewhat ambiguous term ‘regulation’ is functional, narrow and practically aligns with a 
legal system. I use the term regulation and law interchangeably. Regulation denotes ‘deliberate attempts by 
the state [or the EU] to influence socially valuable behavior which may have adverse side-effects by 
establishing, monitoring and enforcing legal rules’.23 The tripartite classification means that there needs to be 
an element of norm-setting (establishment of rules), a way to gather information on the operation of the system 
(monitoring and sometimes, more narrowly, ‘policing’), and a capacity to modify behavior to sufficiently 
conform with norms (enforcement).24 In turn, I am adopting the term ‘governance’ to encompass the different 
 
18 Laidlaw (n 15) 47–56. The Internet infrastructure offers also other numerous access points for power, see Yochai 
Benkler, ‘Degrees of Freedom, Dimensions of Power’ (2016) 145 Daedalus 18. 
19 Laidlaw (n 15) 45–46, 243. 
20 This of course does not presuppose that small gatekeepers would harm-free or should not be regulated. 
21 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of 
information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic 
commerce') [2000] OJ L178/1. 
22 One of the most in-depth inquiry is perhaps Aleksandra Kuczerawy, Intermediary Liability and Freedom of 
Expression in the EU: From Concepts to Safeguards (Intersentia 2018). 
23 Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Materials (CUP 2007) 3. 
24 Reed and Murray (n 14) 140. 
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forms of control more widely, including both institutional and social control. Governance presupposes a 
conflict between (implicit) expectations of at least two people.25 It is Foucault’s ‘conduct of conduct’, that is, 
‘a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons’.26 
Governance also encompasses self-regulation ‘where business or industry sectors formulate codes of conduct 
or operating constraints on their own initiative for which they are responsible for enforcing’.27 The even more 
elusive ‘co-regulation’ is  ‘a mechanism whereby the Union Legislator entrusts the attainment of specific 
policy objectives set out in legislation or other policy documents to parties which are recognized in the field 
(such as economic operators, social partners, nongovernmental organisations, standardisation bodies or 
associations)’.28 It is meant to combine the benefits of legally binding regulation and more flexible self-
regulation.29 However, it should be stressed already here that the border between ‘self’ and ‘co’ is fluid and 
contested.       
Following the regulatory concepts, I am defining the crucial term of (social media) ‘platform’. Confusion is 
often created when a platform refers to both the Internet company itself and as the service they offer.30 For 
instance, Facebook can refer to the social media platform site or the company Facebook Inc operating the site. 
My platform definition is not legalistic, even though I briefly address it in Chapter 2.2. While the question of 
the legal categorization of platforms is important, it tends to sideline some political-economic underpinnings 
in a platform’s purpose and functioning that play an important role in this thesis. Instead, following Gillespie, 
social media platforms are services that ‘a) host, organize, and circulate users’ shared content or social 
interactions for them, b) without having produced or commissioned (the bulk of) that content, c) built on an 
infrastructure, beneath that circulation of information, for processing data for customer service, advertising, 
and profit’.31 By contrast, following the example of Gorwa, I use the term ‘platform company’ to refer to a 
multinational corporation operating a social media platform.32 
Lastly, following Grimmelmann, the term ‘content moderation’ denotes ‘the governance mechanisms that 
structure participation’ on social media platforms.33 Its sanction is social exclusion.34 However, I need to make 
a couple of additions to this definition. Content moderation in this thesis are the governance mechanisms 
 
25 Jeanette Hofmann, Christian Katzenbach and Kirsten Gollatz, ‘Between Coordination and Regulation: Finding the 
Governance in Internet Governance’ (2017) 19 New Media & Society 1406, 1418. 
26 Colin Gordon, ‘Governmental Rationality: An Introduction’ in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller 
(eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality: With Two Lectures by and an Interwiev with Michel Foucault 
(University of Chicago Press 1991) 2.  
27 European Commission, ‘Better Regulation Toolbox: TOOL #18 – The choice of policy instruments’ 109 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/better-regulation-toolbox-18_en> accessed 18 June 2020. 
28 ibid. 
29 ibid 109–110. 
30 Robert Gorwa, ‘What Is Platform Governance?’ (2019) 22 Information, Communication & Society 854, 856. 
31 Tarleton Gillespie, Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, Content Moderation, and the Hidden Decisions That Shape 
Social Media (Yale University Press 2018) 18. 
32 Gorwa (n 30) 856. 
33 James Grimmelmann, ‘The Virtues of Moderation’ (2015) 17 Yale Journal of Law & Technology 42, 47. 
34 Ori Schwarz, ‘Facebook Rules: Structures of Governance in Digital Capitalism and the Control of Generalized Social 
Capital’ (2019) 36 Theory, Culture and Society 117, 131. 
6 
 
through which the platform companies structure participation on social media platforms to further their 
political-economic interests. Of course, it is possible that content moderation advances other interests at the 
same time, including fundamental rights. Yet the root motive of content moderation as a corporate activity is 
to advance the interests of companies.35 Content moderation is also gatekeeping comprising several 
gatekeeping strategies.36 Inspired by Gorwa and others, I am dividing content moderation further to ‘hard 
moderation’ and ‘soft moderation’.37 Hard moderation is disciplinary and soft moderation non-disciplinary 
governance. In turn, ‘content regulation’ denotes the deliberate attempts by the state or the EU to influence 
content moderation through legal norms. Self-/co-regulation may target content moderation as well. Content 
moderation is addressed at length in Chapter 2.   
1.2 Method and Structure  
As I deem it advisable to proclaim a methodological approach as formulated in literature, this thesis takes up 
one that is termed as ‘law and political economy approach’.38 The approach sees law as an inextricable part of 
political economy as law constructs the facilitative conduits between economic and political power, not least 
because law creates the market.39 It is not, therefore, an interdisciplinary approach in a sense that it would 
imagine three isolated realms of politics, economy and law.40 It is also a critical approach with an explicit 
normative aim to advance democracy.41 More specifically, I am drawing upon Julia E Cohen’s analysis of 
power in the ‘regulatory state’ in her book Between Truth and Power: Legal Constructions of Informational 
Capitalism.42 According to Cohen, the emergent political economy of ‘informational capitalism’ requires a 
counterpart in social and political ideology for legitimizing and facilitating economic activity.43 This ideology 
is neoliberal governmentality, which, like classical liberal governmentality before it, promotes the primacy of 
private ordering of the market. However, (classical) liberal governmentality prescribed also robust state 
stewardship in the market to account for its tendency toward ‘monopoly, destructive extraction, and rent-
seeking’.44 The difference that comes with the prefix ‘neo’ is that ‘[n]eoliberal governmentality does not simply 
 
35 ibid 121–122. 
36 Laidlaw (n 15) 45. 
37 Robert Gorwa, Reuben Binns and Christian Katzenbach, ‘Algorithmic Content Moderation: Technical and Political 
Challenges in the Automation of Platform Governance’ (2020)(Jan–Jun) Big Data & Society 1, 3. 
38 Jedediah Britton-Purdy and others, ‘Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-
Century Synthesis’ (2020) 129 The Yale Law Journal 1784, 1784. 
39 Amy Kapczynski, ‘The Law of Informational Capitalism’ (Book review) (2020) 129 The Yale Law Journal 1460, 
1481–1482. 
40 Britton-Purdy and others (n 38) 1792–1794, 1820. 
41 ibid 1827–1832. As regards the meaning of democracy, ‘law should shape the economy to support the institutions and 
capacities that uphold the equality and efficacy of democratic citizens’ (1830). 
42 Cohen (n 17). 
43 For Cohen, who builds her analysis on the theory of Manuel Castells, informational capitalism means: ‘Capitalism “ 
[which] is oriented toward profit-maximizing, that is, toward increasing the amount of surplus appropriated by capital 
on the basis of the private control over the means of production and circulation,” while informationalism “is oriented... 
toward the accumulation of knowledge and towards higher levels of complexity in information processing.”’ Cohen (n 
17) 5–6 (citing Manuel Castells, The Information Age, vol. 1: The Rise of the Network Society (Blackwell 1996) 14–18).    
44 Cohen, Between Truth and Power (n 17) 7. 
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elevate processes of private economic ordering; it also works to reshape government processes in their 
image’.45  
How exactly are informational capitalism and neoliberal governmentality to mirror each other? The crucial 
link between the two is the aim of efficiency.46 Both informational capitalism and neoliberal governmentality 
strive toward efficiency. Efficiency seems like a neutral term, but under neoliberal governmentality it 
practically means the overall maximation of wealth through utilitarian cost-benefit calculus.47 In any form of 
capitalism, the maximation of wealth is of course the outspoken aim. For the Commission, the preferred model 
for assessing harms and benefits is the ‘[c]ost benefit analysis which entails the monetization of all (or the 
most important) costs and benefits related to existing public intervention or all viable alternatives at hand’.48  
By contrast, the often more explicitly stated goal of a neoliberal government is the overall maximation of 
welfare instead of wealth. Welfare maximization is aimed with ‘cost-effectiveness analysis’ which ‘entails 
that you quantify (not monetise) the benefits that would be generated by one Euro of costs imposed on 
society’.49 However, not all harms and benefits are easily measurable and accordingly, with the absence of a 
common ‘welfare unit’, human flourishing does not fit into the simple utilitarian calculus as squarely as money. 
Thus, welfare maximization often de facto ends up lopsided toward wealth maximation.50 Welfare/wealth 
maximation requires the government to act like any actor in the market, commanded by utilitarian efficiency, 
and consequently shapes the government to an image of a company. 
However, what is crucial for my thesis, is that the promotion of efficiency entails a trade-off between 
democracy.51 I cannot overstate the importance of this trade-off here. It forms the backbone of everything that 
unfolds on the pages of this thesis. Unlike liberal governmentality that undertook the quest of decentering 
power to a sovereign individual,52 neoliberalism tends to de-value the processes of a democratic state in its 
respective quest for the overall maximation of wealth. This is because the demands of democracy advance also 
non-market values and thus are not always in line with the market imperatives such as utilitarian efficiency.53 
 
45 ibid. Emphasis added. 
46 Britton-Purdy and others (n 38) 1790.  
47 Zachary Liscow, ‘Is Efficiency Biased?’ (2018) 85 The University of Chicago Law Review 1649, 1658. 
48 European Commission, ‘Better Regulation Toolbox, Tool #57: Analytical methods to compare options or assess 
Performance’ 451, <https://bit.ly/2XjYVaO> accessed 25 July 2020. See also Orla Lynskey, ‘Regulating “Platform 
Power”’ (2017) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 1/2017, 28 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2921021> accessed 25 May 2020. 
49 European Commission (n 48) 452. 
50 Britton-Purdy and others (n 38) 1797. The underlying reasoning behind the overall wealth maximation is that when 
the overall ‘cake’ grows, it can then be redistributed under the concept of fairness, that is, through taxes and income 
transfers, thus benefitting everyone and not just those that have gained most from the overall growth. Whether the ideal 
works in practice is arguably highly context-dependent. Efficient policies are not always offset for the worse-off. 
Liscow (n 47) 1664, 1696, 1703–1704. 
51 Britton-Purdy and others (n 38) 1813–1814, 1827–1832. 
52 Cohen (n 17) 7. 
53 David Singh Grewal and Jedediah Purdy, ‘Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism’ (2014) 77 Law & Contemporary 
Problems 1, 3–6.  
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Consequently, the trade-off also means shifts in power relations, channeling power away from people toward 
the market, within which the government acts. 
According to Cohen: ‘Transforming government in the image of markets is not an abstract exercise. It requires 
changes in the nature and operation of the institutions and practices that comprise government, including (…) 
legislatures, courts, and legal doctrines’.54 It brings techniques that mimic market techniques and company 
management into government.55 Managerial techniques tend to assert ‘the superiority of efficiency, 
technocratic oversight, and utilitarian methods for assessing costs and benefits over fairness, openness and 
public-facing accountability’.56 However, because changes in the institutions of a government must happen 
through law, it follows that law also must change to accommodate the new managerial techniques.57 Therefore, 
on the most practical level, to implement managerial techniques the regulatory approaches are ‘procedurally 
informal, standard-based, [and] mediated by expert professional networks’.58 All of them are leaning toward 
efficiency and away from democratic accountability. 
However, I am stressing that law does not only facilitate political economy but also justice. Law should neither 
be cynically equated with a conduit of instrumentarian political-economic ends nor entirely substituted with 
justice ideals.59 Thus, fundamental rights, including the right to freedom of expression and information, can 
(and should) contribute to justice. More specifically, I am taking the conceptualization of fundamental rights 
as ‘avenues of political equality’ as outlined by Eleni Frantziou in her recent work on the theory of horizontality 
of fundamental rights in the EU.60 Drawing upon the theories of Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas and Claude 
Lefort, Frantziou derives the justification of fundamental rights structure from its purpose of ‘creating the 
necessary conditions for democratic participation’.61 A fundamental right is understood in Arendtian way, as 
a capacity to act (politically).62 As Ingram states, fundamental rights ‘are the product of past struggles and the 
object of present ones’.63 She further notes that ‘beyond any substantive benefits [fundamental rights 
framework] offers, the fundamentality of a rights system consists in its role of organising public life and in 
enabling people to shape and re-interpret its parameters’ in an equal manner.64 The political re-interpretation 
 
54 Cohen (n 17) 7. 
55 ibid. 
56 ibid 194.  
57 ibid 2, 7–8. 
58 ibid 172. 
59 Mireille Hildebrandt, Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 147. 
60 Frantziou (n 8) 175. 
61 Ibid 162. 
62 Charles Barbour, 'Between Politics and Law: Hannah Arendt and the Subject of Rights' in Marco Goldoni and 
Christopher McCorkindale (eds), Hannah Arendt and the Law (Hart Publishing 2012) 314–315. 
63 James D Ingram, 'What Is a “Right to Have Rights”? Three Images of the Politics of Human Rights' (2008) 102 
American Political Science Review 401, 411. 
64 Frantziou (n 8) 163. 
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is aimed towards the very substance and scope of rights themselves.65 Therefore, as a framework, fundamental 
rights based on political equality protect the very politicizing character of rights.66  
To my mind, in life people have political expectations regarding their entitlements to material resources and/or 
status. Principled and value-thick fundamental right texts raise this anticipation and help it to transform to 
more a definite form as legal claims for rights. The claims result in conflicts with the entitlements of others, 
which has the potential to alter not only the distribution of entitlements and disentitlements, including by 
reformulating the meaning of the right in question. Therefore, fundamental rights, like any law, do not and 
cannot fully constrain political change.67 Effectively, the focus of the analysis of rights structure now shifts to 
the power imbalances present in a public sphere. This is congenial to the ‘non-domination principle’ which 
asserts that instead of looking for a concrete infringement to someone’s right, the assessment should interrogate 
power relations and potential abuse of power.68 Yet in Frantziou’s theory, fundamental rights doctrine should 
allow for the scrutiny of power imbalances irrespective of whether the relationship is between two private 
actors or between state and private actor.69 For instance, a powerful actor may inhibit someone’s capabilities 
to act politically within a public sphere, including the capacity to reformulate a right.70 This type of power 
imbalance must be recognized as a fundamental rights issue.71 The structure of the rights framework should be 
constructed to enable the vindication of rights to re-balance the power. In other words, it should foster 
democratic self-determination and, especially on transnational level, what Cafaggi and Pistor call ‘regulatory 
capabilities’. They are ‘institutional conditions for individuals, collectives, and entities to express their 
preferences, [and] choose alternative forms of regulation’.72  
To sum the theoretical framework outlined and to apply it in the specific context of my thesis, I am stating that 
a legislative and administrative fundamental rights framework, as any regulation, mediates between political 
economy and political equality. This mediation informs the distribution of power in society. In terms of 
 
65 Ingram (n 63) 411–412. 
66 Frantziou (n 8) 164. 
67 Barbour (n 62) 315–319. It should be stressed that I don’t seek to advance any idealistic notions of the subversive 
potential of rights. As Boonen points out, there are certainly limits to the politicising capabilities of fundamental rights, 
which have to do with the legal form and their co-evolution with industrial capitalism. See Christian Boonen, ‘Limits to 
the Politics of Subjective Rights: Reading Marx After Lefort’ (2019) 30 Law & Critique 179, 189–196. 
68 Bart van der Sloot, ‘A New Approach to the Right to Privacy, or How the European Court of Human Rights 
Embraced the Non-domination Principle’ (2018) 34 Computer Law & Security Review 539, 545–547. According to the 
commentators, both the ECtHR and CJEU have recently embraced non-domination principle in Roman Zakharov v 
Russia ECHR 2015–VIII 205; and Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for 
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others (hereafter 
Digital Rights Ireland), EU:C:2014:238. In relation to the latter case, see Andrew Roberts, ‘Privacy, Data Retention and 
Domination: Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications’ (2015) 78 Modern Law Review 535. 
69 Frantziou (n 8) 165–168. 
70 ibid 166. As an example from data protection, Mario Costeja González from Spain challenged Google Inc by 
invoking the right to data protection (among other claims). The Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter the 
CJEU) sided with Mario Costeja, thus reformulating the right to data protection to accommodate something new that 
has since came to be known as ‘right to be forgotten’. Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, EU:C:2014:317. 
71 Ingram (n 63) 405, 414. 
72 Fabrizio Cafaggi and Katharina Pistor, ‘Regulatory Capabilities: A Normative Framework for Assessing the 
Distributional Effects of Regulation’ (2015) 9 Regulation & Governance 95, 98. 
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method, deconstruction may serve to reveal how certain values and ideologies presented as foundational or 
neutral are actually founded on contradictions.73 By analyzing the efficiency/democracy trade-off in 
fundamental rights structure, I believe I can deconstruct efficiency as a universal value in regulation and 
challenge the ultimate neoliberal claim that fundamental rights are compatible with efficiency.74 More 
specifically, the old rule of law of liberal democratic state contains mandating principles, encapsulated in 
doctrine, which may cause friction for efficiency-oriented changes.75 Friction may result in legal conflicts 
between players that represent different interests and diverging approaches to fundamental rights. In turn, 
conflicts may produce novel legal arrangements as compromises. The arrangements could then, at least in 
principle, end up working as more balanced legal structures under informational capitalism.   
How then, in practice, am I scrutinizing the relevant law? As mentioned, the legal-dogmatic backdrop for 
assessing the structure of freedom of expression is provided by the ECHR and its interpretations by the ECtHR. 
However, it is advisable to take into account the relevant jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (hereafter the CJEU) as the supreme interpreter of EU law. Complementary to supranational case-law, 
fundamental rights scholarship helps with the interpretation of doctrine. In addition, especially because this 
thesis moves partly on a more theoretical level (Chapters 2 and 3), I am drawing upon regulatory studies but 
also social studies, namely media and platform studies.  
As regards the interpretation of the regulatory framework, my aim is to ferret out various and possibly 
conflicting interests behind regulation to observe how the final text resembles the outcomes these conflicts. I 
believe the interests become surfaced during the legislative processes. Ultimately, this allows me to distill 
insights on whether and how the regulation exhibits the efficiency/democracy trade-off. It follows from here 
that the source material contains policy documentation of relevant EU institutions, most notably the 
Commission, Council and Parliament taken together as the EU legislator, in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure.76 Yet I am trying to tread cautiously here: The legislative processes in the EU are 
meandering and not all the stages are public. I am seeking to avoid drawing definite causal lines between 
interests visible at preliminary stages and the final legal text. Some unpublicized EU documents have been 
obtained (as redacted) by NGOs and I have accessed them through their websites.  
Lastly, I am laying out the structure of thesis. In Chapter 2, after first revisiting the general doctrine of (positive) 
fundamental right obligations, I believe it is important to briefly delve into content moderation and its potential 
harms to freedom of expression. The subsequent chapters 3 and 4 constitute the main part of this thesis and 
aim to interrogate answers to the research questions. Chapter 3 locates the efficiency/democracy trade-off in a 
 
73 Jack M Balkin, ‘Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory’ (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 743, 754–755. 
74 Samuel Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (Harvard University Press 2018) 191–192. Even 
though Moyn remarks that such a claim is more of a caricature than reality, I believe it serves a purpose here to show 
that neoliberalism in an increasingly complex world cannot be just a plain deregulatory agenda that seeks to insulate 
economic activity from public law, including fundamental rights. Grewal and Jedediah Purdy (n 53) 13–14. 
75 Cohen (n 17) 270. 
76 Articles 289 and 294 of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereafter 
TFEU) [2012] OJ C326/47. 
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more specific, but a still generalized, analytical framework. It interrogates the specific regulatory strategies 
under the interconnected concepts of cooperation and contest within the EU social regulation. Chapter 4 
includes three case studies of recent social media regulation initiatives in the EU. The case studies do not claim 
to produce an exhaustive account of the ‘regulatory field’ on the subject matter, but to contextualize and 
exemplify the more general part of Chapter 3. Of course, a drawback of picked case-studies is that the results 
contain reservations in producing definite generalizations. Finally, Chapter 5 draws together the argumentation 
in chapters and delves into discussion developed on them. Thus, it re-engages both the fundamental rights 
doctrine and the background theory to assess how the relevant fundamental rights structure is mediating 
between efficiency and political equality and whether it should be restructured somehow. 
2. Foundations: Freedom of Expression and Content Moderation  
This chapter lays the essential foundation for the upcoming analysis in subsequent chapters. It first revisits the 
doctrine of fundamental rights structure regarding state’s fundamental rights obligations. It then turns to 
freedom of expression on social media and outlines how companies govern through platform content 
moderation. Even though the focus is on free expression, as I mentioned in the introduction, several rights are 
at stake on platforms and it is advisable to point out the major repercussions to them too.  
2.1 Fundamental Right Obligations 
This sub-chapter outlines the doctrinal intricacies of positive obligations under the ECHR and the Charter. 
Fundamental rights law imposes both negative and positive legal obligations for states, even though 
traditionally the rights were thought to require only restraint from public incursions to private sphere.77 The 
ECtHR introduced the concept of positive obligation in the European human rights jurisprudence early on in 
1968.78 According to Beijer, for the ECtHR a positive obligation means ‘a requirement for states to take active 
measures to protect fundamental rights’.79 It explains that ‘states must “do something”, “take action” or 
“undertake affirmative action”’.80 The justification for the positive obligations is the effective protection of the 
rights in the ECHR.81 So, whether one likes it or not, positive obligations are indispensable because, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1.1.2, any regulation needs monitoring and enforcement. Fundamental rights as law 
would have little effect if public institutions would not enforce rights as legal entitlements, i.e. if the state 
would always literally ‘do nothing’ even to prevent or sanction its own agents, as the negative obligations seem 
 
77 Gardbaum (n 5) 396–397. 
78 Case "relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium" v Belgium (Belgian 
Linguistic case) App nos 1474/62 to 2126/64 (ECtHR, 23 July 1968), para 9. 
79 Malu Beijer, The Limits of Fundamental Rights Protection by the EU: The Scope for the Development of Positive 
Obligations (Intersentia 2017) 99. 
80 ibid 41. 
81 ibid 46. 
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to suggest. Therefore, it may sometimes be hard to meaningfully distinguish positive and negative 
obligations.82  
However, often the importance of positive obligations generally and in this thesis specifically is that they serve 
as a doctrinal tool for state to interrogate also situations where private action implicates the rights of others. 
While this forges a link to the horizontal effect of fundamental rights, i.e. the applicability of fundamental 
rights law in private relations,83 the scholarship is not unanimous on the relationship between the two doctrines. 
It has been pointed out that the positive obligations have in practice resulted to the adoption of horizontal 
effect. However, Lavrysen has insisted that positive obligations and horizontal effect are ‘analytically 
distinct’.84 I am following the theorization of Frantziou and Alexy, who practically equate positive obligations 
with ‘state-mediated horizontal effect’ as opposed to indirect and direct horizontality.85 The clearest 
distinction, and important for this thesis, is that like (classical) liberal governmentality in general, positive 
obligations presuppose the strong stewardship of state, that is, they are not imposed on private actors.86 
Congruently, the infringements on rights by private individuals or legal persons can be projected against state 
through the lack of preventative or remedial action.87 This is already indicated by the term state-mediated 
horizontality. Moreover, they are often fulfilled by the actions of the legislator and the judges, while indirect 
and direct effect consider how rights are applicable in courts.88 State administration has an important role in 
positive obligations too. 
The ECtHR imposed the first positive obligations in landmark cases of Marckx v Belgium, Airey v Ireland, 
Young, James and Webster v The United Kingdom, and X and Y v the Netherlands.89 These cases solidified the 
concept as an inherent part of the Convention system. The ECtHR has refrained from defining the positive 
obligations on general level. Instead, it has stressed the contextual analysis for specifying the concrete 
obligations.90 This is inexorable in a sense that, while it is clear that positive steps require some measures to 
be taken by state, it is impossible to say what measures should be taken if the ECtHR is to take into account 
 
82 Jean-François Akandji-Kombe, Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to 
the Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Human rights handbooks No 7, Council of Europe 
2007) 15; and Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Julian Rivers tr, OUP 2002) 359–361. 
83 Alexy (n 82) 354–355. 
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Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (Intersentia 2016) 79. Similarly, Gardbaum (n 5) 397. 
85 Frantziou (n 8) 44–45; and Alexy (n 82) 356–357.  
86 According to Lavrysen, the doctrine of horizontal effect is a matter to be solved on the national level ‘[s]ince the 
ECHR only imposes obligations on States and not on individuals’. Lavrysen (n 84) 13. Indeed, the Court itself has not 
explicitly embraced the horizontal effect doctrine but has left the extent of horizontal effect to be decided on state level.  
VgT Verein Gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland ECHR 2001–VI 243, para 46; and Söderman v Sweden ECHR 2013–VI 
203, para 79. 
87 Akandji-Kombe (n 82) 14–15; and Stéfanie Khoury and David White, Corporate Human Rights Violations: Global 
Prospects for Legal Action (Routledge 2017) 110. 
88 Alexy (n 82) 357. 
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the individualities of the case at hand. Nevertheless, legal scholarship has identified several typologies that 
helpfully bring flesh to its bones in the form of more crystallized obligations.91 
Firstly, the ECtHR has recognized states having positive obligations especially in situations of horizontal 
relationship between private parties.92 Therefore, following the typology of Lavrysen, positive obligations may 
be divided to horizontal and vertical ones.93 According to Lavrysen, ‘[h]orizontal positive obligations are those 
positive obligations that govern relations between private persons. They are typically triangular in character, 
since the individual invokes them against the State to oblige State authorities to intervene in horizontal 
relations’.94 Vertical positive obligations directly govern the relations between the individual and the State.95 
Akandji-Kombe calls it a ‘duty of schizophrenia’ as the state is required to take action to prevent or punish the 
violations that its own agents commit.96 When state takes measures to interfere in horizontal relations, this 
may, however, infringe the rights of others. Therefore, the extent of measures is in many cases determined 
through ad hoc balancing.97 The ECtHR refers to this balancing as ‘fair balance’ test and applies it generally 
for ‘determining whether or not a positive obligation exists’ in the first place.98 Thus, the concept of fair balance 
is the convergence point between negative (restraint) and positive obligations (affirmative action).  
Positive obligations have been further concretized by dividing them to the ones that require states to set up the 
appropriate ‘legislative and administrative framework’ and to the ones that are to be formulated on more ad 
hoc basis.99 In case Centro Europa 7: ‘The Court observes that in such a sensitive sector as the audiovisual 
media, in addition to its negative duty of non-interference the State has a positive obligation to put in place an 
appropriate legislative and administrative framework’.100 Indeed, Xenos argues that setting up both the 
legislative and administrative frameworks for the protection against infringements by private actors are the 
two elements comprising ‘the core content’ of positive obligations.101 Instead, ad hoc obligations are usually 
required on top of the framework and derive even more from the context of the case at hand.102  
 
91 See eg, Lavrysen (n 84); and Dimitris Xenos, The Positive Obligations of the State under the European Convention of 
Human Rights (Routledge 2012). 
92 Beijer (n 79) 47.  
93 Lavrysen (n 84) 57. Beijer (n 79) 58, adopts the same typology.  
94 Lavrysen (n 84) 78–79, 100.  
95 ibid 79. 
96 Akandji-Kombe (n 82) 15–16. One could ask whether vertical positive obligations are actually negative obligations 
and, therefore, whether the class of vertical positive obligations only creates unnecessary confusion. However, the Court 
has not seen them redundant as, for instance, it has required the higher authorities of the State to not only respect the 
Convention rights themselves, but ‘those authorities must [also] prevent or remedy any breach at subordinate levels.’ 
Assanidze v Georgia ECHR 2004–II 221, para 146. 
97 Lavrysen (n 84) 117–118. 
98 Rees v the United Kingdom App no 9532/81 (ECtHR, 17 October 1986), para 37. 
99 Lavrysen (n 84) 112. 
100 Centro Europa 7 Srl and Di Stefano v Italy ECHR 2012–III 339, para 134. As regards positive freedom of 
expression obligations, see also, Özgür Gündem v Turkey ECHR 2000–III 1, para 43; and Khurshid Mustafa and 
Tarzibachi v Sweden ECHR App no 23883/06 (ECtHR, 16 December 2008), paras 43, 48–50.  
101 Xenos (n 91) 107–115. 
102 The ECtHR has stipulated that ‘[positive] obligation may involve the adoption of specific measures’. Hämäläinen v 
Finland ECHR 2014–IV 369, para 63. Emphasis added. Similarly, KU v Finland ECHR 2008–V 125, para 49. 
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Regarding legislative framework, ‘a positive obligation arises for the state to regulate in advance individual 
conduct and the operation of the activities of private parties’.103 For instance, the ECtHR has stated that positive 
obligation contains ‘measures [which] may include both the provision of a regulatory framework of 
adjudicatory and enforcement machinery protecting individuals’ rights’.104 Administrative framework contains 
effective implementation of the legislative framework.105 For instance, in the case of environmental hazard, 
the Court has specified that the administrative framework includes the ‘licensing, setting up, operation, security 
and supervision of the [economic] activity’.106 Of course, the obligation requiring the adequate legislative or 
administrative framework is closely connected to right to effective remedy in Article 13 and right to a fair trial 
in Article 6(1) of the ECHR.107 Moreover, Lavrysen considers that relying on mere ad hoc measures through 
wide discretionary powers could risk undermining rule of law. Thus, a robust and sufficiently detailed 
legislative and administrative framework is crucial for rule of law too.108 
As regards the EU, before Lisbon Treaty and the Charter becoming binding, its obligations were more of 
negative nature. Thus, the EU was only committed not to breach fundamental rights rather than actively 
promoting them.109 Now Article 51(1) of the Charter, addressing the field of application, states that ‘[the 
Union] shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in 
accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on 
it in the Treaties’.110 Yet this choice of wording does not self-evidently assert positive obligations in connection 
to the Charter.111 According to Kuczarawy, the existence of positive obligations for the EU is ‘less obvious’.112  
However, the positive obligation doctrine receives additional backing from the so-called homogeneity clause 
in Article 52(3) of the Charter.113 According to Amalfitano, the meaning of the clause within the EU legal 
system is that: ‘(i) the ECHR represents the minimum floor of the level of fundamental rights protection; and 
(ii) the Union (therefore, above all, the political institutions in the exercise of their legislative powers) is only 
allowed to increase the level of protection provided by the ECHR’.114 The meaning and scope of the 
Convention rights include also the case-law of the ECtHR.115 Therefore, by virtue of the homogeneity clause, 
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also the doctrine of positive obligations could flow to EU system of fundamental rights. Nevertheless, without 
the accession of the EU to the ECHR, its effect on the Union bodies is indirect.116  
Moreover, any recognition of positive obligations is subject to the EU competence in general since, pursuant 
to Article 51(2), the Charter does not in itself set up any additional tasks for the Union regarding the protection 
of rights or otherwise.117 Yet the EU’s Digital Single Market project undoubtedly triggers the application of 
Charter as well.118 Kuczerawy sees that the requirement of effectiveness stated in Articles 4(3) and 19(1) also 
necessitates the existence of positive obligations for Charter rights.119 The effectiveness requirement is of 
course the same as the ECtHR uses to justify positive obligations.120 Further, in the context of Internet 
regulation, the CJEU has affirmed the obligation to provide effective protection and fair balance through 
‘sufficient safeguards’.121 Based on these findings, Kuczerawy argues, and I agree, that there indeed exists a 
positive obligation to guarantee the Charter rights. Instead of explicitly referred to as a positive obligation, it 
manifests itself in the doctrines of effective protection and fair balance. Moreover, this obligation binds not 
only Member States implementing the Union law, but also the EU bodies themselves as constituting a distinct 
supranational legislator.122 For instance, EU regulations don’t even require any implementation to come into 
force. So, to summarize this sub-chapter, it has been argued that not only European states but also the EU as a 
legislator, are understood as the primary subjects of positive fundamental obligations, including those deriving 
from freedom of expression.  
2.2 Hard Content Moderation and e-Commerce Directive 
In this sub-chapter, I first provide a brief (and necessarily limited) account of freedom of expression and social 
media generally. After that, the rest of this chapter considers platform content moderation. As stated, I am 
dividing content moderation to ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ part. The latter part of this sub-chapter focuses on hard 
moderation, its legal facilitation in the e-Commerce Directive, and its implications for freedom of expression 
and other rights. The next sub-chapter 2.3 delves into soft moderation. 
Broadly speaking, there are two theory groups for understanding the value of free expression.123 One links 
speech to individual autonomy, self-determination and dignity. As Woods states, ‘theories in this group 
concern an individual’s right to choose what to believe, and therefore to have access to a choice of views and 
 
116 Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105, para 44. 
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119 Kuczerawy (n 22) 155. 
120 Beijer (n 79) 46. 
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123 Woods (n 1) 107; Mir and Bassini call it ‘double dimension’ of freedom of expression in European legal systems. 
Mir and Bassini (n 11) 78–80. 
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the space to experiment with and to reject ideas, as well as to express him or herself’.124 These theories make 
Article 10 of the ECHR to converge with Article 8.125 The other group sees the value in the functioning of 
democracy as a system.126 Here, speech operates in the public domain where the development of society and 
the critique of those with power is possible.127 Scholars have highlighted the importance of classic case 
Handyside, where the ECtHR arguably embraced both theory groups.128 As regards social media, it enables 
computer-mediated social interaction for people, thus creating vast and complex sociotechnical networks that 
form instances of the networked public sphere.129 They allow for a myriad of ways to form new affinity 
networks, the effects of which have been lauded for their enormously democratizing effects in the domains of 
culture and politics. Also, they have empowered people to circumvent the traditional gatekeepers of mass 
media, providing a chance for self-realizing participation to millions or even billions.130 
While decentralized, networks still allow access points for power concentration.131 The platform is a hub in a 
network, through which all the social interactions must flow. By controlling the hub, i.e. gatekeeping, the 
platform company can record all interactions and store them as data. Data forms the core of social media 
political economy.132 However, people’s social interactions are messy and incommensurate as they appear 
‘offline’, and thus they must first be made commensurate to be recorded as simple numeric data. So, 
companies’ political-economic interests require that a platform simplifies social interactions for 
datafication/commodification.133 This practically means that a platform mediates social interactions through 
highly stylized user actions, such as a suite of ‘likes’ and ‘shares’ that equate with single clicks. These clicks 
can be turned to data much more easily, making them more viable for computational analytics.134 When data 
is processed through computational analytics, information in the form of (unexpected) correlations is produced, 
with potentially high monetary value.135   
Naturally, the number of computer-mediated clicks needs to be maximized. Companies do this through a suite 
of governance efforts that are meant to maximize people’s engagement (i.e., clicks). These governance efforts 
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are social media content moderation. Companies’ governance is possible because of power that flows from 
many different legal, economic and technical sources. It is not possible nor advisable to give a detailed analysis 
of all the power sources. However, I indicate some notable examples. For instance, network effects make the 
platform more valuable for everyone when it grows.136 Thus, the ensuing locked-in effects make it harder for 
users to change the service because of the loss of valuable connections.137 Legally, companies use boilerplate 
terms of contract law that are non-negotiable and assert a suite of legal entitlements for the companies as 
regards, for instance, the user data or their platform use.138 Lastly, trade secrecy and intellectual property rights 
(hereafter IPR) shelter platform workings from scrutiny.139 
The first part, hard content moderation, is disciplinary governance. Its sanctions comprise an escalating scale 
of disciplining actions: warnings, removals of specific content, and account suspensions and terminations.140 
From purely substantive fundamental rights perspective, hard content moderation is a controversial thing. 
Since the implications of user-generated content are myriad, hard moderation can both harm and benefit 
fundamental rights. As regards harms, the content posted on a platform by newly empowered people may, 
among others, violate other persons’ privacy by defaming or disclosing private information,141 constitute illegal 
discrimination in the form of hateful speech against racial minorities,142 lead to harassing of women,143 violate 
the rights of the child not only trough dissemination of child pornography but also through children’s exposure 
to violent or otherwise harmful content,144 and implicate the right to personal security through outright threats 
of violence.145 Other types of illegal content are more closely related to public policy endeavors but 
nevertheless have also links to the enjoyment of individual rights. For instance, the protection of intellectual 
property has a connection with the right to property.146 
Initially, no external community rules existed for social media platforms and the approach to the enforcement 
of any internal rules was hands-off.147 Only after platforms’ user-base grew in numbers and diversity, the 
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companies drafted internal community standards such as Twitter Rules and policies, Facebook Community 
Standards, and YouTube Community Guidelines for indicating prohibited and harmful behavior that would be 
sanctioned.148 Through incremental steps reactionary to vocal demands from users, NGOs and legacy media, 
new prohibitions on different types of harmful and/or illegal content were added to the internal rule set.149 
Special digital tools, often referred to as ‘flags’, were introduced on platforms for the users to report content 
they deem illegal or offensive.150 The reported content would be assessed by a company moderator and, where 
concluded to contradict the internal rules, it would be taken down. In severe cases, also user’s social media 
account could be suspended or even permanently terminated.151 Platform companies indirectly employ 
thousands of human moderators. They usually work for independent sub-contractors, often to multinationals 
such as Accenture. Moderators are lowly paid and some moderation centers are situated in low-cost 
countries.152 Reflection on decisions is discouraged to make the process as mechanic as possible. That’s why 
Schwarz calls this workforce ‘proletarian judicial labor’.153 Later, also civil society organizations and public 
agencies have been designated as ’trusted flaggers’ and through their special flags, they can trigger a more 
streamlined review process based on the flaggers’ presumed expertise in the field. This is meant to lead to an 
even speedier take-down process.154 
Algorithmic moderation techniques are the latest addition to hard moderation. On the one hand, they contain 
‘hashing’ based re-upload filters that automatically prevent uploading content that has been removed before. 
The technique compares the somewhat unique ‘fingerprint’ of the piece of content, i.e. hash, to ones included 
in a specific hash database.155 On the other hand, platform companies deploy techniques based on machine-
learning, in which case the algorithm flags content for review, or sometimes even outright removes it, basing 
on statistical inferences it has been trained to make.156 When deployed, it can also refine its inferences by 
‘learning’ from the content it goes through. 
Reactionary content moderation based on reporting has been named the ‘notice-and-take-down’ model.157 In 
Europe, the specific legal facilitator for the model has been claimed to lie in Articles 14 and 15 of the e-
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Commerce Directive, even though notice-and-take-down is not specifically mentioned.158 Article 14 contains 
a conditional safe-harbor provision for an intermediary ‘hosting service provider’ that exempts a platform 
company from liability as regards illegal content, as long as the company is not aware of it. According to the 
CJEU, this effectively requires that the platform is ‘neutral’.159 In addition, the liability exemption is provided 
only where the company acts expeditiously to remove the content after becoming aware of it.160 In turn, Article 
15 prohibits Member States from imposing ‘a general obligation’ to actively search for illegal content from 
their platform so that the companies would not lose their ‘neutrality’. Applicable to all kinds of illegal content 
irrespective of harm, the directive provisions are open-ended and provide little guidance for the appropriate 
means for achieving these outcomes.161 The idea was that more specific requirements would be prescribed by 
Member States, but in practice the directive was mostly implemented plainly as it is.162  
On top of the relaxed regulatory framework, hard content moderation was able to develop within the companies 
in a rather haphazard and piecemeal way through trial and error and sharing of ‘best practices’.163 Hard 
moderation has been criticized for undue limitations to freedom of expression. Scholarship and human rights 
organizations have pointed to the dangers of over-removal of legal speech, including warnings over ‘censorship 
creep’164 and ‘collateral censorship’.165 After all, freedom of expression protects also views that may ‘shock, 
disturb and offend’.166 Scholarship indicates that companies deploy a ‘better safe than sorry’ mentality in 
assessing takedowns,167 with over-removal of algorithmic filters being a particularly conflictual topic.168 At 
the same time, other scholars and commentators have reminded that hard moderation can serve the protection 
of many rights, and pointed to the persisting failures of the companies to stop the dissemination of content 
harmful to other’s rights.169 It has also been compellingly remarked that the perceived dichotomy between 
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freedom of expression and the protection of rights of others is false. This is because ‘systemic discrimination 
and abuse have serious negative impacts on the agency and participation of people who experience them’ and 
may thus impede the victims from exercising their freedom of expression.170 For instance, scholarship has 
indicated that women may be at risk of being pushed out from platforms because of rampant harassment and 
threats.171  
In Europe, many content-related debates have considered the extent of legal removals. On the level of doctrine, 
it is generally clear that illegal speech does exist – freedom of expression is not absolute. Thus, the common 
ground has sometimes been found in the requirement of fair balance.172 Suzor summarizes that ‘[c]oncerns 
about underblocking hate speech and overblocking counter-speech, for example, can be expressed as a 
proportionality problem that is very familiar to human rights law’.173 Another matter of course is the question 
of where the fair balance lies in individual cases. While hard moderation of companies may have benefits for 
rights, in my view, what is sometimes forgotten is the fact that hard moderation is an inextricable part of social 
media’s political economy.174 It exhibits the efficiency/democratic accountability trade-off in extreme. For 
instance, hard moderation algorithms, so preferred by the companies, are highly efficient in the long term175 
but at the same time highly inscrutable, even to the point of constituting so-called ‘black boxes’.176 
2.3 Soft Content Moderation: Personalization as Commodified Governance 
If content moderation was to be equated with hard moderation, the most important ways to make content 
visible or invisible on platforms would be excluded. Thus, the most important part of social media governance 
would be left unaddressed too. The platform design and algorithmically executed processes organize 
information. Also, they largely constitute what a platform is and what it offers to a user.177 Since a social media 
platform hosts content that users have created, the structure of the platform is the only thing there is. The 
central promise of a platform for its users is to organize the information in a legible way.178 In information 
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society, as Cohen states, ‘[t]he problem is not [information] scarcity but rather the need for new ways of cutting 
through the clutter’. Cohen calls this ‘infoglut’ and Pollicino ‘information overload’, meaning the 
unmanageably massive flows of information.179 Infoglut is a fundamental condition of a social media platform. 
A platform must promote certain information and play down other information because everything cannot be 
shown at the same time. Abandoning these organizational activities would reveal the glut and render platform 
unviable for users.180 But it is also inevitable that ‘the power to include, exclude, and rank is the power to 
ensure that certain public impressions become permanent, while others remain fleeting’.181 These processes 
necessarily make platforms ‘the arbiters of truth’, a title so vehemently rejected by Zuckerberg.182 Platforms 
distribute highly relativized ‘truth’ in the form of content visibility. 
Soft content moderation appears perhaps the clearest in different information ‘feeds’ coded to the user interface 
and operated by complex proprietary algorithms. In scholarship, these are called ‘recommender systems’ that 
include internal search fields, recommendation for network connections, and feeds on trending topics.183 In 
addition to Facebook’s News Feed algorithm, examples here are Twitter’s ‘Trends for you’ and the YouTube 
page of ‘Recommended’ videos or its Autoplay video feed. To be sure, a user may influence her social media 
feeds through all her recorded and immediately analyzed behavior on the platform and Internet in general, for 
instance, by clicking the respective buttons of following, liking and so on. However, in practice it is often 
unclear how the user actions fuse with the other countless factors of the algorithm that conjure the information 
to the interface.184 The factors, like platform design in general, are also perpetually fine-tuned by the 
companies.185 
While the platform design and algorithms are easy take for granted, one should keep in mind that the means 
of people’s communication not so much reflect the social interaction but instead they shape it.186 More 
specifically, the mediation of information and expressions on a platform make is possible to ‘nudge’ users’ 
behavior.187 Nudging means the pre-emptive construction of situations where a person must make a choice to 
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increase the likelihood that she chooses the action she is wanted to choose.188 For instance, to increase the 
engagement on platforms, the companies can make the user choice of liking content more ‘available’ by 
placing the digitized ‘like’ button on the right hand corner on the users’ interface rather than on the left.189 
People’s choice-making and engagement levels are experimented by continuous A/B testing on platforms, 
naturally without people’s knowledge.190   
Platform companies do not speak of this governance as content moderation. While the purpose of the design 
and all the algorithmic ordering of content is to serve the companies’ political-economic interests,191 for the 
users, this non-disciplinary governance is wrapped in the language of personalization and actively marketed 
as ‘features’. According to Zuboff, this marketing of personalization appeals to people’s yearning for self-
realization.192 Personalization is framed as better user experience and coupled with promises to show 
information that user, as a unique individual, purportedly finds interesting.193 Thus, in a way, soft content 
moderation is the commodity the platform offers.194 For instance, Facebook Data Policy stipulates that,  
We use the information we have to deliver our Products, including to personalize features and content 
(including your News Feed, Instagram Feed, Instagram Stories and ads) (…) [t]o create personalized 
Products that are unique and relevant to you. [W]e use your connections, preferences, interests and 
activities based on the data we collect and learn from you and others.195 
Yet soft moderation entails several threats to freedom of expression, irrespective of whether one prefers 
reducing its value to individual self-determination or systemic democracy. As regards individual autonomy, 
the coded structure of a social media platform may be designed so that it threatens rights.196 Technologies 
afford different opportunities for social action and constrain others and their potential (ab)uses may constitute 
threats to fundamental rights.197 For instance, while some nudges are innocuous, nudging may be used for 
suspect and self-serving purposes as well. Importantly, the incessant corporate surveillance and its predictive, 
real-time analysis lay the basis for the personalization of a user’s interface. The predictive correlations are fed 
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back to the user as tailored information configurations.198 Surveillance-driven, personalized information may 
significantly increase the effectiveness of nudging, upgrading it to what Yeung calls a ‘hypernudge’.199 
Sophisticated behavioral data analysis and platform tools afford hidden manipulative practices that target 
individual vulnerabilities without people’s awareness.200 For instance, advertisers can use Facebook’s platform 
to target teenagers precisely at moments when they feel most insecure.201 Also, its efficient advert tools allow 
feeding of mis/disinformation adverts precisely for those audience segments that are predicted to be prone to 
the messages of pseudoscience.202 Effectively, personalization imbued with political-economic micro-targeting 
can be directed to work in the interest of anyone with deep enough pockets. Zuboff calls this instrumentarian 
power: It is effective, neoliberally blind for motives, and detrimental for individual self-determination.203   
As regards the value of democracy as a system, Cohen sees that ‘[p]latform-based intermediation alters 
collective behavior in ways that have begun to produce large-scale societal effects’.204 Some effects of soft 
moderation gather force and become visible and harmful on the collective level, threatening the democracy 
itself. Firstly, personalization ‘intensifies in-group effects, reinforcing existing biases, inculcating resistance 
to facts that contradict preferred narratives, and encouraging demonization and abuse of those who hold 
opposite beliefs and political goals’.205 For the feed algorithms, engagement equates with relevance, making 
platforms deliver whatever its respective audience segments deem engaging.206 Pervasive personalization of 
information creates echo chambers, perhaps more often discussed as filter bubbles.207 Echo chambers fuel 
tribalism and trigger rejection and anger toward conflicting views.208 Thus, they reduce solidarity and can 
erode the basis for collective meaning-making.  
Secondly, ‘relevance’ is especially high with negative or angry expressions, or via content otherwise located 
to the margins of appropriate.209 While some are undoubtedly appalled by controversial content, many are 
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captivated by it. Thus, social media platforms need also content that leans towards extremes.210 But amplified 
visibility also greatly amplifies the harms that content may cause to others. In addition, as on the individual 
level, platform’s affordances of ‘diffusion, polarization, and relativization are easily manipulated and 
weaponized’.211 As Yeung argues, hypernudging is not ‘hyper’ only because it’s more effective on the 
individual level, but because it allows real-time nudging of huge masses. The result is the threat of 
manipulation at scale.212 Early on, public relations industry was apt in reining in the instrumentarian platform 
power, creating a rent-seeking ‘meme-industry’ that produces social media virality in the interest of agencies’ 
clientele.213 But nowadays more malevolent actors have become to master the affordances for collective 
manipulation and harm amplification too (with or without paying). These include not only suspect extremist 
organizations of all sorts, but also foreign governments.214 For instance, China has been revealed to run social 
media disinformation campaigns in Europe during the COVID-19 pandemic.215 Some disinformation 
campaigns may seek to manipulate democratic elections.216  
Thirdly, polarization coupled with the amplification of scandalous, engaging content makes it easy to inflame 
collective outrage, leading to targeted hate campaigns against minorities, politicians and ordinary citizens.217 
Collective outrage combined with popular (and sometimes deeply needed) social media activism has also given 
rise to neoliberal ‘cancel culture’ which has proved highly lucrative for public relations industry offering ‘PR 
crisis management’.218 Yet it can also shun people from participation.219 Lastly, sophisticated advert tools 
conveniently allow discriminatory micro-targeting, recasting the poor and minorities as ‘low-value 
individuals’, thus providing even more ways to entrench the existing forms of disentitlement in society.220  
This reveals how schizophrenic (and perhaps fruitless) an exercise preventing the dissemination of illegal 
content is for platform companies. They are striving to curtail speech whose unprecedently effective 
dissemination is largely caused by the platforms’ own processes.221 Moreover, the company attempts to address 
dangerous content have raised their respective controversies. For instance, freedom of expression may be 
implicated when companies tweak the algorithmic weights to render valuable (but less-engaging) voices 
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practically invisible. For instance, social media platform’s internal search algorithm may be re-calibrated so 
that some search queries do not generate any results even though the content itself is still on the platform as 
before.222 Also, Facebook used to run a fact-checking project where content designated ‘fake’ received 80% 
of reduction in visibility in the News Feed algorithm.223 Arguably, from similar visibility downranking suffer 
also otherwise ‘inauthentic’ or ‘low-quality’ content, whatever these company-stamped categories entail.224  
The amplification of harmful content also brings up a peculiar challenge of ‘probabilistic free speech’.225 The 
knotty issue of probabilistic free speech is to determine whether, say, a 80% reduction in visibility on a platform 
constitutes a proportionate limitation to free expression, or what are the practical results of an 80% reduction 
in the first place.226 Is it already invisible? Intuitively, one could see that there are legitimate interests to scale 
down the virality of harmful expressions, and a person’s freedom of expression cannot include a priori 
entitlement to better visibility than other expressions.227 But some benefit from this governance while others 
must bear their adverse effects, and the determinations are made by company policy experts who impose these 
probabilistic consequences.228   
An interesting link between hard moderation and soft moderation is forged when platform companies 
discipline users for strategic ‘gaming of the system’. While some of these efforts rightly target bots, 
disinformation and hateful propaganda, also cultural workers, which have become highly dependent on social 
media visibility, have been sanctioned for trying to figure out the algorithmic workings to ensure visibility for 
their expressions.229 Those users face warnings and ultimately content/account removals. In reality, research 
has indicated that the line with ‘genuine’ and ‘ingenuine’ content often far from clear.230 The accusations of 
system-gaming are coupled with its even more villainous counterpart ‘system-abuse’.231 As the companies 
strategically insist that algorithmic visibility is somehow meritocratically earned, the gaming of users by the 
companies themselves is left unaddressed.232 In reality, a platform has been designed for gaming, it just wasn’t 
expected to be used in the interest of others than the platform companies and their business partners. 
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In sum, the social media platforms have produced a structure for the networked extensions of European public 
spheres that are impaired by structural dysfunctionalities and infested with rent-seeking and threats to several 
rights. At the same time, algorithmic intermediation of information has proved extremely efficient and 
lucrative for the companies.233 Yet it’s usually very hard for an individual to observe the relatively poorly 
understood and intangible harms of soft moderation and, thus show an infringement to mount challenge against 
these techniques. For instance, manipulative online practices are extremely hard to discern.234 
Correspondingly, Pariser notes that the bias of filter bubbles is almost impossible to see ‘within the bubble’.235 
As regards soft moderation specifically, so far the EU has introduced only some bits of high-level and non-
binding regulation.236 
3. General Framework of Cooperation and Contest 
3.1 Decentring Positive Obligations 
Thus far, we have asserted that EU and Member States have positive freedom of expression obligations to 
install an adequate legislative and administrative framework to protect people against state but also against 
private actors. We also explored the wealth of harm for free expression (and other rights) present on social 
media platforms. Harms flows interconnectedly from user action that platforms have empowered and from the 
hard and soft moderation mechanisms of platforms. These are the issues that the framework should account 
for. In this chapter, I begin exploring how social media and freedom of expression are being regulated in the 
EU and how the regulation metes out power between different actors.  
I start from the argument that effective democratic control over users’ and platform companies’ behavior is 
diminished. Regulatory studies have theorized models for effective control in such situations. As for the 
institutional forms of regulation, Julia Black’s theory on ‘decentred regulation’ is one of the most influential 
and, arguably, one of the most relevant for cyberspace regulation.237 According to Black, decentring ’is used 
to express the observation that governments do not, and the proposition that they should not, have a monopoly 
on regulation’.238 Positively, other social actors than the state, ranging from industries to international 
organizations, have come to have the power to regulate as well. No single actor has enough power to achieve 
its respective aims alone by imposing regulation unilaterally. Decentred understanding of regulation foresees 
complex interactions and interdependencies between the government and other actors, and thus, also the border 
between private and public collapses.239 However, from the decentring of regulation it also follows that there 
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is an increasing pressure to decentre fundamental rights governance too, as Laidlaw has shown.240 This 
concerns especially the traditionally state-focused positive obligations. In this sub-chapter I first briefly explore 
the challenges behind decentring and then define how this decentring leads to power struggles. 
3.1.1 Challenges for Regulating Social Media 
Decentring underlines the real practical constrains that a public regulator has come to have when trying to 
impose its will on people’s behavior on social media. It would be intellectually dishonest to overlook these 
arguments as mere masks of neoliberalism. Thus, as stated, EU’s ability to unilaterally protect rights by 
regulating social media is diminished. More specifically, I recognize three impediments which I call the 
realities of social media. While these impediments are real, I am not arguing that they appeared naturally, but 
they are manifestations of the political-economic advancement of informational capitalism. The three 
challenges are the challenge of scale, challenge of transnationalism, and challenge of complexity. 
The first challenge refers to the massive scale on which the platforms operate. For instance, at the end of last 
year, Facebook had 2,5 billion monthly active users241 and 100 billion pieces of content are posted on the 
platform each day.242 Similarly, YouTube has over 2 billion monthly users and one million hours of video is 
watched each day on the platform.243 Thus, any regulatory solution to the threats of illegal content, or to the 
threat of content moderation itself, should take into account the enormous scale of platforms.244 However, the 
argument of scale has also been deployed purposefully to imply that platforms are beyond effective regulation, 
at least without impossibly high costs.245  
Secondly, decentring theory is specifically meant to answer the effects of globalization.246 The challenge of 
transnationalism may be said to follow directly from the former challenge, as the platforms’ data analysis 
business necessitates the economies of scale.247 Thus, the platform scaling cannot be confided to any single 
nation state.248 While the biggest social media platforms were all founded in the US, they nowadays operate 
globally.249 This means that attempts to regulate often extend only to a state’s ‘respective part of cyberspace’, 
or slightly further to online activities which have a direct link to that state.250 Since platform companies operate 
globally but lack establishment in most countries, many smaller states lack the sufficient leverage to control 
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the companies.251 Only regulators that exercise control over the most valuable markets are usually a worthy 
match for the companies.252 The EU is arguably one of them. Yet transnationalism has been manifested before 
the CJEU as thorny problems of global jurisdiction.253 Jurisdictional issues are also present within the Union.254 
Lastly, ‘a system needs to be understood to be governed’.255 The challenge first refers to the notion of technical 
complexity. The workings of platform algorithms and design code that curate, amplify, report, or filter content, 
are inherently information-dense.256 Yet ample scholarship is pointing how the opaqueness of platform 
mechanisms, resulting from self-serving industry secrecy and obfuscation, is hampering regulatory efforts 
too.257 From early on, opaqueness was intentionally created and nurtured to shelter the emergent data-based 
business model from regulatory scrutiny.258 This is illustrated through the notion of information asymmetry, 
which exists not only between the citizens and companies, but informs also the relationship between regulators 
and companies. In one account, information asymmetry is summarized as follows: 
At the moment, determining exactly how to change these systems requires insight that only the 
platforms possess. Very little is publicly known about how these algorithmic systems work, yet the 
platforms know more about us each day, as they track our every move online and off.259 
Decentred regulation paradigm recognizes that many social issues are so complex that no single actor has the 
informational capacity for successful unilateral regulation. In other words, knowledge is fragmented.260 Finck 
calls to acknowledge that ‘policy-makers frequently simply do not dispose of the required skillset to engage 
with these [social system] phenomena’.261 Arguably, this does not only mean information asymmetry between 
the regulator and regulated, but underlines that not even the industry can have all the knowledge of complex 
social issues. Moreover, each actor understands the phenomenon through their respective lens, and thus also 
each actor’s information on the subject matter is constructed differently.262 But to my mind, the notion of 
information asymmetry should not be downplayed either. It is still hovering above regulatory attempts. 
 
251 Ohm (n 244) 549–550. For instance, already in 2014 Google closed its Google News service in Spain in response to 
state’s intended ‘link tax’, which was meant to protect the country’s local media. Edwards (n 158) 260. 
252 Barrie Sander, ‘Freedom of Expression in the Age of Online Platforms: The Promise and Pitfalls of a Human Rights-
Based Approach to Content Moderation’ (2020) 43 Fordham Internal Law Journal 939, 952. 
253 See Case C-18/18 Facebook Ireland, EU:C:2019:821; and Case C-507/17 Google LLC, successor in law to Google 
Inc v Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL), EU:C:2019:772. 
254 See eg, Council of Europe, ‘Liability and Jurisdictional Issues in Online Defamation Cases’ (September 2019) DGI 
(2019) 04. 
255 Mike Ananny and Kate Crawford, ‘Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of the Transparency Ideal and Its 
Application to Algorithmic Accountability’ (2018) 20 New Media & Society 973, 982. 
256 Pasquale (n 176) 61.   
257 See eg, Lynskey (n 48) 21–24; Zuboff (n 190) 88–89; Suzor (n 169) 165; and Cohen (n 17) 174–175. 
258 Zuboff (n 190) 88–92. 
259 Maréchal and Roberts Biddle (n 209) 11.  
260 Black (n 238) 107. 
261 Michèle Finck, 'Digital Co-regulation: Designing a Supranational Legal Framework for the Platform Economy' 
(2017) LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 15/2017, 19 <https://bit.ly/3fpMSPk> accessed 23 March 2020. 
262 Black (n 238) 107. 
29 
 
3.1.2 Cooperation and Contest 
We have already explored the specific challenges that pressure the EU to adopt new decentred model for 
effective control over people’s and social media companies’ actions. However, to analyze the power 
implications of the ensuing regulatory strategies, I need an analytical framework with higher granularity than 
just the efficiency/democracy trade-off outlined in the introduction. Again, I am inspired by Cohen who takes 
the idea of sovereignty in exception and adjusts it to the new environment of networked and intermediated 
information. She states that in the information age ‘[s]overeignty consists in the power to say what information 
will flow and what will not’.263 This power largely contains the power to dictate the scope and meaning of free 
expression and information: What information is blocked; what information constitutes a legal expression; 
what information is afforded visibility through algorithmic amplification; what information is disfavored?  
As a regulator’s (meaning the EU/Member States) ability to impose regulation unilaterally is diminished, 
rivalries sprout between the regulator and the private Internet companies to claim the sovereignty over 
information flows. This results in the interplay of cooperation and contest.264 According to Cohen, regulatory 
hybrids are the result of this interplay. They exhibit the power of both the state and the companies.265 Because 
of its cost-effectiveness, the new hybrid regulation is also in better harmony with neoliberal governmentality. 
Indeed, in accordance with neoliberal governmentality, decentred regulation promotes regulatory strategies 
that are hybrid (combining governmental and non-governmental actors), multi-faceted (using a number of 
different strategies simultaneously or sequentially), and indirect.266  
However, democratic control becomes residual in cooperation and contest, which is why Cohen notes that the 
information sovereignty is based on exception.267 In the sovereignty interplay, the regulator is animated by 
efficiency, effectively acting as a market-actor. It pursues policy aims with the most efficient means, all the 
while de-valuing democratic accountability. Whereas in Europe the concerns over the state of exception have 
lately focused on Hungary and Poland,268 the state of exception may be worked into society more gradually 
and insidiously too.269 This is squarely captured in Balkin’s comparison of constitutional rot and constitutional 
crisis. Constitutional rot means ‘a degradation of constitutional norms that may operate over long periods of 
time. (…) Constitutional rot is a process of decay in the features of our system of government that maintain it 
as a healthy democratic republic. As constitutional rot occurs, our system becomes simultaneously less 
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democratic and less republican’.270 In the case of free expression, it would mean a framework that relinquishes 
its ability to nurture the right’s politicizing character.  
I am taking the dialectic of cooperation and contest and applying it to the EU regulation on social media. While 
vying for sovereignty over information, the choice between cooperation and contest for both the companies 
and the EU depends on which one affords more utilitarian efficiency in a specific situation. As cooperation 
and contest are only different sides of the same efficiency coin, democratic accountability notions are 
secondary for both. However, no regulation is only a means for instrumentarian ends but affords at least some 
access points for political equality as well. Therefore, contest denotes another dialectic too, namely the 
challenge between the market interest of efficiency and political equality. In the next two sub-chapters, we set 
out the elements of cooperation in legislative and administrative framework. It is argued that in cooperation, 
the respective aims of the EU and the platform companies are thought to be aligned, making it advisable to 
work together to maximize efficiency. The latter two sub-chapters delve into the other half of contest. 
3.2 Legislative Framework: Cooperation in Norm-setting 
Cooperation is presided by the assumption that both the European regulators and platform companies share 
the same goal for the protection of free expression and other rights. It nurtures the idea that while the companies 
may have neglected looming threats, their intentions were naïve but well-meaning and ‘if only people knew 
how to behave’ we would have had an ideal public sphere. Yet the companies now genuinely want to take the 
responsibility for these unexpected adverse turns, at least, with some ‘inducements’. It also presupposes a 
consensus on the meaning of freedom of expression, i.e. that regulators and everyone else see the harms and 
their prevention/remedy the same way, and thus the aims of the regulation are simply ‘just’. 
So, in scholarship, it has been remarked that already under the e-Commerce Directive the European 
governments tended to delegate certain important public policy tasks, mainly the protection of IPR and 
counter-terrorism, to platform companies. Companies have enforced these policies through hard moderation; 
content removals and account suspensions.271 This has led to adverse incursions to free expression.272 Scholars 
have indicated that the reason for public authorities to adopt this strategy has been the possibility to evade 
constitutional scrutiny.273 Under this rationale, which Keller calls ‘laundering state action’, content take-downs 
carried out by private companies would not, presuming the relative weakness of horizontal effect, trigger the 
state responsibility in courts for removing lawful speech.274 While it has been compellingly argued that at least 
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some forms of laundered state action could nevertheless be directly attributed to the state,275 so far the strategy 
has at least to some extent worked. For instance, the CJEU has struck down only the very broadest monitoring 
injunctions imposed on the companies by Member State courts imposed under the e-Commerce Directive.276  
Within regulatory studies, this strategy can be theorized under ‘the RIT model’ where a regulator relies on 
‘regulatory intermediaries’, such as private actors, to carry out regulatory tasks.277 This requires that a regulator 
first delegates its power to an intermediary. With this strategy, the regulator can advance its interests effectively 
and efficiently. In turn, often the motivator for the intermediary here is the attainment of power.278 In EU 
platform regulation, platform companies are these intermediaries.279 However, the highly clinical term ‘RIT 
model’ hides the strategy’s neoliberal underpinnings.280 Thus, while I rely on the regulatory intermediary 
model to make sense of regulatory cooperation, I call it ‘regulatory outsourcing’ instead.  For the regulator, 
outsourcing to private intermediaries promises not only a possibility to advance vital public interests without 
constitutional constraints. It affords significant increase in efficiency as well. In this respect, providing 
adequate protection for rights is no different endeavor than, for instance, advancing public security. Setting up 
the adequate regulatory and administrative framework for the protection of users’ rights is expensive and time-
consuming. Indeed, the resource-intensiveness is thought to be inherent in positive fundamental rights 
obligations.281 Thus, while the EU is increasingly trying to incorporate fundamental rights safeguards to 
account for the older criticism, the responsibility for safeguards can be outsourced as well as another task. 
According to Cohen, outsourcing presupposes that from the perspective of the outsourcing entity, the function 
outsourced is seen as cost-intensive, peripheral, and out of the entity’s competence. In addition, ‘outsourcing 
will be efficient only if the savings in production costs outweigh the increase in communication and 
coordination costs’.282 These communication and coordination costs comprise ‘transaction costs’.283 In 
business management, transaction costs are calculated to determine whether an activity is on net more efficient 
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to keep under the direct command hierarchy within the company, or to contract out to market.284 The new 
technologies for information processing and communication promise significant savings in coordination costs, 
enabling a business organization where everything is outsourced and entirely based on networks.285 As regards 
fundamental rights, their benefits don’t easily lend themselves to quantified measuring.286 Yet the costs of 
preventative/remedying mechanisms certainly do. Therefore, complex fundamental rights aspirations are in 
danger to be run over in a cost-benefit analysis, seen mainly as expenses.287 Thus, it is tempting to conceive 
positive obligations as a prime target for regulatory outsourcing. There are two outsourcing strategies that can 
be worked into the legislative framework of social media: 1) the concept of ‘voluntariness’ and 2) binding 
norms that are principled and highly opentextured instead of precise rules. 
3.2.1 Voluntariness Conundrum, Co-regulation, and Multistakeholderism 
The first outsourcing method involves platform companies already at the stage of norm-setting. It relies on the 
strategic use of the ‘voluntariness’ concept.288 Articles 290 and 291 of the TFEU set strict conditions for the 
delegation of rulemaking powers to the Commission. Very early on, the CJEU also imposed scrupulous 
requirements for the devolvement of the Commission powers further to private actors, including the prohibition 
to delegate rulemaking power or power that the Commission does not enjoy itself. The reasoning based on the 
adverse effects that power delegation has for democratic accountability and for the oversighting function of 
the CJEU itself.289 In practice, often the devolvement of power to the Commission or private actors is not 
prescribed in EU legislation. Thus, in many technically complex sectors that are informed by high regulatory 
costs, the Commission has more recently pursued to facilitate ‘voluntary’ private regulation. It relies on 
insistence that rulemaking by private companies is not an unlawful delegation of power because compliance 
to them is voluntary.290 In practice, this private rulemaking denotes different self/coregulatory codes of 
conduct. The norm-setters, in our context the platform companies, are regulatory intermediaries which largely 
come to draft the non-binding norms, often called ‘standards’,291 on behalf of democratic legislatures. 
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However, scholarship has insightfully pointed out that ‘voluntariness’ is far from genuine if self-regulation is 
paired with implicit threats on binding regulation in the future. In fact, the threat on binding regulation in the 
future is a constitutive element of co-regulation.292 Neither is the voluntary compliance plausible if a code of 
conduct is coupled with a strong presumption of conformity by public regulator, making the code de facto 
followed standard.293 While the Commission advances a rather singular difference of ‘pure self-regulation’ and 
other (impure) self-regulation, where the impure version ‘at the EU level (…) generally involves the 
Commission in instigating or facilitating the drawing up of the voluntary agreement’.294 In any event, both 
self- and co-regulation shift the primary responsibility for regulation to private actors.295  
Unfortunately, the relationship between self/co-regulation and fundamental rights has long been strained.296 
Traditionally, the principle from the early 2000s has been that these regulatory strategies are inapplicable 
where fundamental rights are at stake.297 Importantly, this point was not reiterated in the revised 
Interinstitutional agreement on ‘better’ lawmaking.298 As Marsden notes, the core question here is that ‘who 
will decide what is so unimportant that it can be decided by co-regulation’.299 He sees the introduction of co-
regulation into fundamental rights issues resulting from the increase of commercially applied human rights 
law in various forms.300 Self/co-regulation enjoy particular allure in media and communications sector.301 The 
core problem of outsourcing fundamental rights norm-setting to social media companies is that co-regulation 
allows an access point for social media companies to define the aims of protection, i.e. which harms are 
recognized, prevented and redressed as fundamental rights harm. 
So, ‘voluntary’ self/co-regulation sidelines the democratic involvement in norm-setting somewhat entirely. 
However, arguably this could be mended by involving all the stakeholders at the stage of drafting. It means 
industry but also NGOs, academia, and perhaps even ordinary citizens among others.302 This is often meant by 
a rather uncrystallized term of ‘multistakeholderism’. Raymond and DeNardis define multistakeholderism ‘as 
two or more classes of actors engaged in a common governance enterprise concerning issues they regard as 
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public in nature, and characterized by polyarchic authority relations constituted by procedural rules’.303 The 
difference between public consultations and multistakeholderism is that the latter not only engages different 
actors but also seeks to involve them in the decision-making.304 In principle, multistakeholderism is posited to 
create a sense of ownership over regulation.305 It could facilitate democratic deliberation, innovation, 
knowledge-sharing, and increased transparency.306 
The ideal of multistakeholderism presupposes a setting where all the views are heard, debated and then fused 
to form a sort of synthesis, producing a compromise that gives consideration to all the viewpoints. However, 
its easiness again rests on the presupposed consensus over rights’ meaning. Of course, this is an illusion that 
results in blindness toward stakeholder power relations. Behind the illusion not all stakeholders agree even on 
the fundamentals and not all stakeholders are created equal. Civil society organizations and scholars are often 
marginalized and lack genuine influence in multistakeholder tables.307 In turn, other well-informed and 
abundantly resourced stakeholders, namely industry players, are strongly on the gaining side.308 The industry 
dominance in these initiatives has not been left unrecognized, and after the disillusionment of consensus it may 
become more efficient to just sideline the cranky and market-contradicting civil society stakeholders. So, the 
criticism over the ‘neoliberal capture’ of transnational multistakeholder forums has been scathing.309 
Companies can discreetly diverge regulatory discussion to efforts that are not threatening to impede business, 
while still positing themselves as allies in the pursuit of the common goal of rights protection. In this sense, 
for the industry, multistakeholderism very much delivers its promise of regulatory ownership.  
One could say that the industry capture is a problem only in (pure) self-regulation. In co-regulation, the public 
presence could guarantee equal participation and consideration for all the stakeholders’ views.310 However, in 
multistakeholder processes public regulators may have several interests at stake and the efficiency gains of 
industry solutions may strain their willingness to guarantee meaningful influence for other stakeholders.311 
Increased transparency can also be more high hopes than reality as procedural informality and confidentiality 
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arguably nurture the cooperative aura of the setting.312 In the end, this can make multistakeholderism more 
reminiscent of an ‘invisible handshake’ between regulators and industry than an open deliberative process.313 
In addition, the information asymmetry regarding the sociotechnical platform setting persists between public 
regulators and the companies as well.314 Paradoxically, this is also a part of multistakeholderism’s legitimacy 
promise: regulators should engage private stakeholders and stay on the back because they lack the finesse to 
understand the complex configurations of the Internet.315 With such a spin, the lack of democratic 
accountability of multistakeholderism turns to illegitimacy of law. In EU context, it has been indicated that 
engaging stakeholders in open regulatory dialogue could fill up the democratic deficit that has long been 
plaguing the Union and its ‘opaque legislative trilogues’.316   
Consequently, it may be that some multistakeholder initiatives are multistakeholder only by appearances. 
Wagner aptly states that in transnational Internet governance more generally, multistakeholderism is 
effectively a ‘legitimacy theatre’, which is ‘a form of political participation that focuses primarily on symbolic 
interaction’.317 Multistakeholder conferences and other forums serve as a legitimizing front stage that hides the 
real workings of mainly private power.318 Yet my claim is not that multistakeholderism could not deliver 
democratic participation and advance procedural fairness in rights protection. In practice, however, 
multistakeholderism may often fall short of delivering genuine regulatory capabilities for people. 
3.2.2 Law and the Lack of Normative Refinement 
The second outsourcing method is to impose regulatory provisions that impose generalized outcome-based 
obligations for companies instead of precise rules. The problem with rules is their lamentable inefficiency. 
Rules are rigid and thus always over- and under-inclusive.319 It means that from time to time, rules must be 
changed in a slow and overly cumbersome parliamentary process. Instead, open-ended provisions allow 
flexibility for finding out the specific means for protective goals. Regulation ‘can focus on outcomes rather 
than process, meaning that public authorities define the objectives (…) rather than precise legal rules, leaving 
platforms to decide how to best achieve them, encouraging flexibility and adaptability, and, providing room 
for maneuver to platforms’.320 Extra leeway fosters innovation by ‘harnessing a firm’s own ingenuity in 
devising (…) solutions that meet or exceed legal requirements yet fit a firm’s business model’.321 Of course, 
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on the EU level this strategy concerns mainly regulations as directives are rather principled exactly because 
they are to be translated to more precise rules in Member States. However, these implementation laws may 
only repeat the vague directive articles, as was the case with the e-Commerce Directive.   
An example here is a provision that sets the so-called systemic ‘duty of care’, which has recently become 
popular in national platform regulation initiatives and on the EU level too.322 It requires that companies 
scrupulously and proactively assess all the fundamental right risks of their information businesses and take 
adequate preventative measures to mitigate these risks.323 Such a carte blanche provision fosters companies’ 
regulatory innovation.324 Another example is the idea of ‘technology neutrality’, meaning that rules regulating 
technologies should be so vague that they would not inhibit the deployment of still-to-come technologies. As 
Busch advances, ‘legal rules that aim at regulating digital platforms need to be flexible enough to adapt to 
technological changes’.325 Again, the flexibility avoids the inefficient and strenuous legislative process.326  
To be sure, a systemic duty of care shifts the regulatory attention from harm liability to harm prevention and, 
thus, transcends the bogged-down debates on ex post moderation and liability.327 In principle, such a general 
duty could also address the issues of amplification, manipulative micro-targeting or echo chambers. Also, 
open-ended norms can account for fast technological change where rules may become outdated before they’ve 
even made their way to the Official Journal.328 Yet the daunting downside, like in rights co-regulation, is related 
to the fact that authoritative human rights texts contain mainly principled and open-ended norms themselves. 
As Fontanelli states, the application of fundamental rights requires ‘normative refinement’ which ‘can take 
place at the legislative level and/or through legal interpretation and application’.329 But rights’ ideal standards 
are not fixed and unidirectional but constantly evolving aspirations that accommodate numerous goals in 
different contexts.  
Even though rules are of course always imperfect generalizations, enacting legislative framework is still a 
place for a democratic legislator to interpret these high-level norms in a specific context. Naarttijärvi sees the 
requirement that law must reach certain qualitative requirements of precision and foreseeability as a facilitator 
of democratic deliberation: ‘Maintaining qualitative requirements of legality will uphold a vital link between 
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the language of the law (which holds democratic legitimacy through the deliberations and decisions [of the 
parliament] that precede it) and the actions and decisions of the state’. He calls it ‘qualitative legality’.330 
Importantly, qualitative legality affords also a possibility for the legislator to inject political meaning into 
freedom of expression and other fundamental rights. Correspondingly, if the relevant regulation only repeats 
the authoritative high-level standard, the power to impose the meaning of rights shifts from the legislator to 
those the standard-like provisions are addressed: primarily to platform companies.  
Similarly, technology neutrality ‘becomes in effect a transferal of power from the democratic arena to the 
architects of the digital arena; in some cases, this shifts power from the state to markets, in others from 
parliament to government agencies. In many cases it is both’.331 As flexible norms rarely require amendments 
to accommodate societal changes, the interpretative development of concepts and the very meaning of rights 
may slip from the control of democratic legislators. Technology is embedded is social contexts and new 
technologies may have been designed so that they afford harming people’s fundamental rights. These should 
be debatable in democratic forums. For instance, machine-learning algorithms are more opaque and arguably 
afford more threats to rights than simpler hash-matching re-upload filters used in hard moderation. Similarly, 
a duty of care shifts all the attention and hopes to the monitoring and enforcement of such a provision.  
3.3 Administrative Framework: Cooperation in Monitoring and 
Enforcement 
Traditionally, public administration and courts have been tasked with the contextualization of the fundamental 
rights obligations to real-life situations. In this regard, the full effects of outsourcing become visible in 
monitoring and enforcement of fundamental rights safeguards. This sub-chapter analyses how cooperation 
plays out in the implementation phase, i.e. monitoring and enforcement, which effectively become entangled. 
3.3.1 Monitoring Regulatory Chains 
According to Cappello, ‘the use of co-regulatory models for platform providers leads to a shift in the 
interpretation of concepts that were previously assessed by the courts and authorities, such as that of harmful 
content, and to a “privatisation of the law” when it comes to freedom of speech’.332 The effect is the same with 
overly broad binding norms: positive obligation doctrine is transferred within the platform companies, handled 
as an internal matter. When a duty of care and other fundamental rights responsibilities travel within the 
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companies, they are recast managerial compliance.333 Thus, the administrative framework may be to large 
extent substituted with managerial content moderation procedures. Waldman warns:  
[S]ome legal regimes characterized by vague requirements and process-oriented safe harbors give 
compliance professionals on the ground the opportunity to frame the law in accordance with 
managerial values like operational efficiency and reducing corporate risk rather than the substantive 
goals the law is meant to achieve (…) This opens the door for companies to create structures, policies, 
and protocols that comply with the law in name only.334 
It is ‘the paradigm of best practices’.335 For instance, while a systemic duty of care requires internal risk 
assessments, risks can be assessed selectively, superficially and behind the veil of corporate secrecy. That 
poses immense strain for democratic accountability and substantive fulfillment of rights. More generally, 
translating complex fundamental rights threats to ‘risks’ contains many pitfalls because, as Hildebrandt notes, 
compressing threat to risk denotes quantification which in turn presupposes a consensus on what is 
quantified.336   
Since open-ended norms allow for innovation in rights protection, the result may be something that Cohen 
calls ‘double outsourcing’.337 Regulatory intermediaries may devolve tasks and power to other entities, in 
which case those entities also become intermediaries producing ‘regulatory chains’.338 For instance, as I 
mentioned in Chapter 2.2, the platform companies may use independent contractors to outsource the human 
labor of reviewing platform content to firms like Accenture. Another instance of double outsourcing may be 
at hand when companies decide to protect rights through hard content moderation algorithms that detect and 
filter, for instance, illegal hate speech which does not enjoy the protection of freedom of expression. 
Algorithms disregard context completely.339 They don’t inject any meaning to fundamental rights concepts and 
doctrines. Instead, developers and trainers make the judicial interpretations in the (re)training of algorithms. 
According to Gillespie, ‘it is not clear that the [judicial] human labor necessary to support such automated 
tools can ever go away; it can only be shifted around’.340 Indeed, often it is shifted further down the chain and 
away from democratic scrutiny. While Facebook and Google largely develop filtering algorithms 
independently, there is a growing amount of private companies whose core business is to develop suitable 
automated filtering and detection tools, effectively creating a separate market for these technologies. Some 
 
333 Ari Ezra Waldman, ‘Power, Process, and Automated Decision-making’ (2019) 88 Fordham Law Review 613, 628. 
334 ibid 628. 
335 ibid 628. 
336 Hildebrandt (n 59) 77–78. 
337 Cohen (n 17) 158. 
338 Abbott, Levi-faur and Snidal (n 277) 24–25. The model of a chain is R → I → I² → (…) In → T. For simple model, 
see n 277. 
339 Waldman (n 333) 624. 
340 Gillespie (n 31) 107–108. 
39 
 
companies offer both the software and human reviewers as a necessary ‘human in the loop’ element for hard 
cases.341  
As, in theory, these tools should be developed so that legal content protected by freedom of expression is not 
removed, and because I want to underscore their relevance for fundamental rights law, I call them ‘balancing 
technologies’. Sometimes it may be more cost-efficient for a platform company to source these tools from 
independent developers. The third link to the chain is added when these developers outsource the training of 
algorithms to individual workers contracted through crowdsourcing platforms such as Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk.342 Another challenge here is that privately developed tools for public interest are still proprietary, which 
conjures up specific challenges for public scrutiny and accountability. For instance, the workings of these 
technologies might be sheltered by trade secrecy.343 
However, platform regulation also increasingly designates public administrative entities for monitoring and 
enforcing company obligations. In principle, this is set to guarantee at least some public control and ensure 
that company compliance can interrogate business models too. This is often the idea behind co-regulation or a 
systemic duty of care as well.344 The catch of co-regulation is thought to be the possibility to fruitfully combine 
the benefits of informal flexibility but at the same time orient the conduct of the regulated toward public interest 
and rights.345 But any system that tries to use private regulatory intermediaries for balancing interests is 
inherently unstable.346 The managerial trap here is that successful co-regulation, although perhaps more cost-
efficient than administrative law, is not necessarily cheap. Therefore, there is a constantly looming threat that 
co-regulation de facto collapses back to self-regulation and, over time, leads to ‘significant devolution of 
regulatory authority to the private sector’.347 The managerial trap is that more oversight increases transaction 
costs. The realities of social media; scale, transnationalism and complexity, only enhance the burden. 
Therefore, for an efficiency-oriented public regulator, there is a constant inducement to maintain low level of 
coordination to keep the regulatory costs down and cost-benefit calculus positive.  
In my view, plausible fulfillment of positive obligations would require that regulators interrogate work in 
moderation centers, hash databases, algorithm training data, platform interface code, and soft moderation 
algorithms. Yet monitoring long regulatory chains, where intermediaries may be situated in several countries, 
is cumbersome and greatly raises costs. The most cost-efficient coordination of outsourcing monitors only 
outcomes. This is possible by quantified performance: the transformation of rights protection to aggregated 
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figures and rates. Quantification transforms rights protection to simple numerical representation for speedy 
and efficient evaluation.348 In the context of platforms, performance evaluation is based on transparency reports 
under specific transparency requirements. But scholars has identified several deficiencies in the use of 
simplistic indicators: reports becoming an aim in itself; the dependency on technical expertise; and ‘the 
distortion of public values into numbers’ where phenomena that are not easily measured are left unreported.349 
The figures of transparency reports are often obscure and tell little how concepts and categories are 
interpreted.350 In addition, as regards business sustainability reporting in general, ‘[e]ven among those actors 
who read the reports, many do not find them useful’.351  
In the end, the public authorities responsible for coordination might not have any idea how the imposed 
standards are practically fulfilled. In the end, as is often the case with outsourcing in global business, the threat 
is that the original outsourcing entity (EU/Member States), let alone wider public, has no effective control over 
the other end of the regulatory chain, where the adjudicative work is ultimately done.352  
3.3.2 Bargaining Enforcement and Impaired Horizontality 
In terms of enforcement, one could expect that the receding of legislator, informed by the change from rigid 
rules to flexible rarely amended norms, could usher in a golden age of principled constitutional adjudication 
to check that companies do not implicate users’ rights while supposedly protecting them. Indeed, as rights can 
collide, courts normally recourse to principled and precedent-based proportionality test that balances different 
rights and interests by ‘optimizing’ the rights enjoyment case by case.353 The quest for this contextual fair 
balance is at the core of constitutional doctrine and also brings on the evolvement of fundamental rights.354 
The slow process of interpretation ultimately constructs the constitutional doctrine. However, the full-blown 
individual court review appears unsuitable when courts are faced with the challenges of scale and 
complexity.355 The Internet produces a bulk of ‘low-interest’ cases that are hard to manage by full-blown court 
review.356 It’s often of little use to challenge a single hard moderation case in a court process that may take 
years and costs a lot. In turn, as I mentioned in Chapter 2.3, soft moderation harms are often intangible and 
invisible for individuals. Consequently, few online cases reach the courtroom and even fewer reach the highest 
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(supra)national courts, the access to which is behind a long list of admissibility criteria. Also, the fast 
development of technology makes reliance on precedent often hard.357  
The challenges of court review inform two changes in the enforcement of fundamental rights safeguards. 
Firstly, on the individual level there is a trend to rely on speedy and efficient online dispute resolution 
mechanisms for redress. The provision of these mechanisms can again be outsourced to the companies. All the 
biggest platform already provide an appeal mechanism for hard moderation cases.358 The procedural obscurity 
of online dispute resolution, however, poses challenges to public accountability and procedural fairness.359 In 
addition, it is impossible for people to assert their rights claims against the companies through new low-
threshold mechanisms. Companies are naturally adjudicating fair balance only between users, not between 
rights of the company and rights of the user(s). So, for instance, if one feels that her freedom of expression and 
information is implicated by a platform’s potentially manipulating hypernudging, one should not expect much 
success from the standardized online appeal process, operated by the suspect company itself.   
Secondly, specialized administrative agencies are increasingly tasked with not only monitoring but also 
enforcement of new standard-like norms.360 Importantly, the expert-armed administrative agencies could 
invent more workable ways to interrogate the company power than courts.361 Arguably, this includes the ability 
to address systemic rights issues better than court adjudication which is often more tied to the context of a 
specific case. In case ESMA (standing for European Securities and Markets Authority), the CJEU was willing 
to accept the devolvement of overseeing powers to the agency exactly because issues of finance are 
information-thick as well, and the agency can be more easily vested with the technical expertise needed.362  
The agencies that pop up are typically vested with a wide repertoire of administrative powers. Sanctions create 
a continuum from rather lenient warnings and ‘compliance negotiations’ to highly stringent coercive 
measures.363 According to Yeung, the more lenient end of the continuum exhibits ‘bargaining’. It means 
procedurally informal negotiation between the regulator and regulated, as opposed to formal and public 
adjudication.364 Often the informal process is inscrutable to the public eye and only the outcomes of 
enforcement processes are publicized.365 Importantly, the more coercive sanctions are prone to years-long 
company challenge in court, which makes them less cost-effective for the regulator compared to the consensus-
driven compliance enforcement measures.366 The preference for more benign sanctions is in line with the 
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findings of Short, who has observed that from the 90s to mid-2000s, ‘coercive-state anxiety’ rose in legal 
scholarship that located the main problem of regulation in its coercive nature.367 But as we saw in Chapter 2.1, 
positive obligations often limit the rights of others and thus presume coercion. Disproportionate attention on 
state coercion also produces a disparate lean toward negative obligations and the benignity of enforcement 
may left the fulfillment of the positives ones half-way. 
Together, informality and obscurity of new monitoring and enforcement mechanisms may render even 
adequate oversight almost as opaque as company measures and sever them from democratic control.368 At the 
same time, in the fear of populist authoritarian rise, EU policies have sometimes tended to stress rule of law as 
requiring independence from the government.369 However, the threat to independence may come from two 
directions. The opaqueness of monitoring/enforcement and the presupposed consensus over fundamental rights 
can make the regulatory agencies prone to capture. In regulatory capture, ‘intermediaries become the leaders 
in regulation, with the ostensible rule-makers following them’.370 
In sum, regulatory cooperation gives rise to something I call ‘impaired horizontality’. On the one hand, 
regulation does indeed recognize that the relationships of social media users, as private actors, must be 
regulated by installing a legislative and administrative framework on social media. On the other hand, however, 
to control people’s behavior more effectively and efficiently, the cooperative framework devolves positive 
obligations to regulatory intermediaries, i.e. within the platform companies, from which they may be further 
diffused to regulatory chains that are highly resistant to democratic scrutiny. As we saw in Chapter 2.1, positive 
obligations are indeed hard to define acontextually. That’s why the ECtHR often leaves the determination of 
the most suitable means for their fulfillment to the discretion of the state under the doctrine of margin of 
appreciation.371 Outsourcing through standards, coupled with administrative oversight and informal bargaining 
makes it also harder to discern public interference from private and other way around. In sum, state-mediated 
horizontality becomes only lightly mediated by EU/Member States.  
Moreover, cooperative framework threatens to enhance company power instead of scrutinizing it. The 
companies have perhaps become more amenable for positive obligations that require maintaining safe public 
sphere, for instance, by sanctioning harmful expressions or stamping fact-checking labels.372 However, they 
cannot critically assess the most striking power asymmetry on social media that may threaten users’ free 
expression, namely the power relationship between themselves and users. No ‘best practice’ devised by the 
companies can undermine the companies’ own information organization business, even if the business would 
be the source of abuse. Therefore, the companies are incapable of implementing the non-domination principle 
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to the fundamental rights framework. This job would fall to the public administration. Unfortunately, the very 
idea of cooperation between public and private power prefers consensus and discourages outright challenge. 
Lastly, even though the CJEU has recently embraced horizontality of the Charter more candidly,373 for the 
reasons indicated above, traditional ex post individual court review does not sit well with content moderation 
issues and complex technology. This makes it harder for courts to check the legally enhanced power of the 
companies, rendering the doctrines of indirect (and direct) horizontality less effective too. Thus, impaired 
horizontality has great challenges in fostering people’s democratic self-determination. 
3.4 EU Contest: Fiat Interdiction  
Despite the seemingly harmonious cooperation in the protection of users’ freedom of expression and other 
rights, the EU and the platform companies have also crossing aims.374 The previous sub-chapters outlined the 
cooperative part of regulation which is facilitated by the presupposed consensus over the meaning of free 
expression (and related rights). But regulation could not come into being if the EU would not observe that 
company conduct leaves to be desired. However, we must remember that neither the EU/Member States nor 
the companies are usually positioned to unilaterally dictate the regulation, which results in necessary 
compromises that fuse contest with cooperation. This sub-chapter analyses the element of contest by the EU. 
In this sub-chapter it becomes clear that the EU has chosen to advance also less benign techniques. This has 
led the companies to pick up free expression arguments to challenge these claims, which is explored in the 
next sub-chapter. 
The EU legislator has many vital interests at stake in content regulation. According to Cohen, in some cases, 
the regulator is seeking to assert its sovereignty over platform companies to dictate information flows 
unilaterally.375 Government measures deploy the logics of ‘fiat interdiction’, which denotes draconian 
impositions for companies to block forbidden information. The mandates designate specific types of content 
as existential threats for public interests. Thus, urgent and exceptional countermeasures are purportedly 
justified.376 One could assume, for instance, that the proprietary algorithms affording wide-scale manipulation 
for political-economic gain warrant exceptional regulatory measures. But the monsters sketched here are more 
conventional and potentially more suspect too. Within tech circles in the US, the threats were called ‘the “Four 
Horsemen of the Infocalypse”: terrorism, drug dealers, pedophiles, and organized crime’ with large-scale IPR 
infringement appearing soon after.377 In Europe, especially terrorism and threats to IPR have emerged as 
existential threats that require exceptional public interference.378 
 
373 See generally, Eleni Frantziou, '(Most of) the Charter of Fundamental Rights is Horizontally Applicable' (2019) 15 
European Constitutional Law Review 306. 
374 Abbott, Levi-faur and Snidal (n 277) 30, noting that intermediaries’ goals are not always in the public interest. 
375 Cohen (n 17) 109–110. 
376 ibid 110–111. 
377 ibid 110. 
378 As regards IPR, it is illustrating that before 2019 the CJEU jurisprudence on platform liability under the e-
Commerce Directive revolved solely around IPR violations. See eg, Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v eBay; and Case C‑360/10 
SABAM v Netlog.  
44 
 
Therefore, often the logic of fiat interdiction brings regulation into existence in the first place. However, the 
lack of effective control, coupled with the need for utilitarian efficiency, may reduce fiat interdiction to 
cooperation. For instance, in Chapter 3.3.2, I argued that administrative agencies oversee platforms with 
preference for cost-efficient means of benign compliance bargaining. Yet we noticed that broad administrative 
mandates afford more coercive powers as well. Sometimes public incursions surmount the intensive anxiety 
over costs, producing regulation that forfeits cooperation and seeks to control users with raw power that 
formally resembles traditional ‘command-and-control’ regulation.379 Usually this is manifested in 
straightforward orders to take down individual pieces of content that a public authority has either generally or 
individually stamped illegal. Again, characteristic here are justifications for draconian powers of law 
enforcement that invoke the language of extraordinary threats.380 However, I have already argued that public 
oversight is not always much more democratically accountable than private governance. Especially the 
operations of police and intelligence agencies may be veiled in ominous secrecy that seeks to ensure 
effectiveness/efficiency.381 So, for instance, it was recently claimed that the French Internet Referral Unit had 
demanded a removal of 550 URLs from the Internet Archive which contained publications from governments 
among others. These were arguably falsely stamped as terrorist propaganda.382       
Thus, the logic of fiat interdiction of course raises the familiar worries of government overreach and even 
censorship. Of course, in many countries there is a real reason to worry for government overreach, as many 
authoritarian regimes have been eager to claim their sovereignty over platforms to suppress political 
opposition, minorities, or human rights activists.383 For instance, Gillespie recounts how Russia has been 
particularly innovative in curtailing ‘forbidden information’, grounding its justifications in a wide array of 
existential threats ranging from cybercrime to surveillance by the US National Security Agency.384 However, 
censorship fears have also been raised against EU’s recent interdiction efforts.385 Yet at least in well-
functioning democracies, fiat interdiction is harder to impose without constitutional restraint simply because 
the government overreach is something that constitutional law is accustomed to handle with the straightforward 
doctrine of negative obligations. So, for instance, it is unquestionable that law enforcement is, at least in 
principle, always obliged by fundamental rights and courts are familiar with scrutinizing state practices. For 
instance, the ECtHR is steadily mounting a pile of case-law on different government incursions, interrogating 
administrative powers without proper fundamental rights safeguards.386  
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3.5 Company Contest: Free Expression Management         
Regulatory intermediaries normally have their own diverging interests they seek to advance with their new 
legally endowed powers.387 Indeed, the platform companies have developed their own strategies to contest 
EU’s unilaterally imposed mandates of fiat interdiction that may not afford the same leeway for the companies 
as regulatory cooperation. Cohen gathers them under the logics of ‘innovative and expressive immunity’ which 
includes strategies both in the courtroom and within the realm of public relations. I name one of these 
immunities ‘free expression management’. This sub-chapter outlines the elements of free expression 
management that companies mount to challenge the EU and European regulators.   
3.5.1 Platform Companies as Fundamental Right Subjects 
There is extensive scholarship on how the platform companies have triggered the First Amendment protection 
to shelter their business operations from regulatory scrutiny.388 However, while in Europe companies are also 
entitled to free expression,389 it is doubtful that social media companies’ hard moderation systems or 
algorithmic soft moderation can be considered companies’ exercise of free expression. The picture is slightly 
more complex. Under the ECtHR jurisprudence, platforms as media enjoy indirect free expression protection 
as facilitators of peoples’ expressions.390 Consequently, the platform companies seek to place themselves at 
the forefront in struggles over users’ free expression and invoke ‘narratives about heroic civil libertarian 
opposition to state censorship’.391 While the idea of privately protected freedom of expression challenges the 
logic of fiat interdiction outlined above, it is entirely in line with neoliberal governmentality. As with 
regulatory cooperation, free expression management advances again the proposition that positive obligations 
flowing from freedom of expression are well fulfilled by private companies. 
Freedom of expression and information has for long been fused in the companies’ political economy. For 
instance, freedom of expression is inextricable part of the companies’ outspoken missions. YouTube’s four 
values are freedom of expression, freedom of information, freedom of opportunity, and freedom to belong.392 
Twitter in turn is promoting free expression and ‘protecting the health of the public conversation around the 
world’.393 Jørgensen has conducted insightful qualitative research on how freedom of expression is framed 
within Facebook and Google. It reveals that the companies have indeed deeply internalized their new role as 
frontline fighters.394 Yet, as Schwarz points out, private governance is not even nominally impartial.395 In 
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effect, free expression management seeks to impose a very particular framing for freedom of expression that 
works in the political-economic interests of companies.396 This framing mandates vigilance when it comes to 
threats from states but is willfully blind to any issue that would stem directly from the companies’ businesses. 
Cohen notes that although platform companies’ resistance against public incursion may ‘also implicate users’ 
rights of privacy, expression, and association, platforms more often seem to be principally concerned with 
establishing their own regulatory independence’.397 Suzor claims that ‘[u]ser interests have been able to be 
protected when they align with the interests of the tech sector. But often, technology companies are most 
worried about their own legal risks and costs’.398 
If we take free expression management as a strategy to maintain information sovereignty, it becomes visible 
that it’s not confined to freedom of expression. Companies’ self-serving frame of free expression receives 
backing from the fact that companies’ businesses of information sovereignty are protected by freedom to 
conduct business, as enshrined in Article 16 of the Charter, and the right to property, as enshrined in Article 
17.399 Kaye insightfully states: ‘It remains an open question how freedom of expression concerns raised by 
design and engineering choices should be reconciled with the freedom of private entities to design and 
customize their platforms as they choose’.400 For instance, in the European case law, the Internet companies’ 
right to conduct business has sometimes played a more significant role than freedom of expression when the 
CJEU has struck down the mandates to monitor unlawful content.401 
3.5.2 Free Expression Protection vs Free Expression Management   
In my view, free expression management is rooted in three intertwined assumptions on the right’s meaning 
that frame the scope of protection, i.e. what harms are recognized under freedom of expression and what are 
left out. These three assumptions differentiate free expression protection, which aims to nurture democratic 
self-determination, from company-served free expression management. These assumptions are: 1) that 
freedom of expression and information is connected to presumptive virtuousness of unimpeded private 
innovation; 2) that freedom of expression is fulfilled through individual user ‘empowerment’; and 3) that 
freedom of expression is meant to protect primarily against public incursions. In turn, freedom of expression 
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protection could potentially offer protection beyond these imperatives to account for harms that don’t fall into 
the frame of management. 
Firstly, in informational capitalism innovation rises to prominence as it becomes the crucial competitive 
weapon in the market.402 Its presumed goodness is connected to the Silicon Valley efficiency ideology 
prescribing that social and political issues are solvable through Internet technology. Therefore, the ongoing 
parade of new applications and other tools would eventually lead us to a some sort of technosolutionist 
utopia.403 Indeed, ‘freedom of expression is described as inherent in the services themselves’ turning the right 
into ‘product features’.404 This ideology informs, for example, Facebook’s political-economic statements that 
frame its services as ubiquitous, foundational, if not essential for being social.405 Moreover, the innovation 
imperative sees regulation as its ‘mortal enemy’, from which it follows that regulation that constrains free 
experimentation is to be resisted with full force.406  
In reality, innovation is not inherently good, but can sometimes be harmful and dangerous.407 All the 
mechanisms of platforms have certainly been innovative. While they’ve brought many benefits that are well-
known, the same innovations have also brought new harms and amplified many existing ones, as we explored 
in Chapter 2. While some of these consequences have likely been unintended, others have not. For instance, it 
has been recently revealed that Facebook had indeed understood that its innovative soft moderation algorithms 
were not connecting people, but in fact driving them apart, and that some of its algorithms were 
disproportionately implicating racial minorities. Yet the company pushed ahead with harmful innovation.408 
These choices are understandable when we remember that private innovation is self-interested. As any 
innovated solution must fit to the business model, the political economy of the companies imposes necessary 
boundaries for their innovative capabilities. Indeed, it has been observed that technoscientific innovation has 
become thoroughly marged with data rentiership where ‘people and businesses are innovating in order to 
create data assets and data rents: they come up with new mechanisms, devices, or instruments of data 
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ownership and control that are designed to extract value through the ownership and control of personal data’.409 
So, there is a striking mismatch between the front that posits companies as altruistic ‘connectors of the world’ 
in the name of free expression and information, and the practical backside quest for the appropriation of data. 
The second assumption of the individual empowerment cherishes the very traditional liberal ideal of the 
rational individual who dispassionately assesses the quality of information and disregards demagogy.410 For 
Silicon Valley, this self-reliant rational individual ideal is fused with the idea of consumer who is always 
right.411 For YouTube/Google, user empowerment is afforded by their tools and it means ‘choice, opportunity, 
and exposure to a diversity of opinion’.412 This leads to despise for the editors of old media that don’t promote 
consumer choice but passive media consumption.413 Decentralized social networks afford interaction. Thus, it 
follows that more information means more choice, and freedom of information equates with ‘the more the 
better’. In addition, as rational deliberation requires information as a basis for decision-making, more 
information purportedly results in more rationalism.414 But as Pollicino points out, people’s time has not 
increased from 24 hours a day.415 Neither have their capabilities for maintaining attention reached super-human 
levels. Social networks do not only replace old media gatekeepers but also place social media algorithms as 
new power hubs of information control.416 As platforms are characterized by infoglut, users become highly 
dependent on platform features and recommendations that can make the glut legible.  
In reality, a platform does not even aim to set the stage for users’ rational deliberation but instead to structure 
information so that it nudges people toward specific choices that, while marketed as consumerist 
personalization, are often motivated by political-economic interests. Similarly, the interfaces encourage 
habitual and mind-numbing clicking of stylized ‘like’ and other social buttons instead of conscious 
interaction.417 Of course, nudging does not lead to guaranteed user choices – that would mean belittlement of 
agency. Nevertheless, it’s not self-evident that social media leads to significantly better ‘user empowerment’ 
than linear media, and one cannot exactly describe it leading to individual rationality unbound. Incessant 
nudging reveals a paradox when it’s coupled with the industry’s empowerment rhetoric: neoliberal 
individuality is celebrated while more realistic, context-dependent individual agency is undermined by 
manipulative nudging. Moreover, one-sided imperative of individual personalization does not consider that 
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maybe the relativization of all information may not only erode the existing societal basis, but also make it 
harder for people to come together to build a new one.    
From the two previous assumption logically follows the third that sees the role of the government mainly 
through negative obligations. Jørgensen summarizes: ‘As such, the human rights discourse is not foreign to 
these companies; however, it has been firmly rooted in the context in which governments make more or less 
legitimate requests and companies respond and push back against such requests’.418 Company experts are 
incredulous towards government take-down requests and eagerly conduct secondary reviews against freedom 
of expression standards.419 Moreover, in some cases, the companies even directly challenge government take-
down orders in courts and making their case relying on freedom of expression.420 For instance, Twitter 
challenges court orders mandating removal of content based on its free expression commitment.421  
Isolated fights against states are published in the companies’ transparency reports. But transparency can 
obfuscate also intentionally.422 So, companies have designated reports both as a new commitment of 
cooperation and, at the same time, a discreet challenge to governments.423 In that way, the ongoing reporting 
requirements we addressed in Chapter 3.3 can also be weaponized and directed back against European 
regulators. The number and details of every government order and request are diligently documented and 
publicized in transparency reports.424 As another example, Facebook fancies publicizing reports on how it 
shelters fragile democracies from disinformation by foreign governments.425 However, abrupt silence ensues 
when one asks about their proprietary soft moderation algorithms or advert personalization tools.426  
Of course, independent (i.e. privately controlled) media has always been a corner stone mechanism for 
critiquing those in power. However, Cohen sees that the assumption that regulating speech equates with 
censorship has created a hysteria that impairs regulators from addressing the novel and still poorly understood 
harms of social media.427 The looming threat of censorship arguably informs the doctrine of positive 
obligations on freedom of expression too. Kuczerawy points out that positive obligations are in general less 
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developed regarding freedom of expression than, for instance, the right to privacy in Article 8 of the ECHR.428 
However, companies are not against positive rights obligations that call for assertive action per se. For instance, 
according to the companies, their hard content moderation nurtures safe public sphere for all expressions.429 
Instead, platforms idea of positive obligations is distinctly selective. This idea is conveyed to regulators by 
implying that only through cooperation with companies they can avoid the slippery slope of censorship.  
This brings us back to the concept of impaired horizontality I introduced in Chapter 3.3.2: Companies are 
regulating the relationships between users (as private actors), for instance, when they regulate hate speech to 
maintain a public sphere that fosters everyone’s right to express themselves. At the same time, however, this 
horizontality is impaired because it’s incapable of scrutinizing the most profound power asymmetry between 
two private actors, namely the relationship between  user(s) and a social media company. The inability persists 
because company’s own interests will prevail in case there exists an interest conflict.430 To be sure, it is not 
always that companies are playing down issues of their business with bad intentions, but within the companies 
people consider it inconceivable that their business or the algorithmic processes of platform itself could 
actually jeopardize free expression or other rights.431  
The ideology that comprises the three assumptions of private innovation, individual empowerment, and state 
non-interference, is squarely illustrated by the distinctly American ‘marketplace of ideas’ metaphor.432 It is the 
convergence point of market efficiency that should be free from public interference, and freedom of expression 
that preferably should be left with modest public interference too. While scholarship has questioned the 
metaphor and noted its unsuitability with European freedom of expression,433 it is faithfully followed by 
platform companies and thus far from irrelevant. The reason for contesting fiat interdiction specifically with 
freedom of expression is the right’s argumentative weight. Kaye summarizes this well by stating that:   
It is much less convincing to say to authoritarians, “We cannot take down that content because that 
would be inconsistent with our rules,” than it is to say, “Taking down that content would be 
inconsistent with the international human rights our users enjoy and to which your government is 
obligated to uphold”.434  
The strategy works equally well against regulatory efforts that would target the algorithmic mediation of 
information, after all, free expression in principle protects the medium as well.435 While Kaye is willing to rely 
on the companies mainly against authoritarian governments, some scholars have already been willing to throw 
their faith in platform companies against incursive European regulation. For instance, Citron remarks: 
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‘Ultimately, Silicon Valley may be our best protection against [EU] censorship creep’.436 Others have 
envisioned models for companies to find rights’ fair balance algorithmically.437 To be sure, the company efforts 
against censoring can sometimes be laudable. However, well-meaning encouraging of company contest may 
look aside their interests and the undemocratic underpinnings of private protection. 
4. Case Studies of Cooperation and Contest  
This Chapter builds on the previous chapter to contextualize cooperation and contest by analyzing the level of 
hybridity in regulatory instruments. I have opted for three initiatives the EU has introduced during the last five 
years to analyze them as case studies. While there is also other regulation regarding social media, I have chosen 
these firstly because they are different in nature: one is a formally non-binding code of conduct, the second is 
a directive, and the last a regulation which is directly applicable. This allows me to assess how the more 
theoretical arguments on cooperation and contest are visible in different regulation. I can assess how the choice 
of instrument may affect the degree of involvement of private actors, the hypothesis being that the level of 
hybridity is not the same in a directly applicable regulation as in a code of conduct. I believe this may bring 
more insights than, for instance, assessing three different codes of conduct would.  
Secondly, the material scope of the three case studies, while to some extent overlapping, is also different in 
that one considers primarily the prevention of hate speech, one protection of minors, and one counter-terrorism. 
This widens the scope compared to three instruments that would address for instance only terrorism. However, 
the case studies do of course converge in that all seek to explicitly give consideration to freedom of expression 
by maintaining a safe public sphere while also providing free expression safeguards (together forming a 
legislative and administrative framework). Naturally, one could say that the relevance of freedom of expression 
flows already from the fact the instruments are regulating media.  
4.1 Code of Conduct on Hate Speech 
The first case study to be examined through cooperation and contest is EU Code of Conduct on Hate Speech 
(hereafter the Code).438 As the title indicates, it aims to target hate speech on the biggest social media platforms. 
Agreed in 2016, it is also chronologically one of the first instruments in the ‘new wave’ of EU regulation on 
social media platforms that has emerged during the last five years. Arguably, it is also the ‘softest’ of the 
instruments examined here. One could even claim that it is not content regulation, but a plain self-regulatory 
effort because, after all, the Code is supposedly ‘voluntary commitment’.439 However, as we saw in Chapter 
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3.2.1, the Commission’s use of voluntariness is primarily strategic and as we will see, the Commission’s degree 
of involvement indeed suggests otherwise. 
4.1.1 EU Internet Forum 
The Code is a brainchild of the multistakeholder EU Internet Forum (hereafter the Forum). The Forum was 
initially envisioned in the Commission’s Communication on Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and 
Violent Extremism in 2014 to ‘[c]ooperate more closely with civil society and the private sector to address 
challenges faced online’.440 The Commission would set up a forum with key industry players to discuss a wide 
range of issues related to ‘dangerous propaganda’ online. Officially, the Forum was launched on 3 December 
2015 and has worked as a facilitator of cooperation ever since.441 Despite a somewhat generic name, it has 
only two aims, to prevent terrorism and hate speech on Internet platforms. However, it seems that these goals 
have always been intertwined. Of course, with indications of the rising extremism in Europe, this link is not 
farfetched. In late 2016, the Commission informed that ‘[t]he EU Internet Forum has two key objectives: to 
reduce accessibility to terrorist content online; and to empower civil society partners to increase the volume of 
effective alternative narratives online’.442 
Even though the Forum was to bring together multiple types of stakeholders, already at the beginning it was 
clear that the priority was cooperation with the industry. By contrast, civil society was envisioned to be 
structurally skewed from the Forum to subsumed under the parallel Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) 
initiative.443 The launch meeting minutes picture a slightly paternalistic approach: platform companies and 
public stakeholders would work together to ‘empower civil society partners to challenge the extremist narrative 
online’.444 Yet civil society empowerment through participation at the meetings was not advocated. While the 
intention seemed to be that civil society would be allowed to the workshops of the Forum ‘on a case-by-case 
basis’,445 it was only after several demands that NGOs European Digital Rights (EDRi) and AccessNow were 
allowed to the discussion tables on hate speech.446 The European Parliament is not part of the Forum. 
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The organization of the Forum comprises multistakeholder meetings on three levels, with ad hoc trainings, 
workshops and awareness raising events at the ‘intermediate level’ constituting the main work.447 The 
workshops are meant to ‘address the practical implementation of the common objectives and related actions 
and advis[ing] the Forum on other relevant initiatives, including in the area of hate speech online’.448 The 
annual High level event engages also Member States, while the governance level would gather together at 
‘expert level’ for follow-up and reporting activities.449 The Forum has by now become well-known for its 
notorious secrecy. Barely anything has been publicly disclosed from its meetings and the influence of different 
stakeholders to the final text of the Code is unknown. The Commission’s unwillingness to disclose information 
on the companies’ views at the Forum, even after an access to documents request, escalated to a point where 
EDRi issued a complaint to the European Ombudsman.450  
From the Commission’s initial dismissing decision and the Ombudsman’s decision we can observe the 
reasoning underlying the Forum’s secrecy. It was broadly based on two justifications which can be neatly 
subsumed under the need for efficiency. In accordance with the logics of fiat interdiction, the first evokes a 
narrative of public security being under the existential threat of terrorism. The Commission noted that 
‘[i]dentifying companies and revealing their views and action taken against terrorist content on the internet 
would seriously undermine the effectiveness and success of the measures implemented’ and ‘would reveal 
vulnerabilities that terrorists could further exploit’.451 In effect, ‘the prevailing interest is to secure the effective 
organisation and follow-up of the EU Internet Forum and ultimately the Commission's efforts to address 
violent extremism’.452 The second justification privileges companies’ commercial interests over the public 
accountability concerns. The Secretary-General summarized: 
Nor have I, based on my own analysis, been able to identify any elements capable of demonstrating 
the existence of a public interest that would override the need to protect the Commission's decision-
making process and the companies' commercial interests in the framework of the EU Internet Forum. 
This squarely sums up the pitfalls of regulatory cooperation that foresees convergence and strong 
interdependency between companies and the EU. It also exhibits the efficiency/democracy trade-off. The 
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Ombudsman Emily O’Reilly was convinced by the Commission’s arguments with barely a hint of critique.453 
Being gripped by the existential threat of terrorism, she was effectively also protecting platform companies’ 
right to business at the expense of public’s capabilities to scrutinize regulation. 
While we cannot really know who contributed to what part of the Code and how, it has become clear that the 
influence of the civil society stakeholders was minimal. When the Code was released, EDRi and AccessNow 
roundly rejected its statements, announced their thorough sidelining during the discussions, and resigned from 
the Forum altogether.454 Thus, we can see that the gap between the ideal of co-regulatory multistakeholderism 
and the practice could hardly be any wider. The Commission seemed so anxious to see the Forum ‘succeed’ 
that it felt the trade-off necessary. Fruitful cooperation purportedly requires that the informal setting of 
discussions is nurtured by opaqueness. Indeed, the Commission reminded EDRi that  
engagement with different stakeholders and in particular with the industry is based on a relationship 
of mutual trust among all stakeholders involved. Public disclosure of the positions or proposals of 
stakeholders or Member States would undermine that necessary climate of mutual trust.455  
One may wonder, where exactly lies the extra openness compared, for instance, to the ordinary legislative 
process so lambasted by the proponents of multistakeholderism.456 As the above analysis shows, public 
facilitation does not automatically guarantee equal consideration for all the stakeholders. 
4.1.2 Code and Its Monitoring 
After analyzing the process preceding the Code, we can proceed to its content. The document is somewhat 
brief. It is divided into a more introductory part and an ensuing list of 12 more specific commitments. The 
introductory part starts with a solemn proclamation: 
Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube (…) – also involved in the EU Internet Forum – share, 
together with other platforms and social media companies, a collective responsibility and pride in 
promoting and facilitating freedom of expression throughout the online world.457   
However, straight after it is noted that the companies also share the Commission’s and the Member States’ 
commitment to fight against illegal hate speech, as defined in Article 1 of the Council Framework Decision 
2008/913/JHA.458 Notably, the Parliament is not mentioned, as it was not invited to the Forum in the first place. 
The purpose of the Code is primarily to serve the companies by ‘guiding their own activities as well as sharing 
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best practices with other internet companies, platforms and social media operators’.459 Thus, it is unsurprising 
that the general obligation is in line with free expression management: ‘Companies, taking the lead on 
countering the spread of illegal hate speech online, have agreed with the European Commission on a code of 
conduct setting the following public commitments’.460  
The general statement is followed by the more specific obligations that prescribe a suite of standards for 
removing hate speech that conveniently resemble companies’ hard content moderation processes. The 
importance of efficiency is stressed throughout. For instance, the companies are to have in place ‘clear and 
effective processes to review notifications regarding illegal hate speech’ to remove such content. In addition, 
the companies need to ‘provide information on the procedures for submitting notices, with a view to improving 
the speed and effectiveness of communication between the Member State authorities and the IT Companies’.461 
Vaguely enough, the notifications are to be managed by ‘dedicated teams’, which conveniently allows further 
efficiency to be gained by double outsourcing the work to sub-contractors.462 However, the companies are to 
train their personnel on ‘current societal developments’, which arguably could require them to pay attention to 
the doctrinal evolution of fundamental rights as well.463 After all, the companies are required to assess the 
notifications not only against their community standards but also law, ‘where necessary’.464 
In sum, the Code is deeply entrenched in managerial cooperation, deploying outsourcing in earnest. However, 
it is entirely a matter of faith whether and how the companies de facto adhere to their prideful free expression 
statements, or to hate speech removal either. To be sure, the Code prescribes public monitoring in the form of 
ongoing performance reporting. Monitoring of hate speech management is carried out by the Commission 
itself with ‘a network of civil society organisations’ tasked to aggregate the relevant quantifications.465 The 
Commission has since the release of the Code published yearly reporting factsheets that include ‘key figures’ 
to measure success. The latest factsheet is from February 2019 including also the results of earlier monitoring 
rounds.466 Apparently, this was also the year when the Code could be announced to have delivered a definitive 
success. Vĕra Jourová, then Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, solemnly declared: 
‘Today, after two and a half years, we can say that we found the right approach [to hate speech] and established 
a standard throughout Europe on how to tackle this serious issue, while fully protecting freedom of speech’.467 
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The monitoring factsheet indicates that the best indicator of success is that companies have continuously 
increased speed, with most of the notifications assessed promptly within 24 hours, reaching an average of 
89%.468  
It seems that companies have also magically found almost a perfect balance between illegal hate speech and 
protected speech, which practically means that, in average, 72% of the illegal hate speech notified is removed. 
The Commission estimates this ‘a satisfactory removal rate, as some of the content flagged by users could 
relate to content that is not illegal. In order to protect freedom of speech only content deemed illegal should be 
removed’.469 Unfortunately, it is not disclosed how the Commission knows that 72% indicates an accurate fair 
balance. Removal rates, however, vary depending on the severity of hateful content. 85.5% of ‘content calling 
for murder or violence against specific groups’ was removed, while presumably the more controversial 
‘content using defamatory words or pictures to name certain groups’ was removed only in 58.5 % of the cases. 
Purportedly, this proves that ‘the reviewers assess the content scrupulously and with full regard to protected 
speech’.470 One can but admire the confidence given that the company-specific removal rates indicated 
significant variation. For instance, YouTube removed 85.4 % of notified content, while Twitter only 43,5 %. 
The differences might reflect the respective tastes of the companies as, for instance, Twitter used to be known 
for its unbridled adherence to the First Amendment.471 Be as it may, the differences are inscrutable, 
unchallengeable, and suggest rather arbitrary interpretation of the relevant fundamental rights concepts.  
In September 2019, the Commission also published an extra report addressed to the Council, which assessed 
the company measures against some of the specific Code commitments. Again, the results are noted to reveal 
an overall success in terms of efficiency.472 It remarks: 
The current average removal rate [of stable 70%] can be considered as satisfactory in an area such as 
hate speech, given that the line against speech that is protected by the right to freedom of expression 
is not always easy to draw and is highly dependent on the context in which the content was placed.473 
As regards staff training, the standard is met as all companies conduct ‘regular and frequent trainings, and 
provide coaching and support for their teams of content reviewers, including on the specificities of hate speech 
content’. Facebook is reported to hold discussions in every two weeks.474 According to Kaye, within the 
company these discussions are referred to as ‘mini-legislative sessions’.475 Their agendas and minutes are 
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publicized.476 By contrast, the sessions themselves are secret. By juxtaposing mini-legislative sessions with a 
democratic legislature, it becomes clear that only one of them is accountable to public.  
What the monitoring reports do not explicitly mention is that for the EU, the Code has been highly cost-
effective. Most costs ensuing from the commitments were, to large extent, already internalized by the 
companies. The oversight costs incurred from yearly factsheets, with civil society gathering information, can 
be expected to be modest. This keeps the cost-benefit calculus extremely positive. And to be fair, it is likely 
that the Code indeed helped to curtail some of the rampant hate on platforms. It would be a triumph if only 
utilitarian efficiency and well-meaning outcomes were the sole value at stake. The Code was also later 
complemented by a ‘voluntary’ Communication and a Recommendation.477 In turn, the inscrutable EU Internet 
Forum carried on with solving the problem terrorism. In particular, it has since specialized in facilitating the 
transfer of ‘best practices’, especially filters and other algorithmic technologies.478 
4.2 Directive on Audiovisual Media Services 
The second case study concerns ‘video-sharing platform services’. Commission announced its Proposal for 
amending the Directive 2010/13/EU (herafter in this sub-chapter the Proposal) in May 2016.479 Directive (EU) 
2018/1808 concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (hereafter the Directive)480 came into force 
on 20 November 2018.481 During the writing of this thesis, the period for implementation is still running with 
deadline being 19 September 2020.482 While the Directive has been amended previously, this was the first time 
when these video-sharing platform services were included in its scope. Effectively, the most prominent service 
to be regulated is Google’s YouTube video-sharing platform, but the provisions concern also social networking 
platforms like Facebook and Twitter to the extent these platforms host audiovisual content, that is, video.483 I 
should note that the regulation of television broadcast and on-demand audiovisual services was amended as 
well. These amendments, however, are not the subject of study here. 
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The rationale behind the changes was to ensure a ‘level playing field’ for the providers of different types of 
services in the increasingly converged media markets.484 However, arguably the more important objective 
behind the inclusion of platform video content was the need to strengthen the protection of minors against 
harmful video content and protection against video content that incites violence or discriminatory hatred on 
the platforms.485 Lastly, the Council included the aim to protect also against video which incites terrorism and 
other crimes, which made its way to the final text as well.486 
4.2.1 Violence, Hatred, and Organizational Responsibility  
During preparation, the Commission introduced something that, in my view, is a notable innovation in social 
media regulation: namely the concept of ‘organizational responsibility’. The Impact Assessment notes: ‘Video-
sharing platforms employ tools like Autoplay (switched on by default for all videos in Youtube) which enable 
direct exposure to potentially harmful content and incitement to hatred’.487 Personalization-based autoplay 
features opt for the video that will be played next.488 The role of these ‘tools’ in facilitating harmful content is 
also noted with an illuminating example: 
In 2015, the video of two US journalists being murdered during a live broadcast spread quickly. When 
the video was taken down after 10/15 minutes, it had already been shared 500 times on Facebook. Due 
to the Autoplay feature, many users saw the video unwillingly in their news feed. Since the feature 
debuted on Twitter in June 2015, many people reported that it auto-played all videos, including 
exceptionally violent ones.489 
Therefore, it is implied that organizational responsibility could precisely target the algorithmic personalization 
mechanisms that amplify the effects of violent or otherwise harmful content. In terms of adverts, as we saw in 
Chapter 2.3, the extremely innovative and lucrative advertising tools allow potentially harmful advertisements 
to be targeted precisely to the most amenable audiences. Proposal correctly disentangled harmful content from 
its facilitation by noting that:  
The system would be compatible with the liability exemption for hosting service providers set out in 
Article 14 [of the e-Commerce Directive], in as far as that provision applies in a particular case, 
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because these obligations relate to the responsibilities of the provider in the organizational sphere and 
do not entail liability for any illegal information stored on the platforms as such. 
While regulating amplification of course affects freedom of expression as well, it may better address the 
undeniably thorny issue of how to deal with the proliferating of content which is harmful but may nonetheless 
be legal. The insights of organizational responsibility made their way to the final text in recitals 47 and 48.  
Thus, the central provision concerning video-sharing platform companies is new Article 28b. It requires 
Member States to ensure that video-sharing platform providers take ‘appropriate measures’ to: protect minors 
from paid or user-generated video content which ‘may impair their physical, mental or moral development’; 
protect the public from paid or user-generated video content ‘containing incitement to violence or hatred 
directed against a group of persons or a member of a group based on any of the grounds referred to in Article 
21 of the Charter’; and protect the public from paid or user-generated video content that constitutes a criminal 
offence in relation to terrorism, child pornography or racism and xenophobia. A non-exhaustive list of 
appropriate measures is included in Article 28b(3). However, while the ten-point list exhibits genuine effort to 
carefully define the actions to be taken, they reflect the idea of organizational responsibility, as outlined above, 
only thinly. For instance, under Article 28b(3)(d) the companies could be required to establish and operate 
‘transparent and user-friendly mechanisms for users of a video-sharing platform to report or flag to the video-
sharing platform provider concerned the content referred to in paragraph 1 provided on its platform’. As a free 
expression safeguard, however, all ex ante monitoring including upload filtering was explicitly excluded. Point 
i) describes ‘establishing and operating transparent, easy-to-use and effective procedures for the handling and 
resolution of users' complaints to the video-sharing platform provider in relation to the implementation of the 
measures referred to in points (d) to (h)’, something that could be understood as another (company-enforced) 
free expression safeguard. However, paragraph 7 foresees a possibility for escalation to an impartial out-of-
court redress mechanism, while redress in court remaining available under paragraph 8 as well.  
To be sure, the measures do concern the ‘organisational sphere’. But none foresees interference to the 
algorithmic personalization mechanisms. For instance, it is not stated that Member States could mandate that 
algorithmic features such as YouTube Autoplay would be set off as default, or that some harm-amplifying 
personalization features could be outright banned. However, a notable and positive point is that Member States 
may impose stricter or more detailed measures, as explicitly mentioned in Article 28(b)(6).  
4.2.2 (Un)viability of Co-regulation 
The question on how far the positive obligations are shifted within private companies will be highly contingent 
on what the ‘appropriate measures’ will eventually entail and how the impositions are enforced. In this regard, 
it seems the Directive informs a sort of mix of the two outsourcing techniques I described in Chapter 3.2, as 
Article 28b(4) encourages, though not strictly necessitate, the use of co-regulation in implementing the rules. 
The choice of co-regulation is justified only in recital 49: ‘It is appropriate to involve video-sharing platform 
providers as much as possible when implementing the appropriate measures to be taken pursuant to Directive 
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2010/13/EU. Co-regulation should therefore be encouraged’.490 The relationship with fundamental rights and 
co-regulation was not problematized during the legislative process. Therefore, the principle of non-
applicability of co-regulation in fundamental rights issues seems indeed to bend in the Directive.491 Impact 
Assessment underlined ‘it is possible to identify scope for cost-efficiency also when looking not only at legal 
obligations but also at the possibility to leverage self and co-regulation arrangements’.492  
Besides that co-regulation is plainly cheaper, according to the views collected by the Parliament Research 
Service at the start of the legislative process, it has two claimed benefits in media regulation. As co-regulation 
is supposed to be more adaptive to changes, it does not hinder innovation as much as rigid state regulation.493 
During the public consultation this was especially underlined by the ICT industry. For instance, EDiMA, which 
is perhaps the most prominent lobbying association representing ‘online platforms and other innovative tech 
companies’ in Europe,494 stated that if any regulation is needed at all, ‘[t]he status quo would be complemented 
with self-/co-regulatory measures and other actions (media literacy, awareness-raising)’.495 It stressed that 
during the revision process the EU should focus on two factors:  
To what degree the current AVMSD (and its articulation with the e-commerce Directive) has allowed 
digital innovation to drive the growth of the European creative sector and to empower consumers? To 
what degree extending the AVMS framework to other areas would harm the Internet, digital innovation 
and in turn the European creative sector?496 
According to EDiMA, on platforms traditional media houses and individual cultural workers can engage in 
genuine competition for audiences. This fosters innovation.497 Yet in reality, the competition for platform 
visibility is far from meritocratic but orchestrated by soft content moderation and pervaded by political-
economic interests of anyone that is willing to pay for extra visibility. In addition, we should remember that 
innovation is not a virtue. The autoplay features that algorithmically opt and play videos from the endless 
repertoire of content have likely been breakthrough innovations. Even so, the Commission had now identified 
these same features as problematic examples of hate amplification.  
The other justification for preferring self- and co-regulation is the empowerment of media users instead of 
state ‘paternalism’.498 Indeed, EDiMA’s position hailed the liberating potential of the video-sharing and social 
media platforms. It declares that ‘[d]iscoverability of content has never been so easy, and put to such use. It 
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has never been easier for AVMS providers to make their content discoverable and there exists a plethora of 
new tools, consumer personalisation technology and social recommendations’.499 However, as we saw in 
Chapter 2.3 and 3.5.2, this paints a partial picture, as user choices and other online behavior feed into platform’s 
algorithmic workings, nudging users and making it impossible to disentangle the effects that their choices have 
on information organization from the effects of other factors. 
As we explored in Chapter 3, co-regulation that can strike some sort of balance between fundamental rights 
and flexibility/efficiency requires a robust public monitoring and enforcement system. In this regard, Article 
4a(1)(c–d) of the Directive prescribes somewhat reassuringly ‘regular, transparent and independent monitoring 
and evaluation of the achievement of the objectives aimed at’ and  ‘effective enforcement including effective 
and proportionate sanctions’. But as I argued, robust enforcement adds to the transaction costs which strain 
utilitarian cost-benefit calculus. Indeed, it is expected that the co-regulatory oversight of video-sharing 
platforms under the new Directive will be a significant burden for public regulators.500  
In addition, the level of opaqueness of the media regulator also affects how undemocratic a co-regulatory 
model ends up being. Independence of media and its governance have always been considered important for 
freedom of expression, but now the Directive further reinforced the independence requirements of Member 
State regulators in Article 30. Arguably, developments in certain Member States, Hungary’s controversial 
Media Act adopted in 2011 as an example, might have played some role here.501 Even so, inscrutable private 
control over media is not necessarily better or more democratic.  
Article 28a(1) also reinforces the so-called ‘country of origin principle’ which determines the jurisdiction 
between Member States. For most video-sharing service providers, this practically means that they fall under 
the jurisdiction of Ireland where they established their main establishment in Europe.502 Therefore, ‘it could 
be said that preparatory work on the implementation of Article 28b of the Directive [on appropriate measures] 
appears almost redundant outside Ireland’.503 This is why it’s reasonable have a look into the implementation 
plans even though the scope of this thesis is generally delineated to remain on the European level. As regards 
audiovisual content on social media platforms in the whole Europe, the country of origin principle effectively 
shifts the site for cooperation and contest to one Member State.504 There may be good justifications for 
reinforcing the principle. Yet in my view, it places excessive responsibility over the implementation of 
regulatory and administrative framework to a single regulator. Of course, concentrating regulation enforcement 
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on the largest platforms to Ireland is nothing new. The GDPR enforcement against these same companies has 
ended up on the shoulders of the Irish Data Protection Commission as well.505 
Again, the cards for Europeans’ fundamental rights on platforms are set in Ireland’s hand. Cappello notes that 
in practice, ‘jurisdiction over the same overall service (content on a video-sharing platform) will sometimes 
be shared: Ireland will be responsible for the platform and the relevant member state for the content played 
through it’.506 Also the new out-of-court complaint mechanisms will be regulated under Irish law.507 In my 
view, this is problematic from the viewpoint of public accountability. The expressions should not be thought 
in isolation of the medium, i.e. platform itself, because algorithmic soft moderation sets the terms of for 
content’s visibility. Moreover, the debates and harms on social media ‘spill over’ to affect the overall 
democratic deliberation in that society. The organization of content greatly influences the harm it may cause. 
In addition, jurisdictional concentration makes it harder for people to challenge the terms of algorithmic 
intermediation, impairing the horizontal effect of their rights.   
4.2.3 Irish Online Safety & Media Regulation Bill 
In early 2019, Richard Bruton, Minister for Communications in Ireland, made a keynote speech regarding the 
implementation of the Directive, where he declared that,  
The situation at present where online and social media companies are not subject to any oversight or 
regulation by the state for the content which is shared on their platforms is no longer sustainable. I 
believe that the era of self-regulation in this area is over and a new Online Safety Act is necessary.508 
Thus, a ‘[r]egulator, an Online Safety Commissioner, would oversee the new system’.509 Afterwards, a public 
consultation took place which sought to gather stakeholder views on how the specific co-regulatory framework 
prescribed in the Directive should be set up in Ireland.510 Naturally, the major platform companies Google 
Ireland and Facebook Ireland put forward their views as well. Their contributions provide important insights 
of the specific challenges the Irish administrative framework will be facing in implementing co-regulation. 
Companies are invoking both the narratives of cooperation and contest. Facebook hails the achievements of 
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its hard content moderation apparatus and underlines its long, 15 years of experience on addressing harmful 
content.511 It heavily underlines the effectiveness and efficiency of cooperation. For instance,  
The future regulator should also implement a flexible and responsive rapport with VSPS, developing 
a working relationship that jointly seeks to protect internet users from harmful content while also 
ensuring that the ability to innovate is preserved and service providers are able to adopt the best 
solutions to these issues.512 
However, it is not considered that perhaps the best solutions are not ex post hard content moderation measures, 
but ones that target the root causes that make the harm to proliferate in the first place. This would require 
scrutinizing the platform code and algorithms instead of focusing solely on ‘clear definitions on illegal content’ 
as Facebook suggests.513 Unsurprisingly, the company stays silent on its platform mechanisms. Nor it ponders 
whether it would be the job of the state instead of Facebook to decide the ‘best solutions’ to fulfill positive 
obligations. 
In turn, Google Ireland took a more challenging stance. While it similarly self-congratulates its hard content 
moderation, it also implies that effectively any regulatory interference that goes beyond the notice-and-
takedown model of the e-Commerce Directive could implicate freedom of expression and hamper innovation. 
To be sure, Google states the general preference for cooperation and even suggests a new multistakeholder 
forum to be set up for cooperative monitoring.514 But on the one hand, the main insistence is that, 
In particular, we would highlight the need for national legislation to reflect the ‘notice and takedown’ 
procedures specifically envisaged by the E-Commerce Directive (…); this system strikes a careful 
balance between the interests of persons affected by unlawful information, ISSPs and internet users.515 
Conveniently for Google, the e-Commerce Directive is totally blind for soft moderation by regarding platforms 
as completely neutral hosts. Google also demands transparency from the government regulator to guarantee 
that its intrusions are proportionate.516 In sum, ‘governments should take a flexible, collaborative approach that 
supports best practices, and promotes research and innovation’ with the main role of the regulator again limited 
to providing clear definitions for unlawful content.517 Taken together, all these suggestions denote a 
comprehensive obfuscation of the Directive mandates to water down organizational responsibility. This 
underlines how this concept, like a systemic duty of care, allows myriad interpretations depending on the 
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interests at stake. The company views are entirely in line with free expression management that seeks 
expressive and innovative immunities against interference to platform mechanisms. 
On 10 January 2020, Draft Scheme of New Online Safety Law was publicized. According to the Minister: 
‘This new law is one of the first of its kind in the world and is breaking new ground in terms of how online 
services will be required to deal with harmful content’.518 It would foresee a new Online Safety Commissioner 
under the new Media Commission as the regulator who would draft binding ‘online safety codes’ and oversee 
their enforcement. The appropriate measures would eventually be prescribed in the codes and would address 
the types of harmful content prescribed in the AVMS Directive.519  
Online safety codes and even more precise ‘guidance materials’ would be used to provide the specific 
definitions of content types for platform companies, taking into account users’ fundamental rights.520 
According to Head 50A of the draft scheme, the online safety codes are drafted by the regulator, with 
consultations of stakeholders, but not in a multistakeholder forum. They may prescribe measures regarding 
‘content delivery and content moderation’.521 In addition, the Commissioner may appoint authorized officers 
to audit the companies. Under Head 15B, these officers would be vested with rather sweeping investigative 
powers resembling those of competition authorities.522 The regulator could ‘audit any user complaints and 
issues handling systems operated by designated online services and to direct a designated online service to 
take specified actions, including to remove or restore individual pieces of content and to make changes to the 
operation of their systems’.523 As regards sanctions, while the early comments highlighted their stringency,524 
in reality, the big enforcement toolbox seems to prefer informal ‘compliance and warning notices’ and 
bargaining-style ‘voluntary arrangement’ negotiations over more coercive financial sanctions and blocking of 
service in Ireland. At least some of the negotiations, however, are stated to be public.525  
Lastly, the enforcement includes the power to devise and operate so-called ‘super complaints’. This is where 
‘nominated bodies’, for instance NGOs and other Member State regulators could bring systemic issues they 
have identified on a platform to the attention of the Irish regulator for possible action.526 The super complaint 
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mechanism is meant to facilitate the cooperation between Member State regulators foreseen in the Directive 
and could thus offer a channel for other Member States to influence the regulation of the biggest platforms.  
On paper, it may be that the Irish draft scheme takes positive obligations seriously by relying on binding and 
robust regulation and bringing in much-needed public responsibility for the protection of rights. However, 
much remains to be seen. A compromise would be contingent on the funding and actual regulatory practices 
of the Commissioner regulator and at this point one cannot rule out the occurrence of an administrative crisis 
similar to one troubling the GDPR enforcement. The lingering issues on how to understand and regulate 
complex code and algorithms effectively are hard to tackle. In addition, as an access point to company contest, 
under Article 28b(3) all imposed measures ‘shall be practicable and proportionate’. According to Cappello, 
the requirement practically means that company challenge against too incursive regulatory efforts is likely.527 
One could expect the fiercest contest to be mounted against measures that target automated platform 
mechanisms. Indeed, Google had already reminded that companies should be able to challenge all measures 
in court, possibly resulting in years-long battles that are indeed cost-intensive for regulators. In line with free 
expression management, ‘[c]ompanies should be able to bring evidence before a neutral arbiter to contest 
findings of systemic failure [of obligations] and raise countervailing considerations, such as respect for 
international human rights’.528 Again, the alternative narrative here is that the obligations may need to be 
imposed precisely because the state has to fulfill its human rights obligations.  
Even so, at least the draft administrative framework has the potential to subject both hard and soft moderation 
to some public control, even though the efficiency/democracy trade-off is of course part of the package. As 
noted in Chapter 3.3 and 3.4, the oversight mechanisms may themselves be opaque and unaccountable to the 
public, in this case especially to other European citizens which are lacking regulatory capabilities to influence 
regulation platforms which, of course, affect them too. Yet, the framework with broad administrative powers 
may still serve as a site for innovative development of another kind of ‘best practices’, that is, novel ways for 
more democratic fundamental rights protection against platform power and business model.        
4.3 Regulation on Preventing Terrorist Content Online 
The third and most recent case study is the Proposal of a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online (hereafter terrorist content regulation or in 
this sub-chapter, the Proposal).529 The Proposal aims to prevent the dissemination of terrorist content on the 
platforms.530 The Commission announced the proposal on 12 September 2018 and the Council and the 
European Parliament both proposed amendments to it on 3 December 2018 and 17 April 2019 respectively, 
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with the Parliament’s amendments constituting major revisions to the original text.531 At the time of writing 
this thesis, the legislative process is still under way at the closed trilogue negotiations phase.532 Since the final 
text of the regulation is still debated, my case study focuses on the initial Commission proposal but also 
analyzes the relevant amendments made by the Council and the Parliament. 
4.3.1 EU’s Attempt of Fiat Interdiction 
Of all the three cases examined in this chapter, terrorist content regulation follows the logics of fiat interdiction 
to the furthest. Already the choice of instrument, an EU regulation that is directly applicable without Member 
State implementation, to some extent reflects high priority. While the Commission states a regulation to be the 
most appropriate instrument for the functioning Digital Single Market, clarity, and legal certainty,533 it also 
justifies the choice by the extraordinary threat that terrorist content creates for security in Europe. 
Extraordinary threats cannot be tackled by soft means only. Thus, the explanatory memorandum, after lauding 
the EU Internet Forum, takes note of the ‘limitations’ of cooperation.534 In effect, for the Commission, these 
limitations mean friction in the form of insufficient amount of removed content. The impact assessment admits 
the underlying logic of fiat interdiction more candidly. It acknowledges that the cooperative strategy has 
delivered promising results in removing terrorist content.535 However: 
Taking into account the particular need and urgency to prevent the dissemination of terrorist content 
online, there is a corresponding need to put in place measures which capture the most harmful content 
and are particularly effective.536  
In addition, ‘the limited level of progress when compared to the scale of the problem, developments and the 
need to significantly reduce accessibility to terrorist content as a matter of urgency reveal the limits of the 
voluntary approach’.537 To achieve full compliance by big and small platform companies alike, all the retained 
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options in the proposal are legally binding.538 The proposal also reminds of the ‘particular serious consequences 
of certain terrorist content’.539  
The perceived threat is ultimately rooted in the terrorist attacks occurred in Europe in the last two decades.540 
However, the Commission attributes the exceptional gravity also to the unprecedentedly fast spreading of 
terrorist content on platforms. Given the lament over virality, it’s first seems strange that the Commission does 
not reiterate the notion of organizational responsibility. Yet the reason for rejecting direct interventions to 
platform mechanisms is the seductive efficiency of platform moderation. Too direct attempts against 
companies’ business would risk fruitful cooperation in the future. Indeed, despite preference to unilateral 
interdictions, the Commission also acknowledges that cooperation with the industry is still needed. Impact 
assessment reminds that ‘action by Member States alone to refer or block material, will always fall short 
considering it is the companies who are best placed to know which technology can be applied and how in order 
to ensure a safe online environment for their users’.541 
The need for maximal efficiency explains the focus on terrorist content, not its facilitation. The Commission 
adopts the narrative of system-abuse and sets out how viciously terrorists exploit the platform mechanisms 
intended for facilitating free expression and information.542 In turn, the companies play their victim role well. 
During the consultations, companies expressed how terrorist content hampers their business and damages 
reputation.543 Therefore, like the previous case studies, the proposal ends up mixing both cooperation and 
contest.   
4.3.2 Removal Orders by Competent Authorities 
Fiat interdiction is also visible in the measures proposed. Firstly, the Proposal mandates each member state to 
designate a ‘competent authority’, which is given power to scour the platforms for potentially terrorist material 
and to assess whether this content falls within the definition of terrorist content.544 Thus, the task of the 
competent public authority is essentially to determine the precarious line between the content that is protected 
by freedom of expression and the content that is terrorist and may then be justifiably taken down. Where the 
competent authority deems content terrorist, according to Article 4(1) of the proposal, it has the power to issue 
a removal order to the platform company, after which the company takes the content down. According to 
 
538 SWD (2018) 408 final, 25. It should be noted that, according to Article 2(1), the proposal applies to all ‘hosting 
service providers’ and not only the biggest social media platforms to which this thesis is largely limited. For the sake of 
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Article 4(2), the company must execute the order within one hour from the receipt of the order and this timeline 
may be extended only in narrowly defined exceptions stated in Article 4(7–8). 
The introduction of removal orders was received with heavy criticism. Together with the wide definition of 
terrorist content laid down in Article 2(5), the orders were thought to lead to government overreach and over-
removals. The one-hour timeline was seen unreasonable especially for smaller platform companies.545 The 
criticism is not unfounded. As it becomes clear from the Impact Assessment, the aim of the Proposal was to 
provide the broadest possible mandate for the competent authorities so that potentially terrorist content could 
be removed as much as possible. Among of the policy options considered, the Commission chose the one with 
the broadest definition for terrorist content and the broadest obligations for removal, even though the same 
option was also acknowledged to be the most notorious for people’s rights. The one-hour timeframe and 
narrowly defined exceptions of non-compliance seek to institute removal orders as a mechanism that forecloses 
any secondary assessment by the platform companies.546 In line with fiat interdiction, the additional regulatory 
burden of such a unilateral enforcement is no issue for the Commission either, as the benefits for the vital cause 
of counter-terrorism would be so significant as well.547 
However, despite draconian competences provided for authorities, the removal order mechanism is actually 
the most accountable part of the whole Proposal. The commentators welcomed the use of binding law for 
online regulation as well.548 Indeed, the Commission noted that to challenge removal orders, judicial redress, 
as an important safeguard, would be available for the affected users and the platform companies alike.549 Also 
the Impact Assessment recognized that, ‘[r]egarding removal orders, the main responsibility of assessing the 
content and ordering the removal stays with the competent authority, which would have to undertake a 
thorough check of the content and be subject to legal controls before the issuing of the order justifying the one 
hour removal time for this measure’.550 
Against this backdrop, it is peculiar, that no mention of judicial redress has made its way in the actual articles 
of the Proposal but only in recital 8. Be as it may, the Parliament took note of this uncertainty by adding a new 
Article 9a on effective remedies in its own version. This does not, however, mention judicial redress 
specifically but mandates Member States only to ‘put in place effective procedures for exercising this right’. 
Given the relatively low interest in an isolated case of removed content against the heaviness of full-blown 
judicial process, the vague terminology could allow fruitful exploration of middle ground between efficiency 
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and procedural fairness. As Kuczerawy summarizes: ‘The effectiveness of the remedy is questionable if it 
takes one hour to remove content, but months or years to put it back online’.551 Ideally, Member States could 
develop new publicly controlled redress mechanisms that could be efficient enough but provide also better 
impartiality and public accountability. In these redress mechanisms, users could at least in principle assert their 
rights horizontally against companies too. In this regard, it is somewhat discouraging, however, that during the 
public consultations, Member States wanted to express their special concerns that creating dispute resolution 
and oversight mechanisms would be burdensome and cost-intensive.552  
In addition, the Parliament makes some other amendments to the Proposal that may be said to add some 
robustness to safeguards. They mitigate the most draconian aspects of removal order mechanism. Firstly, it 
narrowed down the definition of terrorist content. For instance, the Parliament’s version institutes a blanket 
exclusion to content that is disseminated for ‘educational, artistic, journalistic or research purposes’ in new 
Article 2(2a). The Commission regretted this exception as ‘creating a potential loophole’ for terrorists.553 
Secondly, in new Article 2(9a), it redefined the competent authority to denote ‘a single designated judicial 
authority or functionally independent administrative authority’. This seems to answer the calls for increased 
independency of the designated authority from law enforcement.554 Thirdly, the Parliament introduced a 
separate Article 8a on certain transparency requirements for competent authorities, while the original Proposal 
introduced obligations only on platform companies. However, the one-hour time to comply with orders under 
Article 4(2) persisted. Even so, despite some lingering overreach concerns, from the perspective of this thesis, 
the Parliament’s version seems to at least have the potential to tame the undemocratic excesses of fiat 
interdiction. 
4.3.3 Referrals to Platform Companies 
The second measure of a new mandated referral mechanism, in turn, is deeply entrenched in managerial 
cooperation. As mentioned, the Commission stressed the need to continue and intensify cooperation on the 
side of any unilateral power assertions. Consequently, Article 5(1–2) of the Proposal states that  
‘[t]he competent authority or the relevant Union body may send a referral to a hosting service provider. 
Hosting service providers shall put in place operational and technical measures facilitating the 
expeditious assessment of content that has been sent by competent authorities and, where applicable, 
relevant Union bodies for their voluntary consideration’.  
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Fundamental Rights’ (12 February 2019) FRA Opinion 2/2019, 7–8; Special Rapporteurs (n 546) 13. 
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Article 5(5) further stipulates the instruction for the company assessment: ‘The hosting service provider shall, 
as a matter of priority, assess the content identified in the referral against its own terms and conditions and 
decide whether to remove that content or to disable access to it’. The model for the referral system comes from 
the Europol Internet Referral Unit (hereafter EU IRU). EU IRU was established in 2015 to search for 
potentially terrorist content on platforms and refer its findings to companies,555 thus implying that the content 
should be taken down as a violation of community standards. It has been operating ever since. According to 
Vieth, the unit is part of ‘the emerging constellation of public and private actors cooperating to regulate 
expression online in the name of counter-terrorism’.556 Recital 15 of the Proposal clarifies that the relevant 
Union body issuing referrals would be Europol. Since 23 Member States do not have referral units of their 
own,557 newly founded units would significantly contribute to the institutionalization of the model.  
As the final decision upon removal of referred content would be made by the platform company, finding the 
fair balance between free expression and counter-terrorism would be transferred to platform companies. 
Moreover, the content subject to referrals is arguably going to be at the margins of legal if it does not fall under 
the more efficient removal order mechanism. Of course, officially the company is only interpreting its own 
community standards, not any binding fundamental rights instrument. But it is hard to deny this de facto, 
especially since the circumspect general ‘duty of care’ for platform companies in Article 3 stipulates that in 
complying with the regulation, companies shall ensure the fulfillment of the fundamental rights of the users 
and ‘take into account the fundamental importance of the freedom of expression and information in an open 
and democratic society’.  
So, who would be the companies’ adjudicators, the real people making the decisions upon referrals? The 
Impact Assessment seems to anticipate extra costs for platform companies that would incur from the hired 
experts required for the more in-depth assessment of referrals.558 However, the Proposal text does not impose 
any detailed requirements on the assessment of referrals, except that, according to recital 33, the handling 
process must be fast.559 The Impact Assessment points out that ‘[s]ome of the costs [for the companies] are 
assumed to be absorbed in moderation functions already in place for other types of content’.560 This 
conveniently leaves the door open for double outsourcing of referral assessment, transferring the positive 
obligations further down the regulatory chain. 
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The motivations of this state action laundering are twofold, as set out in Chapter 3.2. First, security policy 
could potentially be pushed beyond traditional constitutional limits. The Impact Assessment admits that 
referrals are not strictly limited to illegal content and they cannot be challenged in court as they are not legally 
binding.561 Earlier, in the context of EU IRU the advocacy was more open. The EU Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator pointed out to Member States that,  
Consideration should be given to a role for Europol in either flagging or facilitating the flagging of 
content which breaches the platforms’ own terms and conditions. These often go further than national 
legislation and can therefore help to reduce the amount of radicalising material available online.562 
Secondly, from the perspective of utilitarian cost-efficiency its’s fully sensible to outsource. Removed content 
increases and, by contrast, the costs for Member States are expected to be none.563 Not unrelated to savings in 
costs are savings in effort, as during the public consultations ‘[p]ublic authorities outlined the increasing 
difficulty to judge which content is harmful or illegal and which is not’.564 Judged against this, it is rather 
unsurprising that the specific freedom of expression safeguards in relation referrals are outsourced to 
companies as well. The incumbent Article 10 is an emblematic act of outsourcing, including a highly open-
ended mandate for the platform companies to devise ‘effective and accessible mechanisms’ for redress against 
referral-based removals. A lot will be left hanging from the vigilance (and resources) of the competent 
authorities who are tasked with general overseeing of complaint mechanisms. Moreover, the two-lane redress 
mechanism underlines the arbitrariness of public/private divide here. While from the perspective of user, it is 
irrelevant whether content is removed based on an order or a company decision after a referral, the user has 
the access to public review only where the content has been removed under a (legally binding) removal order. 
The interconnection between outsourcing and free expression management becomes clear with the referral 
mechanism, as discretionary power granted for platform companies affords access points for their contest. In 
the case of EU IRU, the compliance ratio of referrals has varied between 89% in Q4 2017 to 63% in Q2 2018,565 
but on average the referred content has been removed in 86% of the cases.566 This rate is intended to remain 
high and execution easy because of ‘high quality’ preliminary assessments made by the competent 
authorities.567 Thus, there must be a difference between standards,568 or at least some secondary assessment, to 
explain the gap. The power to decide allows companies to pick cases for challenge by refusing removal and 
then publicizing them as anecdotal examples of valiant opposition in their transparency reports. Aggregated 
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figures of referral outcomes for monitoring are mandated in Article 8. The removal ratio of EU IRU alone 
should, however, reveal how much faith people could put in platform companies for their rights protection. 
According to the Commission, it has been between 96 and 100% for Facebook, YouTube, Microsoft and 
Twitter.569 In effect, the referral mechanism is an example of bargaining enforcement. As Keller and Leerssen 
note, referrals are about ‘convincing platforms to adopt law enforcement agents’ interpretation’.570 At the same 
time, ‘[b]oth assessment processes are obscure and completely inscrutable’.571 
The Parliament removed the referral mechanism entirely in its own version, which the Commission noted with 
regret, as ‘the deletion undermines the functioning of an effective cooperation tool between providers, the 
Member States and Europol’.572 One could therefore assume the referrals to be one of the most contested part 
of the ongoing trilogue negotiations. The Commission receives backing from the Council, which seemed to be 
all in for broadening the referral system, making only minor adjustments to the mechanism in its own 
version.573 It remains to be seen whether the Parliament holds to the end, however, as possible sign of 
compromise, it added a new recital 27a recognizing that ‘[r]eferrals by Europol constitute an effective and 
swift means of making hosting service providers aware of specific content on their services’. According to the 
recital, no changes are intended to be made to Europol’s referral mandate under Regulation (EU) 2016/794.574 
4.3.4 Companies’ Proactive/Specific Measures 
The third important measure for tacking dissemination of terrorism in the Proposal is the obligation to take 
proactive measures to protect platforms against terrorist content, as stipulated in Article 6. The competent 
authority may first request a platform company to take proactive measures, meaning actions that exceed mere 
reactionary measures taken after the company has been informed on the terrorist content. The measures should 
prevent the re-upload of content that had been already removed as terrorist, but also detect, identify and remove 
new content.575 If the platform company does not cooperate or the competent authority deems the taken 
measures insufficient, according to Article 6(3) it may first issue another request for additional proactivity. It 
seems that as a baseline, the companies are again expected to innovate the measures themselves. If cooperation 
doesn’t work, according to Article 6(4), the competent authority may impose a unilateral decision on the 
company, specifying the additional measures on behalf of the company. In the Council’s version the competent 
authority’s power to decide upon the nature and scope of measures under Article 6(4) was reinforced.576 
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Article 6(1–2) is probably meant to be read in conjunction with the systemic duty of care in Article 3, but what 
the Commission has especially in mind with proactive measures is couched in the technologically neutral term 
of ‘automated tools’. In practice, these can be re-upload filters, upload filters, and algorithmic detection tools 
among others (and who knows what else in the future). In the Commission’s vision, these could take the 
efficiency of content removals to a whole different level. The preparatory materials show how the efficiency 
of biggest companies’ technology holds the Commission in thrall. Automation is unmatched in speed and the 
volumes of removed content immense. The Commission notes that ‘some companies using automated 
detection claim that content can be identified within a matter of minutes or less’.577 Experiences from the UK 
are also referenced. For instance, it is noted that tests have shown that a tool developed by a company named 
ASI Data Science can ‘automatically detect 94% of Daesh propaganda with 99.995% accuracy’.578 The 
conclusion is that, despite some lingering concerns, machine learning and artificial intelligence are becoming 
more and more promising.579 Indeed, long regulatory chains are possible here. The Commission even envisions 
that a whole new market could be created for companies like ASI Data Science, who could develop solutions 
for platform companies to detect and filter terrorist content amongst legal content.580  
Accuracy is crucial so that no lawful expressions are removed erroneously (false positives), and no illegal 
terrorist content is left on platforms (false negatives). All the high accuracy claims imply that some sort of 
sweet spot, an ideal fair balance is attainable and has almost been found between terrorist content and other 
lawful expressions. According to the Commission and the companies, it is becoming closer all the time.581 But 
against whose interpretation is 94% of Daesh propaganda detected with 99.995% accuracy? It is plainly 
acknowledged that ‘no data is available on the parameters under which a piece of content is considered to be 
terrorist material’.582 At the development stage there are people interpreting, i.e. making sense of all these fluid 
concepts: Daesh propaganda, terrorist content (definition in Article 2 of the Proposal), journalistic speech and 
so on. How can people scrutinize and influence these underlying interpretations that can be at the end of the 
regulatory chain? Of course, there is no 100% to be reached as new situations in life force people, courts, 
authorities, legislators and others to continuous re-interpretation, leading to development that reformulates 
these concepts, including the reformulation of rights. How is this development in life considered and how the 
fair balance developed? The Commission notes indifferently that retraining of tools by someone is needed so 
that new patterns in terrorist content would be recognized. It stresses that efficiency must be maintained.583  
To be sure, the Proposal includes safeguards here too. Firstly, under Article 3 the platform companies naturally 
have again a general obligation to guarantee users’ freedom of expression, when they fulfill their obligations. 
This makes the tools definitively ‘balancing technologies’ I addressed in Chapter 3.3. The more specific 
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safeguards are found in Article 8, 9 and 10. Under Article 9, the most important safeguard is ‘human oversight 
and verifications’, especially in cases where ‘a detailed assessment of the relevant context is required in order 
to determine whether or not the content is to be considered terrorist content’. The provision conveniently allows 
further outsourcing to sub-contractors, as no further specifications is set for this human review requirement. 
Secondly, the importance of ‘human in the loop’ is underlined.584 It is a final touch of human interpretation 
and empathy that supposedly can make the configuration imperfectly perfect. Unfortunately, there is little 
consideration on how ‘human review’ could be subjected to robust democratic oversight or how the so-called 
‘automation bias’, humans’ propensity for quasi-automated rubber-stamping of fully automated suggestions, 
could be countered.585 
Article 15(1) and 17(1)(c) mandate Member States to coordinate and oversee the implementation of proactive 
by companies. Thus, in principle this could secure some control by the competent authorities, but in practice, 
the amount of oversight remains unclear. If a user’s content is removed as a result of proactive measures, the 
user must seek redress from the online complaint mechanism managed by the platform company. Pointedly, it 
seems that the user is not explicitly entitled to challenge a proactive measure in abstracto, but only the removal 
of a piece of content. For the companies, however, under Article 6(5) they can indeed revoke the authority’s 
request on proactive measures, where the authority needs to conduct a secondary review on its request. If it 
then issues a unilateral order, it is legally binding on the company and, thus, challengeable in court. 
The Parliament considerably softened the obligations of Article 6. It renamed activities under Article 6 as 
‘specific measures’ so that the terminology would appear less controversial against the prohibition of general 
monitoring obligation established in Article 15 of the e-Commerce Directive.586 The deployment of automated 
tools was narrowed down with more precision on the technologies used, and the new specific measures are 
meant as voluntary. The new Article 6(1) stipulates only that the companies may adopt specific measures, and 
naturally, with full regard to freedom of expression. Thus, the amended article is not so much a mandate but 
rather a competence to be used or left unused by the companies. In practice, objectively it may be impossible 
to determine which measures have been requested by authorities and which are genuinely implemented by 
companies’ own initiative. Yet little indication is given on what the measures would entail, although, recital 
16 is added with a list that they ‘may include regular reporting to the competent authorities, increase of human 
resources dealing with measures to protect the services against public dissemination of terrorist content, and 
exchange of best practices’.587 
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Under the amended Article 6(4), competent authority can only request additional specific measures where the 
amount of removal orders indicates that the platform is not complying. However, the exact legal nature of such 
a ‘request’ is notoriously blurred. Its voluntary nature is ultimately cast into doubt by the fact that the amended 
Article 18(1)(d) foresees penalties applicable only to ‘systematic and persistent breaches of the obligations’ 
by platform companies ‘following a request imposing additional specific proactive measures’.588 Despite the 
apparent benignity of the term, it seems that requests are imbued with some coercive force. Nevertheless, the 
stated preference is clearly on cooperation. However, meaningful free expression protection would require 
scrupulous interrogation hash databases and algorithms, also when relevant technologies are sourced from 
third-party vendors. This is painstaking and possibly expensive.589 
The transparency requirements under Article 8, with only slight modifications by the Parliament, impose 
ongoing reporting mandates of removal figures, amounts of appeal, general information on company actions 
and ‘a meaningful explanation of the functioning of specific measures’. Bargaining enforcement that 
underlines cooperation in compliance is advocated throughout the original Proposal590 and the Parliament only 
enhanced this.591 As the EU-level monitoring on specific measures is to be facilitated by EU Internet Forum 
and coordination by Europol,592 one can justifiably raise concerns whether the cooperative 
monitoring/enforcement will be subject to robust democratic scrutiny. To summarize, it seems that the 
Parliament was somewhat more successful in scrutinizing the more straightforward removal mechanism than 
the cooperative parts of the Proposal. This might inform a presumption by the Parliament that companies’ 
governance is somehow more legitimate and harm-free than public. But such governance, as I highlighted in 
Chapter 3, may be even more undemocratic.  
5. Conclusion: Between Co-optation and Compromise  
We have seen that all three case studies exhibited the hybridity between public and private power, albeit in 
different varieties. The most prominent feature of the emerging legislative and administrative framework is 
the interdependency between platform companies and public regulators. Although, the proposal on terrorist 
content is clearly the most unilateral regulatory attempt of the EU, while the code of conduct on hate speech 
involves the companies to the furthest. Even so, the Code included a role for the Commission too. But in all 
case studies the role of public regulators is more ancillary. In turn, the companies are largely taking the 
responsibility for positive free expression and related obligations on social media, thus thoroughly merging 
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private and public interests and correspondingly collapsing the border of between public and private, as 
foreseen by Black in her theory of decentred regulation and observed in rights context by Laidlaw.  
In this chapter, I first reflect the emerging framework against the ECtHR jurisprudence. Secondly, I draw 
together the arguments and reflect on the effects the framework may have for freedom of expression. The final 
sub-chapter is more exploratory as it contains a brief reconstruction exercise by considering what structural 
changes should be regarded to maintain freedom of expression as an avenue for political equality.      
5.1 Regulatory Framework and the ECtHR Jurisprudence 
So, the roles of public regulators and companies in the legislative and administrative framework are changing 
through the interconnected ways of cooperation and contest. We must now see if we can determine whether 
the emerging regulatory framework is an ‘adequate’ one under the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. After all, 
according to the doctrine, the locus of positive obligations is on the state instead of private actors.  
Firstly, it should be noted that the ECtHR jurisprudence that concerns user-generated content does not clearly 
address the issue of private involvement in regulation. For instance, in the most notable case Delfi, the ECtHR 
didn’t scrutinize the privatization of platform monitoring.593 The case was only about the liability of platform 
over content.594 It was not considered whether in some cases the monitoring measures of service providers 
would actually require something more from the state’s part than just ex post imposition of damages. Similarly, 
other notable cases, including MTE v Hungary, revolved around the question of service provider’s liability 
over potentially illegal content.595 In those cases, there was no more interference needed from the state’s part.596  
Moreover, in line with its generally positive stance toward the relationship between the Internet and free 
expression,597 the ECtHR has tended to underline the positive impact of platforms for free expression. For 
instance, both YouTube598 and Instagram599 have received praise from the ECtHR as important means of 
exercising the freedom to receive and impart information. It has even accepted that ‘YouTube is a unique 
platform on account of its characteristics, its accessibility and above all its potential impact, and that no 
alternatives were available to the applicants’.600 While in Delfi it was accepted that the novel threats of the 
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Internet do not flow only from the content but also from facilitation,601 the ECtHR has not so far delved deeper 
to scrutinize the platform mechanisms to forge a link between harm amplification and soft content moderation. 
However, in other contexts, the ECtHR has reflected the role of private activity for the public interest. In 
Appleby, the ECtHR noted there could be situations where a completely privatized public sphere would bar 
‘any effective exercise of freedom of expression or it can be said that the essence of the right has been 
destroyed’. In those situations, the positive obligation of the state to ‘protect the enjoyment of the Convention 
rights by regulating property rights’ could be triggered.602 The case concerned a private shopping center where 
the applicants had been prevented from expressing political views. In that case, the ECtHR noted that the 
applicants had had several other means and accessible places for expression. Thus, the positive obligation was 
not triggered.603 However, shopping centers are, of course, spatially very limited.604 One could claim that the 
scope of privately controlled platform networks is something different. This is also highlighted by the 
statement that YouTube lacks viable alternatives for expression.  
While it is not certain what the positive obligation anchored in Appleby reasoning would now require, it implies 
that the regulation mandate of the state would contain a ‘must-carry’ requirement: people must be allowed to 
express their views on platforms.605 Indeed, the ECtHR has often linked positive obligations of free expression 
to the public need to guarantee pluralism in media sector.606 It has quite firmly stated that ‘the State is the 
ultimate guarantor of pluralism’.607 It’s unclear, however, whether and how the pluralism argument translates 
to the platform context to justify the deeply needed state interference platform mechanisms. Although, the 
disproportionate amplification of harm with downplaying of other voices could be addressed in terms of 
pluralism.608 
The ECtHR has also considered situations where certain activities of public importance have been delegated 
to private actors. As regards privatized schools and psychiatric treatment, the ECtHR noted ‘that the State 
cannot absolve itself from responsibility by delegating its obligations to private bodies or individuals’.609 In 
case Sychev v Ukraine which considered privatized execution of court judgements, it noted: 
[T]he fact that a State chooses a form of delegation in which some of its powers are exercised by 
another body cannot be decisive for the question of State responsibility ratione personae. In the Court’s 
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view, the exercise of State powers which affects Convention rights and freedoms raises an issue of 
State responsibility regardless of the form in which these powers happen to be exercised.610  
In other words, despite the delegation of State activities to private actors, at least it’s still possible for the 
ECtHR to scrutinize the actions in the light of positive obligations. However, from case-law it becomes equally 
plain that the privatization of State functions is not a breach per se.611 More specifically, the Court has required 
legislative and administrative preventative measures to be in place for maintaining adequate level of 
protection.612 But the question of the adequacy of the framework in our context remains unanswered. 
Finally, possible restrictions on freedom of expression through self-/co-regulatory codes of conduct and open-
ended provisions, and thus the framework more generally, could be challenged based on the ECtHR’s case-
law on rule of law, or more precisely on the requirement of qualitative legality.613 Under article 10(2) of the 
ECHR, restrictions must be ‘provided by law’, which requires that there is a sufficient legal basis.614 In theory, 
all the regulatory instruments in our three case studies could struggle with this requirement either because there 
is no law or it’s unprecise. In practice, it remains to be seen whether this branch of ECtHR jurisprudence will 
mandate changes in the context of social media.  
In sum, so far it remains unclear to what extent state can outsource power and responsibility. In our context, 
we should also remember the challenges of scale, transnationalism and complexity. After all, a positive 
obligation must consider ‘the choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources’ and it must not 
be ‘interpreted in such a way as to impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities’.615 
Having said that, it appears that the ECtHR case-law imposes some restrictions on unfettered privatization. 
Ultimately, the exact proportion of public and private power in the regulatory framework is to be determined 
in the conflicts over fair balance. The doctrinal elements of the case-law I outlined may provide points of 
friction against the emergence of increasingly obscure and undemocratic management. Friction may 
sometimes result in legal conflicts before the ECtHR, which in turn might eventually produce compromises 
between efficiency and public accountability. While it of course ultimately depends on the European legislators 
to implement any additional safeguards, the ECtHR could at least push them toward the values of public 
accountability and openness through positive obligations. Even so, the pre-requisite conflicts before the 
ECtHR are yet to appear. 
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5.2 Summary and the Threat of Co-optation 
In this thesis I have traced the emerging entanglements of public and private power in freedom of expression 
and related rights protection on social media. I have used a piece of doctrine formulated by the ECtHR in the 
60s to work as a backdrop for changes observed. The responsibility and power over fundamental rights 
protection has traditionally laid on the institutions of liberal democratic state. In addition, I have sought to 
deconstruct utilitarian efficiency as the prime driver for change by revealing and analyzing the 
efficiency/democracy contradiction. 
Firstly, we have seen that, on the one hand, the responsibility/power is increasingly transferred to private 
actors, most notably to a handful of large US-based social media companies, from which it may channeled 
further to form complex regulatory chains. On the other hand, the responsibility/power is transferred to a suite 
of specialized public agencies. At the same time, regulation channels power away from democratic legislatures, 
including also the European Parliament, and also courts. The increasingly privatized, obscure and specialized 
institutional configuration distances power away from the European public of course as well.      
Secondly, we have seen that the new legislative and administrative framework deploys novel regulatory 
techniques that engage the executive branch and private actors in cooperation to protect relevant fundamental 
rights on platforms. Freedom of expression protection becomes a) based on open-ended norms of binding law 
and different self-/co-regulatory codes of conduct; b) heavily reliant on companies’ compliance apparatuses of 
content moderation that are tasked to carry out the ‘field work’ protection under the management of company 
experts; c) quantified to be presented in outcome-based performance reports which provide the basis for public 
oversight; and d) increasingly enforced through different computational algorithms that curate, rank, detect 
and filter information. In addition, e) individual violations are increasingly redressed through online dispute 
resolution mechanisms and f) systemic oversight is provided by administrative agencies vested with broad 
discretionary mandates with some preference for cooperative, ‘bargaining’ enforcement.    
The framework is now leaning towards efficiency. To be sure, the structure could offer more effective ways 
to control user behavior to protect safe public sphere when the EU and Member States are facing the challenges 
of scale, transnationalism and complexity. However, we see that it also squarely fits in the stencil of neoliberal 
governmentality delineated by privatization, utilitarian methods for assessing costs and benefits, procedural 
informality, reliance on vague standards, and mediation by expert professional networks. Of course, it would 
be possible to turn the new framework oriented toward public accountability. We indeed noticed attempts to 
inject these values, for instance, in EDRi’s challenge of EU Internet Forum, in the concept of organizational 
responsibility, and in (some of) the Parliament’s legislative amendments to terrorist content regulation.  
Thirdly, we have seen that the new hybrid framework sets some tension with the traditional doctrine of 
fundamental rights structure which understood the liberal democratic state as the guarantor of fundamental 
rights enjoyment and, at the same time, the interpreter of rights’ meaning. Yet so far, the ECtHR jurisprudence 
is not yet properly developed to meet the challenges of the emerging framework. Given the challenges of scale, 
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transnationalism and complexity, in my view it seems likely that the Strasbourg Court will adapt the old 
doctrine to accommodate the increased private involvement. However, the old doctrine is a potential point of 
friction for structural change, thus affording opportunities to re-orient the framework toward democratic values 
as well. 
But why, after all, does it matter that platform regulation is opaque and undemocratic, if the aim of the 
regulation is to protect fundamental rights, that is, if the aim is simply ‘just’? To answer that we must revert to 
the purpose of fundamental rights structure which is fostering the political character of rights. The power-
centralizing framework may squeeze the political character out of freedom of expression in digital context. 
This happens when democratic institutions and citizens lose their grip on interpreting what freedom of 
expression in the digital environment means. More specifically, the platform companies may co-opt freedom 
of expression on social media. Its protection turns to management. Free expression management is aligned 
with overall wealth-maximizing efficiency and entrenched in the political economy of social media: 
virtuousness of private innovation, individual user empowerment, and disproportionate anxiety over public 
interference. Then freedom of expression falls to irrelevance – to a card like the US First Amendment that 
could be always used by the companies to entrench their information sovereignty.  
Yet co-optation makes it harder to address some very real substantive freedom of expression issues too. It 
becomes considerably harder to claim that private innovation may endanger and not only benefit free 
expression; that free expression should also protect against new systemic harms such as wide-scale 
manipulation and reduction of social cohesion; that freedom of information cannot be reduced to a ‘more is 
better’ maxim; and that threats to free expression may in fact flow directly from the self-serving interests of 
private companies which purport to advance the very same right. It should be explicitly recognized that while 
the platforms have advanced people’s free expression in many ways that are well-known, they can also be 
damaging to not only people’s privacy and other rights, but also to their freedom of expression. It is a twisted 
condition of neoliberal age that freedom of expression issues are perhaps more politicized than in a long time 
but, at the same time, especially small Member States have lost the power to set the overall terms for 
democratic deliberation that is now mediated by these platforms. Small states’ power is limited to putting ex 
post plasters by, for instance, chasing individual perpetrators in collective campaigns of hate and harassment 
while the defunct online systems manipulate their citizens and erode their democracies.  
5.3 Toward Compromise? – Final Remarks 
While my thesis has critiqued the role of social media companies in regulation from the perspective of the 
positive obligations, I don’t propose that we should simply go back to the old. Neither I’m suggesting that 
European regulators should ‘take over’ the activity of content moderation from companies entirely, i.e. that 
private companies should not have positive obligations at all, if that is even possible given the slippery line of 
positive/negative obligations and the interconnectedness of expression and a medium. Also, we should 
remember that the regulation in case studies, despite their numerous managerial traps, contained also potential 
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for political equality. Even so, I haven’t hidden my proposition that the overseeing role of democratic 
institutions in regulation should be significantly stronger to avoid the co-optation of free expression. Thus, 
before wrapping up, I want to tentatively outline some reconstructions for a better compromise between 
efficiency and democracy. I believe these suggestions may also serve to preserve (the old) rule of law to which 
fundamental rights are inextricably linked and, thus, prevent constitutional rot more generally. 
So, firstly I believe I have not left unclear that freedom of expression in the social media age needs 
reformulation. When the idea of rational individual collapses, and there exists far more insidious ways to make 
people’s voice disappear and democracies crumble than just archaic censorship, also the right itself should 
transform to accommodate new harms. Information manipulation should be considered a threat for freedom of 
expression and information. Society’s eroding ability to come together to deliberate and compromise on the 
hard questions of good and bad should be considered a threat for freedom of expression and information. 
Algorithmic discrimination and amplification of harm on platforms should be considered a threat for freedom 
of expression and information. Perhaps these issues are approachable from the perspective of other rights. 
However, it is not that other rights would necessarily be less prone to co-optation than free expression, which 
in my view still has special normative force in Western societies. Thus, it’s a worthy site for contesting power.  
However, ‘the realization of rights is always contingent on enabling institutions’.616 Thus, secondly, with the 
emerging framework that entangles public and private in intricate ways, it is necessary to greatly enhance the 
horizontality of fundamental rights by envisioning new ways for people and communities to assert their rights 
against unprecedented private power. As Cohen states, ‘institutions for recognizing and enforcing fundamental 
rights should work to counterbalance private economic power rather than reinforcing it. Obligations to protect 
fundamental rights must extend – enforceably – to private, for-profit entities if they are to be effective at all’.617 
In particular, the doctrine of horizontal effect should enable cracking open the proprietary and opaque systems 
of algorithmic intermediation. It is clear, as we have seen in this thesis, that private power is facilitated by law, 
which in a hierarchical legal system is ultimately traced back to a constitution. Trade secrecy and IPR would 
not exist constitutional law, that is, without the right to conduct business, right to property, law-enforcing 
institutions and so on. So, mending the undue power imbalances must also be done by constitutional law. This 
is especially true when under neoliberal governmentality the state itself is turning to an image of a company, 
animated by the market logic of efficiency.  
My thesis has focused on the issue of state-mediated horizontality. However, also indirect and direct 
horizontality should be reinforced, an effort that would more precisely focus on the protective potential of 
courts. Yet the realities of information age, to some extent, seem to demand for a shift of fundamental rights 
oversight from courts to more specialized administrative entities (or at least to more specialized courts). But 
in the long run, an institutional reform to the court system should be made so that the relevance of courts in 
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adjudicating the meaning of rights in asymmetrical horizontal relations could be upheld. For instance, 
horizontality should be more firmly linked with the non-domination principle. By focusing on potential power 
abuse, one could interrogate private power that eludes individual awareness. 
Secondly, the EU and Member States should look for new ways to put their increasingly powerful 
administrative agencies under democratic scrutiny as well. Here, I am inspired by Laidlaw, who suggests not 
only an agency for overseeing social media and other gatekeepers from the fundamental rights perspective, but 
also a parliamentary committee that would oversee the operations of this agency.618 In the information age 
characterized by increasing complexity, a workable compromise for democratic accountability may require 
certain specialization from legislators as well. It should be noted that oversight might lead to increased 
localization of platforms too. Yet a pre-condition to the empowerment of Member State institutions is that the 
EU not only channels power away from platform companies, but also that it re-distributes it sufficiently evenly. 
While the concerns over populist authoritarianism are indeed warranted, and EU-level (and even global) 
coordination is obviously needed as well, it is not a fair compromise to centralize all the power to the 
Commission, EU agencies or Ireland either. The undeniable challenge here is that such an exercise would 
require the EU to pay less attention to its internal market roots that underscore efficiency.  
Since I noted that positive obligations are mandates directed also to legislators, I regard my thesis a timely 
one. As the EU lumbers forward with several major initiatives, including the Digital Services Act that is posited 
to refresh social media’s responsibility for content,619 one can expect conflict-ridden years ahead. Companies’ 
lobbying is well under way with Google, Facebook and EDiMA spearheading the efforts to spread the 
presumptive virtuousness of private ordering, algorithmic intermediation, and unencumbered innovation. 
Elsewhere, within the European Parliament there seems to be an explicit intention to have the platform 
businesses scrutinized.620 And of course, the CJEU has not become entirely disempowered either.621 While 
much is at this point uncertain, competition over the sovereignty of information flows is bound to continue. 
What remains to be seen is whether these conflicts will end up in a compromise for the benefit of European 
people. 
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